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Philosophers convinced by Bernard Williams that there is a potential 
psychological conflict between the demands of love and the requirements of morality 
have approached the problem in various ways. The objective of this dissertation is to 
rehearse some of the ways in which contemporary philosophers have attempted to 
resolve the potential conflict with respect to love in some of its various forms and to 
show how each attempt to do so ultimately fails. Then I develop and defend an 
alternative theory of love and its motivations found in the work of Thomas Aquinas. 
The dissertation is devoted to the examination of some of the most compelling 
contemporary approaches to addressing the potential conflict between the goals and 
special relationships which provide our lives with meaning, and the so-called moral 
point of view which is understood to be impersonal and impartial. I attempt to show 
what is compelling about each approach to the problem, but argue that each one 
ultimately fails to resolve the problem satisfactorily. I shall then show how Aquinas’s 
more comprehensive theory of the relation between certain forms of love and 
morality addresses the potential worry by showing how, on his account, the love 
  
characteristic of friendship is at once personal and partial and yet deeply moral. Hence, 
on his account there is no potential conflict between the special relationships which 
provide one’s life with meaning and purpose and the requirements of morality. Love, 
according to Aquinas, in a certain sense grounds morality and provides us with 
normative reasons for promoting the good of certain other persons as part of 
promoting one’s own good and the good in general. In the final chapter I show that 
although the love characteristic of friendship is personal and partial, the highest form 
of love—caritas or the love characteristic of friendship toward God—is at once partial 
insofar as it entails normative reasons for prioritizing certain relationships over others, 
and yet impartial insofar as it entails loving all persons as possessing intrinsic value as 
creatures made in God’s image and loved by God.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
A POTENTIAL CONFLICT BETWEEN LOVE AND MORALITY 
Bernard Williams has raised a substantive worry concerning potentially 
conflicting motivations of the moral agent between the impartial and impersonal 
character of the moral motivations provided by both Kantian and consequentialist 
moral theories, and the partial and particular concerns which provide structure and 
meaning to the agent’s life. He characterizes the problem as follows: 
The deeply disparate character of moral and non-moral motivation, 
together with the special dignity or supremacy attached to the moral, 
make it very difficult to assign to those other relations and motivations 
the significance or structural importance in life which some of them are 
capable of possessing.1 
This worry is particularly problematic when it comes to determining what sort of 
priority the agent should assign to the significant love relationships in her life: “Once 
morality is there, and also personal relations to be taken seriously, so is the possibility 
of conflict.”2 Both Kantian and consequentialist moral theories face difficult if not 
insurmountable challenges in attempting to reconcile this potential conflict between 
morality, which is characterized as impartial and impersonal, and loving relationships 
between individuals, which provide the agent with personal motivations and entail 
partiality.  
                                         
1. “Persons, Character, and Morality.” Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press) 1981, 2. 
2. Ibid., 17. 
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One problem with attempts to reconcile the potential psychological conflict 
between love and morality is that both Kantian and consequentialist moral theories 
characterize love in different ways, focusing on particular forms of love, but failing to 
account for other forms of love widely acknowledged as genuine. To be sure, 
disagreement in the recent philosophical literature regarding the essence of love is not 
terribly surprising given its complex and multiform nature. In order to get a better 
handle on the nature of love and hence on its relation to practical rationality and to 
morality, it will prove useful to look back into the history of philosophy, specifically to 
the thirteenth century, in order to explore in some detail the different kinds of love 
presented in the works of Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas, from his unique vantage point 
in the history of philosophy, was able to incorporate fundamental insights from both 
the western Christian and the classical Greek philosophical traditions into an 
inherently interesting and philosophically sophisticated account of love, an account 
which clearly appreciates not only love’s complexity but also its fundamental role in 
practical rationality and human motivation. 
One of the virtues of Aquinas’s theory of love is his recognition of various 
kinds of love, the different sorts of motivations they provide us with, and a normative 
account of how our loves ought to be prioritized. In the dissertation, I distinguish 
between Aquinas’s descriptive accounts of the different kinds of love and their role in 
his moral psychology, ranging from the mere passion or feeling of love to an 
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intentional relationship which is (at least partly) constitutive of the entire motivation 
structure of the rational agent.  
With respect to the latter sort of love, which Aquinas identifies as the love 
characteristic of friendship (amor amicitiae), he provides normative reasons for 
prioritizing and acting on behalf of the good of particular persons to whom the agent 
is closest (under normal conditions). Nonetheless, he takes seriously the command to 
love our neighbor as ourselves, where the term neighbor is inclusive of all persons. 
Certainly, the kind of love with whom the agent is most closely connected provides us 
with motivations distinct from those by which we love all persons, an issue which I 
take up in the final chapter of the dissertation.  
The primary aim of the dissertation is to show how Aquinas’s account of a 
particular kind of love, amor amicitiae, and its connection with the moral virtues, 
promises to equip us with certain resources helpful for resolving the apparent conflict 
between the impersonal obligations of morality and the particular demands of love 
which contemporary defenders of modern ethical theories have had difficulty 
reconciling.  
A. CONTEMPORARY ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICT 
In the dissertation I analyze and assess what I take to be the three most 
promising contemporary strategies for reconciling the potential conflict between love 
and morality. The first strategy is advocated by Peter Railton. Railton argues that the 
motivations of love and morality need not conflict insofar as the so-called moral point 
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of view, characterized by consequentialist and Kantian moral theories as impersonal 
and impartial, can accommodate the concerns of love and friendship, characterized as 
personal and partial. He adopts a “two-level strategy” according to which the moral 
agent aims to live her life in accordance with morality’s impartial or impersonal 
demands on the meta-level. But on the more immediate level, the agent is motivated 
by her cherished projects and relationships and accordingly prioritizes those projects 
and persons she cares about most. Nevertheless, on Railton’s theory, these more 
immediate motivations must ultimately be justified in terms of the impartial moral 
theory to which the moral agent subscribes. Accordingly, the motivations of love can 
be reconciled with those of morality only by subordinating the former to the latter, 
but in such a way that the two sources of motivation have no intrinsic connection 
with one another.  
Harry Frankfurt employs another strategy in addressing potential conflict 
between the motivations of morality. On his view, all of the rational agent’s personal 
motivations are ultimately rooted in love. The impersonal demands of morality may 
indeed conflict with the motivations of love, but Frankfurt does not think the conflict 
is problematic since he denies that the demands of morality are overriding. Rather, 
when it comes to the foundations of practical reasoning, the motivations of love 
trump those of morality. Frankfurt offers a sort of Humean desire-based theory 
according to which the things one really cares about or loves provide the agent with 
her most basic motivations and reasons for action. But our most basic loves, on his 
 5 
account, have no reasons, moral or otherwise—they are merely brute desires. Hence, 
for Frankfurt, worries about psychological or motivational conflict between the 
demands of love and the demands of morality simply don’t arise. 
According to the final strategy I consider, love indeed has reasons insofar as 
love is a response to the generic value of the one loved. Moreover, the reasons for love 
and the motivations it provides are moral reasons insofar as love is understood as a 
response to impersonal moral qualities of the one loved. According to Jennifer Whiting, 
the best kind of love is modeled on the Aristotelian virtue of friendship according to 
which the paradigmatic or ideal sort of love between friends is based on the friend’s 
quality of character. Friendship, on her view, is impersonal in the sense that it is 
initially justified in terms of the virtuous character of the beloved friend, and this is what 
makes the relationship morally praiseworthy. David Velleman holds a similar account 
of what makes love moral insofar as, on his view, love is also a response to a generic 
quality of the other. Appealing to the Kantian notion of reverence or respect, he 
argues that love is impartial and hence moral insofar as it is a response to the bare 
rational essence of the one loved whom the rational agent is in a special position to 
appreciate and recognize as intrinsically valuable. 
B. AQUINAS’S ACCOUNT OF LOVE AND MORALITY 
In the dissertation I argue that each of these contemporary approaches fails to 
capture the true nature of the relation between love and morality. I argue rather that 
eudaimonistic moral theories in general, and Aquinas’s theory of love in particular, 
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provide the rational agent with moral reasons for prioritizing or showing partiality to 
certain persons insofar as doing so is constitutive of attaining the agent’s own 
complete fulfillment or perfection, i.e. one’s final ultimate end, as an essentially 
rational and relational being. Aquinas’s moral theory actually entails partiality insofar as 
it requires the agent to give special consideration to her own perfection, which entails 
prioritizing the love of self and those with whom the agent is specially related by 
virtue of natural bonds (as in the case of family members), or through a shared history 
and shared values or long term goals (as in the case of close friends).  
In keeping with the Aristotelian virtue tradition, proper love of self entails 
developing virtuous character since such character is necessary for attaining of one’s 
complete good or perfection as a rational being. Aquinas, in keeping with Aristotle, 
maintains that the rational agent naturally and necessarily seeks her ultimate good of 
happiness in the sense of the Greek term eudaimonia, that is a state of human 
flourishing in which all of the agent’s rational desires are completely satisfied.3 
According to Aquinas, attaining such happiness, the final ultimate end of human 
beings, requires that the rational agent has a correct understanding of what is essential 
to human nature, since without such understanding she will fail to grasp what human 
fulfillment or perfection ultimately consists in.  
                                         
3. Aquinas renders the Greek notion of “eudaimonia” using the Latin term “beatitudo,” which 
carries with it the notion of possessing certain virtues which are necessary for a rational agent to 
attain the human good. 
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The ancient eudaimonist tradition holds that human happiness entails 
possessing a virtuous character so that the rational agent cannot attain happiness 
without possessing the right kind of character. Nevertheless, she does not seek to 
acquire virtuous character merely as a means to happiness; rather she seeks to be 
virtuous as an end in itself, an end that is partly constitutive of her final ultimate end. 
On both Aristotle and Aquinas’s view, friendship plays an important role in 
developing virtue, assuming the friendship is of the proper nature. Moreover, since 
human beings are essentially not only rational but also relational beings, the pursuit of 
one’s perfection or the proper love of self entails developing one’s friendships. Doing 
so entails giving special consideration to certain persons, and showing partiality 
toward one’s friends. Hence for both Aquinas and Aristotle, the proper love of self 
entails both the pursuit of virtue and also certain forms of friendship, both of which 
are constitutive parts of the agent’s happiness or completion as a human being. 
As mentioned above, Aquinas’s theory of love considers different kinds of love 
ranging from the passion based upon feelings or emotions (amor properly speaking), 
to love based not upon passion but upon choices of the will (dilectio), and finally, the 
sort of love characteristic of friendship (amor amiticia). This latter form of love is most 
relevant to my purposes in the dissertation insofar as it characterizes the best kind of 
love between persons. One of my primary aims is to show how this form of love is 
essentially moral not by virtue of being impersonal or impartial, but by its very nature 
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insofar as it is directed toward the good or perfection of both the agent herself and 
that of the persons loved. It is at once partial and particular but also deeply moral. 
Amor amicitae is essentially partial and particular insofar as it entails prioritizing 
the good for those persons for whom the agent has a special sort of care and concern, 
starting with one’s own good. Aquinas shows how valuing particular persons more 
than others is required by amor amicitiae insofar as the sort of love is directed toward 
two distinct ends: 1) the objective good of the another person desired for the other’s 
own sake, and 2) a certain kind of union the agent desires to have with the persons 
she loves. The first end, desiring the good of the other for the other’s own sake, may 
be identified as a form of benevolence which one can have toward any number of 
persons, even those the agent does not know or is merely acquainted with. The 
second end, however, union with the one loved, seems to require partiality given that 
the agent is constitutionally limited to experiencing the sort of union toward which 
amor amicitiae is directed with a limited number of persons. Accordingly, the agent 
must prioritize certain relationships over others in order to achieve such union. 
Throughout the dissertation, I argue that this sort of prioritization characteristic of 
amor amicitiae is not only essential to the agent’s own complete good or perfection, that 
is, her happiness, but also to the good of the agent’s friends. 
C. THE PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION 
In the first chapter of the dissertation, I examine Peter Railton’s two-level 
strategy to resolve the potential psychological conflict between love and morality. 
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Railton agrees with Williams that such a potential conflict exists, characterizing the 
problem as one of alienation—from oneself and one’s significant relationships. He 
attempts to resolve the problem by showing how the motivations of love and morality 
need not conflict by suggesting how the so-called moral point of view can 
accommodate the concerns of love and friendship. According to his two-level strategy, 
the moral agent aims to live her life in accordance with what she takes to be the 
impartial demands of morality, but in a way compatible with prioritizing her most 
cherished relationships. He argues that one need not adopt the so-called moral point 
of view except at the meta-level, and this need not be made explicit except upon 
reflection. Despite its apparent merits, I argue that the strategy is problematic insofar 
as it severs the motivations of love from those of morality in such a way that love 
seems to lack any sort of intrinsic connection to morality.  
In the latter part of chapter one, I indicate that, according to the moral 
psychology of Aquinas, amor amicitiae and morality are intrinsically connected. On his 
view, the love characteristic of friendship is essentially partial insofar as it involves 
prioritizing relationships of those closest to us, but is at the same time moral insofar 
as it entails desiring the good of others for their own sake. Aquinas holds that at the 
most basic level of motivation, love and morality are inextricably connected. I appeal 
to his moral theory highlighting the teleological aspect of his account of motivation 
showing how all motivation is in a certain respect ultimately grounded in the love of 
self. Those who love themselves according to their true nature are motivated toward 
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their own fulfillment or perfection, that is, to live the best sort of life for a human 
being. Self-love properly understood provides the principle by which one is motivated 
to develop virtuous character as well as to pursue the particular interests and love 
relationships constitutive of the agent’s final ultimate end. On Aquinas’s moral theory, 
there is no deep disparity between the motivations of love and those of morality since 
all of the agent’s rational motivations are directed toward the same final ultimate end: 
the happiness or perfection of the moral agent herself, and this essentially includes 
loving others as ends in themselves.  
In the second chapter I examine Frankfurt’s account of the reasons of love. 
While Frankfurt acknowledges that the concerns of love and morality do potentially 
conflict, he does not see this as a cause for concern. On his view, love is what 
provides the rational agent’s life with meaning and determines the volitional structure 
ultimately grounding all of practical reason. Hence, Frankfurt holds that love and 
morality do in fact provide us with distinct sources of motivation which potentially 
conflict, but insists that this is not a problem since love trumps morality as that which 
grounds practical reason. According to Frankfurt what the agent loves, at the most 
basic level of motivation, is not subject to rational or moral evaluation. Love on his 
account is a form of caring—the things we love are those which we cannot help but 
care about. Accordingly, Frankfurt contends that love provides us with reasons for 
action, but at the end of the day, love has no reasons aside from the fact that love 
itself is what imbues our lives with meaning and purpose.  
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I intend to show that Frankfurt is wrong to think that the love has no reasons 
and to deny that it is subject to moral evaluation. While he is right to think rational 
agents aren’t necessarily motivated to love particular persons solely on the basis of 
unique qualities, or on account of their virtuous character, there are nevertheless 
normative reasons for loving particular persons and prioritizing the wellbeing of those 
persons. Frankfurt’s paradigmatic example of genuine love is that of a parent for his 
or her small child. Certainly, it seems right to say that parental love is in some sense 
“brute.” Still, this is not to deny that parents have reasons for loving their children. 
Even when it comes to these most basic instinctual sorts of love, there are normative 
reasons for our caring. This is demonstrated in the fact that we would think it 
somehow inappropriate and even morally blameworthy for a parent to fail to love his 
own small child, or to prefer someone else’s child to his own. Of course, Frankfurt’s 
paradigmatic case of love as parental love for a small child is only one subset of the 
many kinds of authentic love, the kind in which it is most likely to think that brute 
instinct rather than reason provides the most fundamental motivations. Still, some of 
the most important love relationships are those between non-related adult persons. 
And certainly these sorts of relationships or friendships involve reasons both for 
choosing one’s friends and for supporting and sustaining the friendships one has, 
even if such reasons serve only as a sort of background condition for supporting and 
sustaining such relationships. Frankfurt’s “no reasons” account of love fails to take 
into account that we deem it morally blameworthy to fail to love certain persons, and 
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somehow morally blameworthy to love certain persons with vicious dispositions. 
Hence, Frankfurt’s denial that love and morality provide us with entirely distinct kinds 
of motivations is uncompelling. 
In the second part of the chapter, I indicate how Aquinas, like Frankfurt, 
appreciates the fundamental role love plays in determining the motivational structure 
of rational agents, and even holds that love of self, or the desire for one’s complete 
fulfillment, serves as the final ultimate end of all practical reasoning. He holds that 
love provides rational agents with reasons, acknowledging that without love, the lives 
of such agents would fail to have any meaning or purpose. However, Aquinas unlike 
Frankfurt holds that, aside from the love of self expressed in the desire for happiness 
toward which every human being is naturally and necessarily inclined, there are 
objective reasons for loving certain things as opposed to others. On Aquinas’s 
account, love in all of its forms is an appetitive response to some object or end the 
intellect apprehends as good to be pursued. Accordingly, love has reasons insofar as 
its formal object is the good in general, while it’s particular object is some thing we 
apprehend as good. Nevertheless, Aquinas holds that the agent can be wrong about 
what is good to be pursued, given that not all objects or ends are objectively good for us 
to pursue insofar as we are essentially rational beings; only certain ends will actually 
promote our good given the kinds of beings we are. Hence Aquinas, unlike Frankfurt, 
holds that what we love is both rationally and morally evaluable in terms of whether it 
actually promotes the ultimate fulfillment or perfection of the rational agent. Only by 
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loving the right sorts of objects and ends can one attain genuine happiness, which 
Aquinas takes to be the ultimate end of all human beings.  
In the third chapter, I address what I take to be the most compelling way in 
which contemporary philosophers have attempted to address the potential 
psychological conflict between love and morality. On this view, the motivations of 
love and morality need not conflict because love and friendship are best understood 
as responses to impersonal features of the person loved. Impersonal features are those 
qualities possessed by all persons, or at least a particular subset of persons. The reason 
that impersonal love is considered moral is that it is not based upon either particular 
qualities of the person, or upon mere brute characteristics which happen to make that 
person an object of desire for the one loving. Jennifer Whiting provides such an 
account of friendship, providing an Aristotelian based argument that friendship is a 
moral relation insofar as it is initially justified by the moral virtue of the one loved. 
David Velleman argues along similar lines that love is a moral emotion insofar as it is 
a response to an even more impersonal feature of the one loved—their rational 
capacities or capacities for valuation.  
I argue that while each of these views is right in holding that the person loved 
has intrinsic value both as a moral being and as a rational being, they fail to take into 
account that we have particular reasons for loving particular persons, and the fact that 
a person possesses such impersonal qualities is not generally the primary reason why 
we love the persons we do. Moreover, the fact that we love certain persons more than 
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others is not merely a matter of accidental circumstances according to which we 
happen to be in the right position to recognize and appreciate the impersonal qualities 
of particular persons. Rather, we are drawn to particular persons more than others, 
not necessarily on the basis of their virtue or rationality, but on the basis of having 
certain natural affinities for particular persons, or on the basis of the shared histories 
and common purposes we share with certain persons. Hence I argue that love is an 
essentially personal relationship grounded in something more than the other’s generic 
qualities. The natural affinities, shared histories, and common purposes we share with 
particular persons provide the grounds for the intentional commitments we make to 
those we love. 
My view is that certain forms of love are morally praiseworthy quite apart from 
being ultimately justified in terms the sort of impartial aims of consequentialist and 
Kantian theories. What makes love of other persons morally praiseworthy is not that 
it can be justified in terms of a person’s impersonal qualities, but the fact that it is 
directed toward the good of another person for that person’s own sake and further 
that loving persons in this manner is partly constitutive of one’s own completion or 
perfection as a rational and moral being. Some moral philosophers, however, have 
argued that in order for love to be morally praiseworthy it is not enough to love 
another person for her own sake. The moral value of love must consist in its being 
entirely altruistic such that one’s love cannot ultimately be directed toward the 
perfection or completion of the one loving, i.e. the final ultimate end of happiness. 
 15 
This objection, however, seems unwarranted. I argue that love can be at once other-
directed and a constitutive part of the agent’s own good or final ultimate end. Certain 
forms of love are morally praiseworthy simply by virtue of the fact that they are aimed 
toward ends which are in themselves objectively valuable, both the rational ends of 
other persons and one’s own rational ends.  
In the second part of chapter three I argue that Aquinas’s moral theory entails 
both the proper love of oneself and the love of other persons, which entails desiring 
the good of the other for the other’s own sake. According to Aquinas, loving other 
persons is an extension of self-love; the proper love of self provides both the grounds 
and the exemplar for loving other persons. It provides the grounds for love insofar as 
the proper love of self entails possessing certain virtues necessary for attaining one’s 
objective good or perfection as a human being. The most significant of those virtues 
is love. Hence, proper love of self according to which one seeks to attain one’s own 
objective good entails loving other persons as ends in themselves. The fact that the 
moral agent loves other persons as ends in themselves precludes loving them 
instrumentally, i.e., merely as a means to the agent’s own happiness. Desiring and 
pursuing the good of another for the other’s own sake entails seeking the other 
person’s objective good. It is in the sense the proper love of self also provides the 
exemplar for the genuine love of other persons.  According to Aquinas, loving another 
person with amor amicitiae entails desiring the complete or perfect end of the person. 
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Just as the agent who loves herself properly desires her own objective good, she 
desires the objective good of the ones she loves.  
These three chapters are aimed toward solving the problem raised by Williams 
concerning the conflicting motivations of an agent’s personal projects and in 
particular the love relationships which provide one’s life with meaning, and the 
impersonal and impartial demands of morality on consequentialist and Kantian 
theories. I argue that that such theories are wrong to suppose that the demands of 
morality are in fact impersonal and impartial. Hence, Williams is right in rejecting such 
theories; nevertheless, he fails to indicate how certain relationships and forms of love 
are in themselves morally praiseworthy. I show that love, in its paradigmatic form not 
only provides one’s life with meaning and purpose, but that it is also inherently moral.  
In particular, I aim to show how Aquinas’s amor amicitiae is a morally 
praiseworthy phenomenon insofar as such love is essentially directed toward the 
objective good of both the agent loving and the one loved. Williams correctly 
identifies the significance of our most cherished projects and loves in the structure of 
our motivations. But by characterizing the motivations associated with those ends and 
persons we care about most deeply as non-moral, he fails to see that the potential 
conflict between the best forms of love and morality is in fact illusory.  
In the final chapter of the dissertation, after having argued that love can be at 
once essentially particular and partial and yet genuinely moral, I suggest how 
Aquinas’s theory of the best kind of love for other persons also entails a sort of 
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impartiality. One of the most significant features of Aquinas’s account of the love 
characteristic of friendship is that in its most perfect form it is grounded in caritas, 
which just is the love characteristic of friendship for God (amor amicitiae ad Deum). 
Aquinas characterizes caritas as an infused virtue which incorporates both impartial 
and partial demands upon our attention.  
Aquinas’s development of the traditional Christian account of the ordo amoris 
provides a detailed normative account of how one’s loves are properly ordered based 
upon the proximity of the person loved to oneself and to God.   Yet a striking and 
distinctive feature of amor as understood in the Christian tradition is that all persons, 
even one’s enemies, are properly included within its scope. The greatest 
commandment of Christianity is twofold requiring that one love God with all her heart, 
soul and mind, and that she love her neighbor as herself, where the second 
commandment is viewed as an extension of the first.4  According to the tradition, the 
term “neighbor” is inclusive, extending to all persons. According, on Aquinas’s view, 
caritas requires not only desiring the good of all persons as ends in themselves, but 
also desiring a sort of union with them based upon the everlasting fellowship of 
happiness in which all persons will ultimately partake, either actually or potentially. 
Accordingly, in specifying the order of caritas, Aquinas provides a normative account 
of love ranging from the particular and the partial to the more general and impartial. 
                                         
4. Mt. 22:36-40, Cf. Lev. 19:18, Deut. 6:5. 
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Although the best kind of love ought to be ordered in such a way that prioritizes 
particular persons closest to the one who loves, it is not limited to such relations. 
Love founded on caritas is inclusive of all persons. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
TWO-LEVEL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING THE CONFLICT 
On Aquinas’s account the moral obligations of rational agents are not 
potentially in conflict with the demands of love because the agent’s moral obligations 
are actually rooted in love—the love of other persons, and more basically, the proper 
love of oneself.  Moral obligations, according to Aquinas, are grounded in a proper 
understanding of self-love; self-love, correctly understood, gives rise to moral virtue as 
well as the love of other persons for the other’s own sake. The moral agent desires and 
promotes the good of other persons as ends in themselves, not merely as instrumental 
to achieving her own happiness or perfection. Nevertheless, loving other persons for 
their own sake is partly constitutive of and hence necessary for attaining happiness. 
Contemporary moral theorists since the latter part of the twentieth century 
have had their hands full attempting to reconcile an apparent disparity between the 
impersonal and impartial requirements of morality, which we are obligated to fulfill in 
order to be good, and the particular requirements of our individual personal projects 
and commitments which provide our lives with meaning and purpose. Emphasis on 
the impartial and the universalizable are the respective hallmarks of the two most 
prominent modern moral theories, consequentialism and Kantianism. Rather than 
favoring our own interests and the interests of those most closely connected to us, say 
through family ties, group affinities or patriotic loyalties, the so-called moral point of 
view requires us to be unbiased, giving equal consideration to all persons and favoring 
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no one in particular.1 Many contemporary philosophers identify the moral point of 
view with an impartial point of view from which, according to Bentham’s famous 
dictum, “everybody [is] to count for one, nobody for more than one.”2 But taking an 
impartial perspective seems to run the risk of putting us at odds with those things we 
really care about—the projects and commitments around which we organize our lives 
and which make them meaningful. The danger is that when we take the moral point 
of view, our own particular interests and concerns must be considered as no more 
significant than the interests and concerns of anyone else; hence it appears that living 
up to the demands of morality does not allow room for special attention to our own 
cares or even to those of our closest friends and loved ones. For this reason, both 
consequentialist and Kantian theories give rise to a sort of psychological conflict or 
inner disharmony within the moral agent, potentially alienating her from herself and 
from the persons she cares about.  
As indicated, Bernard Williams has been particularly influential in pressing this 
sort of criticism demonstrating how the problem cuts across some of the differences 
between consequentialist and Kantian moral theories.3 Consequentialist moral 
                                         
1. To be sure, there is a wide range of opinions concerning the nature of the moral point of 
view and its relation to the “impartial” (or “impersonal”) point of view. For the purposes of this 
introduction, I shall not get into the details of this debate, but rather assume that there is a deep 
connection between morality and impartiality while keeping in mind that part of my larger project 
will be to show how certain kinds of partiality are also fundamental to morality.  
2. Quoted in John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. M. Warnock (London: Fontana, 1962): 319.  
3. Williams initially introduced this sort of psychological or motivational conflict as a 
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theories evaluate actions in terms of outcomes; roughly, the consequentialist holds 
that the morally right action is the one which makes the greatest contribution to the 
overall good.4 Accordingly, consequentialism appears, at least prima facie, to require 
that the moral agent be rigorously impartial insofar as it obliges her to give equal 
consideration to the interests of each and every individual, evaluating all of her actions 
in terms of what, under the circumstances, will contribute the most to the overall 
good. Accordingly, applying the consequentialist standard to the moral agent’s 
practical deliberations appears to preclude paying special attention to her own 
interests and ends as such and likewise the interests and ends of those closest to her. 
For this reason, consequentialist moral theories have been criticized for bringing with 
them a sort of alienation from oneself and from one’s most cherished relationships. 
                                         
problem for utilitarian moral theories in particular. Cf. “A Critique of Utilitarianism,” in J.J.C. Smart 
and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism for and Against. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973).  
Later he went on to show how it presents a problem for modern moral theories in general. See, for 
example, “Morality and the Emotions.” Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956-1972 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1973): 207-229, and “Persons, Character, and Morality.” Moral Luck: 
Philosophical Papers 1973-1980. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981),1-19. Other 
contemporary philosophers who have raised concerns along these lines include Michael Stocker 
“The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories,” Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976): 453-466, and 
“Friendship and Duty: Some Difficult Relations.” Identity, Character, and Morality: Essays in Moral 
Psychology, ed. Owen Flanagan and Amélie Oskenberg Rorty (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991): 
219-233; Susan Wolf, “Moral Saints.” Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 419-439, and “Morality and 
Partiality” Philosophical Perspectives 6 (1992): 243-259; and John Deigh, “Morality and Personal 
Relations,” The Sources of Moral Agency: Essays in Moral Psychology and Freudian Theory (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996): 1-17. 
4. I.e. the good of the whole or the impersonal good which is comprised of the interests and 
ends of individual persons and in which each person’s interests and ends count just as much as and 
no more than those of every other person. For purposes of this project I shall limit my discussion of 
consequentialism to act-consequentialism, which is ostensibly the most defensible form of the 
theory. 
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Williams famously contends that consequentialism undermines the moral agent’s 
personal integrity by alienating her from herself and her first-order or “ground 
projects,” those long-term plans and commitments that provide her life with unity and 
purpose.5 Moreover, consequentialism has been criticized for alienating the moral 
agent from those persons most closely connected to her insofar as it appears to 
discourage partiality, an essential feature of close friendships and other intimate 
relationships.6 
The problem arises in a slightly different form in Kantian moral theories. 
Giving persons equal consideration in Kantian ethics does not necessarily require 
attributing equal weight to the interests of each and every individual, but rather 
attributing equal weight to the rights of each individual, and this is quite plausibly 
considered to be compatible with paying special attention to one’s own interests as 
well as those of the persons most closely connected with us.7 Nevertheless, Kantian 
moral theories have been understood as emphasizing the significance of impartiality 
by virtue of the central role attributed to the universalizability requirement. Roughly 
                                         
5. “A Critique of Utilitarianism,” 110-112.. Cf. Neera Badhwar Kapur, “Why It Is Wrong to 
Be Always Guided by the Best: Consequentialism and Friendship.” Ethics 101 (1991): 483-504, 
Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), and 
Stocker, “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories.”  
6. Cf. Lawrence Blum, Friendship, Altruism, and Morality (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1980), John Cottingham, “Ethics and Impartiality” Philosophical Studies 43 (1983): 83-99, John Kekes. 
“Morality and Impartiality,” American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (1981): 295-303, Michael Slote, 
Common Sense Morality and Consequentialism (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985). 
7. J. David Velleman, “Love as a Moral Emotion.” Ethics 109 (1999): 340. Cf. Marcia Baron, 
“Impartiality and Friendship.” Ethics 101 (1991): 836-857. 
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stated, this is the requirement that the moral agent ought always to act only on 
principles which can be universalized or, in other words, principles which could be 
regarded as appropriate for any other moral agent under similar circumstances for 
deciding which course of action to pursue.8 The requirement that the moral agent act 
only on universalizable principles entails a sort of impartiality by demanding that she 
take a distinct perspective on her reasons and motives for action. She must be 
consistent in the sense that she must evaluate her own reasons for action in 
accordance with the same standards by which she evaluates the reasons of any other 
moral agent. This seems to entail that all of the moral agent’s motivations and 
practical deliberations must be characterized by a sort of “moral mindedness” which 
threatens to interfere with the sorts of reasons and motives by which persons are 
generally thought to be actually moved—specifically, those motives which arise from 
one’s particular projects and life-defining commitments. Hence, Kantian moral 
theories, like consequentialist theories, appear to give rise to a psychological or 
motivational conflict between the agent’s moral obligations and her personal cares 
and concerns. 
A. RAILTON: SOPHISTICATED CONSEQUENTIALISM 
Peter Railton attempts to answer this psychological conflict charge by 
demonstrating how a fully consequentialist moral theory can allow for prerogatives 
                                         
8. Here I am following Velleman’s interpretation of the Categorical Imperative developed in 
“The Voice of Conscience,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1999): 57-76. 
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which do in fact permit, and indeed may even require, the moral agent to pay special 
attention to her ground projects and life-defining commitments, insofar as doing so 
promotes the most good overall.9 While this debate is not strictly about love, a 
person’s loves are certainly among the most important of her life-defining 
commitments; hence the significance of this debate to how we conceive of the 
relation between love and morality should be fairly clear. I shall examine Railton’s 
argument for the compatibility of the impartial and impersonal standards of 
consequentialism with the special attention required to support and maintain one’s 
ground-projects, focusing especially on the implications of his argument for the 
particular and partial demands of love.  While Railton’s account is directly concerned 
with a consequentialist moral theory, he maintains that his strategy can be utilized 
mutatis mutandis in order to defend a Kantian moral theory as well.10 
  Railton considers the sort of problem raised above as a form of alienation both 
from oneself and from those persons and commitments that provide one’s life with 
meaning and value. He argues that, developed in the right way, consequentialism need 
not entail this sort of alienation, except to an appropriate degree necessary for 
                                         
9. Peter Railton, “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality,” Philosophy 
and Public Affairs 13 (1984): 134-172.  
10. Railton, 148. For now I will take this point as a given, while acknowledging that precisely 
how Railton’s argument applies to Kantian ethics requires the sort of attention which lies outside the 
scope of this chapter.  
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preserving individual autonomy.11 His strategy is to distinguish between what he calls 
“subjective consequentialism” and “objective consequentialism.” He uses the term 
“subjective consequentialism” to describe the view according to which the moral 
agent, as a matter of course, ought consciously to make each and every decision based 
upon a deliberation determining which course of action she believes will in fact 
promote the most overall good. In other words, the rational agent behaves as a 
subjective consequentialist insofar as she appeals to a consequentialist decision-
making process by which she attempts to determine in any given situation which 
course of action promotes the most good.  She then acts in accordance with this 
determination. Objective consequentialism, on the other hand, does not specify any 
particular decision making process, but concerns rather the criterion by which a course 
of action is morally evaluable. Any given action or course of action is morally right 
just in case it in fact promotes the most good. The critical difference is that objective 
consequentialism, unlike subjective consequentialism, does not require adhering to 
any particular decision-making process or mode of deliberation, but concerns only the 
outcome of any particular course of action. Railton introduces the term “sophisticated 
consequentialist” to denote a moral agent committed to objective consequentialism, 
but not subjective consequentialism: the sophisticated consequentialist seeks to live a 
                                         
11. Railton maintains that some degree of alienation for our ground projects and 
commitments is crucial to autonomy given that many of them are formed pre-theoretically or 
unconsciously. Holding our basic cares and concerns up to rational scrutiny is required for them to 
be chosen autonomously, 147-8. 
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life that in fact promotes the most good, but is not committed to any particular 
process of deliberation.12 He argues that the sophisticated consequentialist is able to 
avoid the problem of alienation since she is not committed to the decision making 
process to which the subjective consequentialist is committed, contending that it is 
the process of deliberation which gives rise to the problem. 
To illustrate how the decision-making process of a subjective consequentialist 
alienates the rational agent from the persons he values the most, Railton considers the 
example of a man named John who attempts to justify the special attention he pays to 
his wife Linda from the so-called “moral point of view” of the subjective 
consequentialist. In order to justify this attention, John appeals not only to his genuine 
affection for his Linda, but to the fact that he is in a special position to know and to 
look out for her needs, and derives satisfaction from doing so. Moreover, he makes a 
global appeal to his belief that the world as a whole is better off if people take good 
care of the persons they love. Railton points out that John’s broadly consequentialist 
justification for his disposition toward Linda is not only likely to strike his Linda as 
cold and impersonal, thus alienating him from her, but also indicates a sort of 
alienation of John from his own affections and actions. The problem arises because 
his rational deliberative self is unnaturally divorced from his affective self insofar as he 
                                         
12. 152-3. 
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views such affections apart from their cognitive content. Indeed, John’s alienation 
from his own affections is what causes his alienation from Linda.13  
Railton contends that this is a problem for morality insofar as many ethicists 
contend that the moral agent is required to deliberate about which course of action 
should be taken from the impersonal moral point of view, or the “total assessment 
position.”14 If the moral point of view requires that the moral agent deliberate from 
this sort of global standpoint, then he must provide some sort of global justification 
regarding whether or not he is morally permitted to pay special attention to his own 
projects or the needs of a particular person rather than giving equal attention to the 
needs of all. Hence if being moral is a matter of taking this so-called moral point of 
view, then the moral agent is forced into the situation where he is alienated from his 
deep commitments, the persons he loves, and ultimately himself in a way that 
undermines his psychological well being and that of his loved ones.  
Railton’s aim is to show that consequentialism need not force the moral agent 
into this sort of alienation. He contends that the sophisticated consequentialist, by 
rejecting subjective consequentialism while maintaining objective consequentialism, is 
able to live his life in a way that in fact promotes the most overall good but, unlike the 
subjective consequentialist, is able to do so in a manner compatible with giving 
                                         
13. 135-136. 
14. Williams, Critique, 130. 
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priority to his most valued personal commitments and affections thus avoiding the 
problem of alienation. Since the sophisticated consequentialist does not appeal to any 
sort of consequentialist calculation at the level of actual deliberation, he can make 
decisions based upon the projects and personal commitments he truly cares about—
those things which give his life meaning and purpose. Yet since he is committed to 
living an objectively consequentialist life, the sophisticated consequentialist is willing, 
when pressed, to question his projects and commitments from the more global and 
impersonal moral point of view. So long as he is able to justify his life as one which in 
fact contributes to the most overall good, he is acting morally according to the 
criterion of rightness of objective consequentialism. Accordingly, the sophisticated 
consequentialist is able to live a genuinely moral life, but one which does not alienate 
him from the commitments and persons he really cares about. 
In order to illustrate this, Railton appeals to a scenario parallel to the one 
sketched above. He imagines a new character, Juan, who unlike John is a sophisticated 
consequentialist. When asked about the special attention he pays to his wife, Juan 
would answer much differently than John, the subjective consequentialist of the 
previous example: Juan would say that it’s because he loves Linda and, given their 
shared history, it’s almost part of him to give her needs and interests special 
consideration. Juan does not need to deliberate about whether or not to prioritize 
Linda’s well being in a given situation from some impersonal total assessment 
position. Nevertheless, when pressed, Juan could still give an answer justifying a course 
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of action which  prioritizes Linda’s well being by appealing to the criterion of 
objective consequentialism. Railton suggests that Juan might reason as follows: overall 
the world is a better place with the kinds of close relationships such as the one he has 
with Linda, and if every decision were based upon a deliberation about what would 
promote the most good, such relationships would hardly be possible since such 
deliberation would inevitably give rise to the sort of alienation from one’s affections 
and one’s loved ones described above.15 So, it turns out somewhat paradoxically that 
actually promoting the most good overall, the goal of objective consequentialism, 
sometimes requires that the moral agent stop deliberating as a subjective 
consequentialist. If every moral agent were to deliberate about each and every course 
of action, consciously having to justify prioritizing certain persons or commitments in 
given situations, there would be more alienation among such agents from themselves, 
their commitments and their loved ones. Taken into the objective consequentialist 
calculation, the net result may actually be less good overall.  
The upshot of Railton’s argument, then, is that the sophisticated 
consequentialist rejects subjective consequentialism to the extent that it undermines 
the kinds of relationships and commitments that make life meaningful and contribute 
to human happiness. Nonetheless, he upholds the criterion of rightness held by 
objective consequentialism, even if his practical deliberations are not based on 
                                         
15. 150-151. 
 30 
consequentialist considerations. What makes the sophisticated consequentialist a 
genuine consequentialist is that he abides by the following counterfactual condition: 
“while he ordinarily does not do what he does simply for the sake of doing what’s 
right, he would seek to lead a different sort of life if he did not think this were morally 
defensible.”16 Railton, then, essentially advocates what I take to be a two-level strategy 
in defense of consequentialism. At the level of deliberation, the moral agent need not 
(and perhaps ought not) think as a consequentialist. But at the meta-level, the level at 
which one evaluates one’s life as a whole, the moral agent is a consequentialist in that 
he seeks to live a life that in fact promotes the most good overall.  
B. PROBLEMS WITH THE TWO-LEVEL STRATEGY 
One problem with Railton’s theory is that it may no longer be genuinely 
consequentialist. He himself acknowledges that it may strike us as counterintuitive 
that objective consequentialism actually entails the rejection of subjective 
consequentialism. Indeed, it appears to some philosophers that the rejection of 
subjective consequentialism undermines consequentialism altogether. For example, 
when considering this sort of two-level strategy as a defense of utilitarianism17 
Bernard Williams famously objects, “If utilitarianism…determines nothing of how 
thought in the world is conducted, demanding merely that the way in which it is 
                                         
16. Railton, 151. 
17. According to Williams, utilitarianism is the view that the right thing to do is whatever will 
promote the most happiness, i.e. “eudaimonistic consequentialism” (Critique, 80). 
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conducted must be for the best, then I hold that utilitarianism had disappeared and 
that the residual position is not worth calling utilitarianism.”18 It does appear that if 
consequentialism must “usher itself from the scene” at the level of deliberation about 
which course of action is the best in a particular situation this undermines at least part 
of what makes consequentialism an attractive moral theory—for instance, the 
practical guidance it provides when it comes to decision making, especially when there 
are conflicting interests at stake.  
In reply to Williams, Railton appeals to his distinction between subjective 
consequentialism (a method of deliberation which reliably guides our decisions) and 
objective consequentialism (the criteria which must be met for a course of action to 
be morally right) arguing that only the latter is essential to consequentialism. He 
contends that objective consequentialism is a genuinely consequentialist theory in that 
it holds that the standard of rightness is that which in fact promotes the most good. 
While it is true that objective consequentialism may not play much of a role when it 
comes to deliberating about the courses of action with respect to the moral agent’s 
ground projects and personal commitments, the objective consequentialist would 
presumably give these up or change the role they play in his motivational structure if 
his way of life did not meet the counterfactual condition that, upon reflection, he can 
                                         
18. Critique, 135. Rawls holds a similar position: “What we want to know is which conception 
of justices characterizes our considered judgments in reflective equilibrium and best serves as the 
public moral basis of society. Unless one maintains that this conception is given by the principle of 
utility, one is not a utilitarian,” (A Theory of Justice, 182). 
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give an account of how his actions are compatible with living an objectively 
consequentialist life.19 
Still, one might worry that Railton’s strategy gives morality a primarily negative 
role—it merely provides a check on the life of the moral agent. Although the 
objective consequentialist does not consciously evaluate whether each and every one 
of her actions meets the criterion of objective consequentialism, she reflects upon 
particular actions or courses of action for various reasons. For instance, when she is 
pressed by someone to give an account of the moral defensibility of her actions, or 
because, in general, she thinks it worthwhile to occasionally reflect upon whether her 
actions actually meet the criterion of objective consequentialism, or because she is 
faced with some new moral problem which requires further consideration of the 
rightness of her actions.20 Nevertheless, nothing about objective consequentialism 
actually requires that she always, or even often, reflect upon whether her actions 
contribute to her aim of living an objectively consequentialist life.21  
                                         
19. Railton makes this point with respect to his analogous account of objective hedonism: 
“The sophisticated hedonist's motivational structure should therefore meet a counterfactual 
condition: he need not always act for the sake of happiness, since he may do various things for their 
own sake or for the sake of others, but he would not act as he does if it were not compatible with 
his leading an objectively hedonistic life,” (Railton, 145, cf. note 29, p. 158). 
20. Cf. Butler’s account of reflecting upon our life “in a cool hour,” (Sermon 11, §21). I am 
grateful to Nick Sturgeon for challenging me to think further about this.  
21. Of course, Railton might respond that it is part of living an objectively consequentialist 
account that the moral agent adopt a standing policy to occasionally take stock of whether or not, in 
general, her actions contribute to promoting the most good overall. However, I see nothing in his 
account that requires her to do so, or to do so often enough, that she meet this goal. 
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Moreover, without some sort of standing policy to take this sort or reflective 
attitude toward one’s actions in general, objective consequentialism does not provide 
much practical guidance to the agent in determining which sorts of actions, projects, 
or relationships to prioritize in order to attain the goal of promoting the most good 
overall. According to sophisticated consequentialism, the test of morality lies merely 
in meeting the counterfactual condition that the moral agent would seek to live a 
different sort of life if she were to discover that hers was not morally defensible, 
because, in fact, it fails to promote the most good. But Railton does not indicate what 
role, if any, morality has to play in coming to have the sorts of projects, commitments 
and relationships the sophisticated consequentialist chooses in the first place. If, with 
respect to such fundamental matters, the agent does not bring consequentialist 
considerations into play except upon occasions where, for whatever reason, she 
considers whether or not particular actions contribute to the overall good, then it 
seems difficult to see how the moral agent will actually achieve her aim of living an 
objectively consequentialist life.  
A deeper worry concerning the sort of two-level strategy Railton advocates is 
that it still leaves us with a self potentially divided between a personal and an 
impersonal point of view. According to objective consequentialism, the moral value of 
the agent’s life is determined solely in terms of promoting the most overall good, but 
this does not necessarily account for the intrinsic moral value of the agent’s particular 
project, commitments, and relationships. Although Railton’s account of objective 
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consequentialism attempts to account for the intrinsic non-moral value of one’s 
particular commitments or relationships, he does consider these as possessing moral 
value.  
One of the primary advantages of Railton’s version of consequentialism is that, 
unlike some of the more dominant forms of consequentialism according to which the 
only intrinsic good is a subjective state (e.g. happiness), Railton advocates a pluralist 
account of human value. He allows that the best overall good for a human being 
includes an aggregate of goods, which he takes to be intrinsically non-morally valuable. 
Among such goods he includes happiness, friendship, knowledge, purposeful activity, 
autonomy, solidarity, respect and beauty.22 Accordingly, Railton’s account of objective 
consequentialism holds that the criterion for a course of action to be morally right is 
that it promotes the most intrinsic good where such good is inclusive of the 
aforementioned intrinsic non-moral values.23 
While Railton maintain that one’s projects, commitments, and special 
relationships have intrinsic value, he nevertheless considers their value to be non-moral. 
According to even sophisticated consequentialism, they are morally evaluable not in 
                                         
22. 148-150. 
23. Railton claims that such non-moral goods need not be ranked lexically, but each is to be 
allotted a certain weight in the overall good thus making it possible to determine “trade-offs among 
values” (150). He does not however specify how such weights might be distributed. Such a lack of 
specification and clarity makes it difficult if not impossible to determine how any particular course 
of action contributes to the overall intrinsic good and thus difficult if not impossible to determine 
how the courses of action one chooses over a lifetime are in fact morally evaluable.  
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terms of their intrinsic moral worth but rather in terms of being part of a life which 
upholds the consequentialist standard of rightness, i.e. a life that promotes the most 
overall intrinsic, but non-moral, good. Nevertheless, it seems to me that in keeping 
with objective consequentialism, the life promoting the most overall good must be a 
life that prioritizes the projects, commitments etc., which maximize the non-moral 
goods of all persons. In order to achieve such a life, the agent, despite rejecting 
subjective consequentialism, must nevertheless determine at some level how she 
ought to prioritize certain projects and commitments over others in terms of how well 
her priorities promote objective consequentialism. This means that, upon reflection, 
she must also take into account the intrinsic value of other persons’ projects, 
commitments and relationships as well as her own when determining the moral value 
of the courses of action she in fact pursues.  
Hence it would appear that Railton’s account of sophisticated consequentialism 
does not really solve the problem of alienation, since living an objectively 
consequentialist life still leaves the moral agent potentially divided between courses of 
action which prioritize the projects and commitments which give her own life meaning 
and purpose, and the impersonal standard by which she must evaluate such projects 
and commitments, if they are to be justified in terms of objective consequentialism, 
given that objective consequentialism entails promoting the most intrinsic good overall. 
The essential worry here is that, in keeping with the objective consequentialist 
criterion for the moral rightness of an act, the agent cannot merely be concerned 
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about her own intrinsic non-moral goods, but must also take into account those of all 
other people, since moral rightness includes valuing the intrinsic non-moral goods of 
all persons.  
However, Railton’s objective consequentialism has the resources to resolve this 
worry. He argues that promoting the most good overall, i.e. the best consequences for 
the most people, may entail the agent’s being a certain sort of person, i.e. the sort of 
person who acts from a stable disposition or character according to which he prioritizes 
commitments to particular persons and acting in accordance with being this sort of 
person, all things considered, does in fact maximize the most intrinsic good overall 
even when a particular action performed by such a person does not. Railton 
strengthens this claim arguing that “the objective act-consequentialist can approve of 
dispositions, characters, or commitments to rules that are sturdy in the sense [that 
they] do not merely supplement a commitment to act for the best, but sometimes 
override it, so that one knowingly does what is contrary to maximizing the good,” (159, 
emphasis mine).24 That is, the best sort of person from the act-consequentialist point 
of view will sometimes perform the wrong action. In support of this claim, he 
considers again the case of Juan and Linda. In this scenario, the couple has a 
commuter marriage. Generally, one of the two travels to see the other every other 
                                         
24. According to Railton, his account of sophisticated consequentialism does not entail 
advocating an indirect sort of consequentialism such as trait consequentialism or rule 
consequentialism (both of which he rejects), but is still a genuine form of act consequentialism, 
albeit one that takes into account the character of the moral agent. 
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weekend. But on one of the off weeks, Juan notices than Linda is feeling particularly 
depressed. Juan must determine whether or not, under such circumstances, it would 
be better for him to spend money on a ticket to go see Linda, or whether the money 
would be better spent by writing a check to OXFAM, thus significantly contributing 
to the quality of life of an entire village. Clearly in this case, more overall good would 
result from Juan’s writing the check to OXFAM. Nevertheless, Railton suggests that, 
although the best action from a consequentialist standpoint would be to write the 
check, being the best sort of person from a consequentialist standpoint overrides the 
agent’s obligation to performing the right action. All things considered, being the sort 
of person who prioritizes the needs of his loved ones will, at the end of the day, 
promote the most overall good.  
But Railton’s suggestion does not necessarily provide much guidance as to 
whether or not and under what particular circumstance the agent should  perform the 
best action from the consequentialist point of view, or instead act according to the sort 
of character attributed to the best sort of person, even when this would result in 
performing the wrong action. Railton acknowledges this tension in a footnote stating 
that “for an act-consequentialist to say that an action is not right is not to say that it is 
without merit, only that it is not the very best act available to the agent.”25 He 
contends that the act consequentialist may share the sort of character assessment 
                                         
25. 160, fn. 30. 
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according to which it would be more valuable for Juan visit Linda in her distressed state 
as opposed to writing the check to OXFAM. Railton suggests that the intuitive sense 
of rightness in doing so “may be due less to an evaluation of the act itself than to a 
reaction to the sort of character a person would have to have in order to stay home 
and write a check to OXFAM under the circumstances.”26 In a later article, Railton 
argues, appealing to a similar case, that the act consequentialist must hold a normative 
view of the agent’s character, contending that “the best way to achieve good results 
almost always involves taking seriously the development of firm character, where 
‘taking seriously’ includes embracing a character even though it will sometimes lead to 
wrong action.”27 It certainly seems right that the act consequentialist can and should 
be able to evaluate sorts of persons as well as particular actions, and may conclude 
that under certain circumstances the right action is one that the best sort of person 
would perform, in this case, Juan, being the right sort of person, would never neglect 
the needs of Linda if he could help it.  
But here it would seem that Railton is guilty of equivocating about the sense of 
“rightness” at issue. Railton himself admits that, on his account, the act 
consequentialist tends to treat moral “rightness” as a term of art insofar as he tends to 
“pull out one contributor to value and one component of moral evaluation linking 
                                         
26. Ibid. 
27. “How Thinking About Character and Utilitarianism Might Lead to Rethinking the 
Character of Utilitarianism” in Acts, Values and Norms (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003): 233. 
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them in a fairly simple, direct or indirect, way.”28 As Railton points out, this tendency 
leads to a dilemma. Either the act-consequentialist, by making “all-things-considered 
obligation” a term of art, removes obligation from reasonable expectation,29 or if he 
retains the familiar sense of the role of the term “rightness,” the right action requires 
too much of the agent, both in terms of what is expected of him, and what he will be 
criticized for failing to do.30 In the case of Juan deciding to buy the ticket to visit 
Linda, his action may be morally right in the sense that it is based upon possessing a 
certain sort of character, but morally wrong, insofar as his decision fails to promote the 
most overall intrinsic goodness. Railton admits as much, conceding that he was 
inclined here to “pick and choose among the connections the expression ‘right’—as 
used by an act utilitarian—would retain within existing usage.”31 The problem, then, 
lies in determining which sense of “rightness” the act consequentialist should 
prioritize. Many (perhaps most) would agree that Juan is acting “rightly” by 
prioritizing the needs of his wife given that this is what the best sort of person would 
do given the circumstances. But in other sorts of situations, it may not be as clear 
when the act consequentialist ought to act in terms of the best sort of character, and 
                                         
28. Ibid. 238. 
29. Railton has in view the connection between the sense of “rightness,” and one’s “all 
things considered moral obligations.” The latter concerns traditional notions of what may be 
reasonably expected of the moral agent, what is praiseworthy and blameworthy, etc., notions which 
the act consequentialist is inclined to connect with moral rightness.  
30. Ibid. 238-9; Cf. Bernard Williams, Critique. 
31. 248, fn. 19. 
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when he ought to act in terms of promoting the most overall intrinsic good. Thus, 
while Railton’s account of sophisticated consequentialism may be able to take into 
account the character of the moral agent, there is a cost. That cost is the practical 
ambiguity involved in knowing when to act in accordance with having the best sort of 
character when doing so violates the norm set by objective consequentialism, the 
action which will promote the most overall intrinsic good.  
In applying Railton’s account of objective consequentialism to the special case 
of love, it would appear that an action which prioritizes persons the agent loves, and 
the role love plays in the agent’s motivational structure is morally good only to the 
extent that such loves are part of a life that in fact promotes the most intrinsic good 
overall. The agent is entitled to pay special attention to particular persons so long as 
the counterfactual condition is met, i.e. the moral agent is willing to step back from 
her cherished relationships in order to consider whether prioritizing such relationships 
is in fact morally justifiable insofar as they are part of a life that promotes the most 
overall intrinsic good. The deep worry about this sort of view in relation to love is 
that despite the attempt to avoid appealing to consequentialist calculations at the level 
of particular deliberations and choices, the agent must appeal to the objective 
consequentialist standard of rightness at a more global level in order to justify actions 
stemming from being a certain sort of person who prioritizes those he loves, since 
such loves are not morally evaluable in their own right. Accordingly, the objective 
consequentialist must still ultimately determine the value of her love relationships in 
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terms of the consequences which ensue from being the sort of person who prioritizes 
them. He thus remains potentially divided between the so-called impersonal moral 
point of view from which he determines the intrinsic but non-moral value of his loves 
in terms of the overall consequences of being the sort of person who prioritizes his 
love relationships, and the personal point of view according to which he prioritizes 
such relationships simply because they are important to him in their own right 
without having to consider the overall good which results from doing so.  
Ultimately, then, even though Railton attributes intrinsic value to love and to 
being the sort of person who prioritizes the persons he loves, love itself is not morally 
evaluable except in terms of its overall consequences. But if my arguments are correct, 
Railton does not, in the end, resolve the problem of potential conflict between acting 
from the impersonal point of view and the personal point of view. According to the 
former one’s actions are morally right just in case they in fact promote the most 
intrinsic good overall, even when this takes into account being the best sort of person 
who may sometime fail to perform the morally right action so long as he doing so on 
the basis of having the right sort of character. On the other hand, one acting from the 
personal point of view prioritizes particular persons, commitments and relationships 
simply because they are important to him without any further justification. The 
problem this potential conflict highlights is that the objective consequentialist must 
still (even if he does so only on occasion) evaluate his actions from a global 
perspective in determining when he ought to act in accordance with being the best 
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sort of person who sometimes does what is morally wrong in prioritizing his loves and 
personal commitments, and when he ought to act in accordance with what is morally 
right, i.e. performing the action that will promote the most intrinsic good overall. The 
objective consequentialist is thus not immune to the problem of alienation insofar as 
he is required, from the impersonal point of view, to make such determinations.  
What I take to be the primary problem with Railton’s account of objective 
consequentialism with respect to love is that, although he takes the agent’s loves and 
personal commitments to possess intrinsic value, he does not take them to possess 
moral value. This leads to the sort of potential conflict described above. But it seems 
reasonable to think that the agent’s cherished relationships and commitments are not 
only intrinsically but also morally valuable. This is precisely the view that Aquinas 
holds. On his account of certain kinds of love, the moral agent is not required to meet 
some impersonal criterion of the rightness of moral action which can potentially 
conflict with being the best sort of person. This is because certain sorts of love 
provide the very basis of morality. Our standing dispositions and actions are morally 
praiseworthy or blameworthy to the extent that grounded in or motivated by the right 
sorts of loves. Hence, I turn now to consider Aquinas’s views about the relation 
between love and morality. 
C. AQUINAS ON LOVE AND MORALITY  
According to Aquinas’s moral psychology, love between persons—in particular the 
love characteristic of friendship—plays a foundational role in his account of the moral 
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life. As a eudaimonist, Aquinas holds that morality consists in pursuing the ends 
constitutive of happiness or the best kind of life for a human being. All of the projects, 
commitments, and cherished relationships the fully rational agent pursues,32 she 
pursues ultimately for the sake of achieving happiness, where happiness is an 
objective state which entails becoming fully actualized as a rational or intellective 
being. Hence for Aquinas there is no artificial psychological divide between the 
supposedly impersonal and impartial demands of morality and those particular and 
partial projects or commitments the fully rational agent really cares about, given that 
the fully rational agent will care about those things which actually contribute to living 
the best sort of life for a human being. All such considerations play an important role 
in the motivational structure of the moral agent and all such considerations are 
ultimately evaluable in terms of how well they promote one’s final ultimate end, the 
objective happiness or perfection of the moral agent. Accordingly, moral agency 
extends beyond the sorts of actions or courses of action generally thought of as 
comprising the moral life—those actions which have been described by the modern 
moral theories of consequentialism and Kantianism as requiring that moral agents 
adopt an impersonal and impartial point of view. On Aquinas’s account, morality 
pertains to the entire motivational structure and character of the individual moral 
                                         
32. I specify that this is the case with the fully rational agent because although Aquinas holds 
that all rational agents naturally and necessarily pursue happiness as their final end, the agent can be 
wrong about what is constitutive of genuine human happiness and thus fail to live a fully rational life. 
Aquinas’s provides a normative account of the ends a rational agent ought to pursue in order to attain 
that which will actually perfect or complete her in accordance with her essential nature. 
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agent. Accordingly, all of the agent’s deliberations and choices are to some degree or 
another morally evaluable, especially those commitments and relationships which 
form the core of the agent’s motivational structure and are potentially constitutive of 
the agent’s happiness, depending upon their moral value. Hence, on Aquinas’s view, 
there is no deep disparity between the fully rational agent’s moral and non-moral 
motivations since morality pertains to her entire motivational structure. 
With this account of Aquinas’s moral psychology in the background we are 
now in a position to consider how particular love relationships, in particular the love 
characteristic of friendship (the paradigmatic form of love for another person), is 
deeply moral insofar as such relationships comprise the very core of the moral agent’s 
motivational structure and are hence key to her perfection qua moral agent. That 
certain forms of self love and the love of particular persons play such a central role in 
his moral theory is key to understanding how Aquinas must not only allow for, but 
positively require that the moral agent pay special attention to the particular persons 
one is specially committed to, actively seeking their well being as an end in itself. 
Nevertheless, although Aquinas’s moral theory does advocate showing partiality to 
certain persons to whom we have special commitments and to whom we are most 
closely connected, his theory importantly extends beyond those particular 
commitments to include all persons insofar as all persons are appropriately considered 
within the scope of love. I will come back to develop this aspect of Aquinas’s moral 
theory in the final chapter of the dissertation, but for now it is worth noting that a 
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striking and distinctive feature of love as it is understood in the Christian tradition to 
which Aquinas belongs is that all persons are to be loved as actually or potentially 
sharing in the everlasting happiness found in a loving personal relationship with God. 
Aquinas’s theory of love takes seriously the greatest commandment of Christianity—
the twofold injunction requiring that one love God with all her heart, soul and mind, 
and that she love her neighbor as herself.33 Since the term “neighbor” is inclusive, 
extending to all persons as actual or potential participants in everlasting happiness, 
Christian love requires that the moral agent desire the good of all persons. Aquinas 
upholds this impartial commandment of Christianity, but does so in a way that 
nevertheless requires paying special attention to those particular persons with whom a 
person is most closely connected, as he makes clear in his account specifying the 
order of caritas (ST II-II 26.6). Accordingly, the moral agent should prioritize those 
persons with whom she has a special relationship. But she must also intend the good 
of all other persons within her scope of influence; moreover, her obligation to do so 
extends not only to persons in special need, but in accordance with the Christian 
tradition, even to persons she considers to be her enemies.34  
So Aquinas’s moral theory does in one sense have an impartial element—the 
fully rational agent is required to include all persons within the scope of love and 
                                         
33. Mt. 22:36-40; Cf. Lev. 19:18, Deut. 6:5. For Aquinas’s commentary on this passage see In 
Mt., cap. 22 l. 4. 
34. Cf. Car. VIII; ST II-II 23.1 ad 2, 25.8. 
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hence to promote the well being of all. Still, Aquinas allows and indeed requires that 
special attention be given to those particular commitments and persons most central 
in the life of an individual. My intention in what follows is to develop the particular 
and personal aspect of Aquinas’s moral theory demonstrating how his theory, unlike 
consequentialist and Kantian moral theories, provides the moral agent with reasons to 
prioritize particular persons and commitments in their own right and that doing so is 
morally valuable.  
It is worth pointing out from the beginning that Aquinas’s theory of love is not 
a desire-based theory. As I will demonstrate in detail in chapter two, Aquinas provides 
a normative account of the appropriate objects of desire and how one’s desires are to 
be properly ordered in the life of the rational agent who, by virtue of her rationality, 
naturally and necessarily seeks to attain her own genuine happiness or perfection.35 As 
will become clear further on in the chapter where I exposit Aquinas’s descriptive 
account of desire, which he identifies as the inclination of an individual toward a 
particular object or end initiated by love. But love itself is deemed morally praiseworthy 
or blameworthy according to the objective value of the beloved object or end. This 
requires that the rational agent apprehend the objective value of the object or end 
through the intellect. The apprehension of a particular object or end as something 
good to be pursued is what gives rise to desire and is itself rationally evaluable. 
                                         
35. I will argue for a rationalist as opposed to a desire based account of love in chapter two.  
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It is also important to note from the beginning that although Aquinas’s moral 
theory obviates the problem of alienation endemic to consequentialism and Kantian 
moral theories, there is nevertheless a deep worry concerning whether the moral agent 
can genuinely seek to promote the good of another for the other’s own sake if the well 
being of those she loves is ultimately sought for the sake of the agent’s own happiness 
or perfection.36 In response to this sort of worry, I shall argue that although Aquinas’s 
account of happiness (beatitudo) does entail that the rational agent’s love for other 
persons is partly constitutive of her own happiness or perfection, this does not require 
that she loves others merely for their instrumental value, since the for the sake of 
relation need not be viewed exclusively as the relation of a means to an end. Moreover, 
seeking to promote the good of the other for the other’s own sake, i.e. as an end in itself, 
is a defining feature of the highest and best sort of love on Aquinas’s account. And 
this sort of love for another person is precisely the sort that partly constitutes the 
agent’s own happiness or perfection. 
In what follows in the remainder of this chapter, I will develop and defend 
Aquinas’s account of the inextricable connection between love, the desire for 
happiness, and morality. In section A, I will explore the relevant aspects of Aquinas’s 
                                         
36. Jennifer Whiting worries that a view which gives primacy to the agent’s eudaimonia is 
contrary to loving another for the other’s own sake, since such love is essentially a matter of 
promoting one’s own self-interest. As Whiting puts it, “loving and seeking to benefit one’s friend for 
her own sake is acceptable because, and only insofar as, it is a way of seeking to benefit oneself,” “The 
Nicomachean Account of Philia,” in “The Nicomachean Account of Philia,” in The Blackwell Guide to 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Richard Kraut )Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006) 277. I will consider 
Whiting’s worry at length in chapter three. 
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account of happiness, in particular how he identifies the genuine happiness of a 
human being with the completion or perfection of her rational nature, i.e. the state in 
which all of the her rational desires are fulfilled such that there is nothing left for her 
to desire.37 As will become clear, Aquinas identifies the desire for genuine happiness 
with the proper love of self. On Aquinas’s view, the proper love of self is at the center 
of all the agent’s desires and inclinations insofar as it provides the principles for both 
moral virtue and the other-directed relationships, i.e. friendship love. In section B, I 
will focus on developing Aquinas’s view that self-love is the principle of moral virtue, 
the habits or settled dispositions of the appetitive power of the soul inclining the 
moral agent toward the good and to act for the sake of the good. In section C, I will 
consider Aquinas’s related claims that 1) friendship is required for moral virtue, and 
thus for genuine happiness, and 2) self-love provides the principle, or the “form and 
root” of friendship, the sort of other-directed-relationship which entails desiring the 
good of another for the other’s own sake. Finally, in section D, I will consider what I 
take to be the most worrisome objection to Aquinas’s moral theory: that one cannot 
love another person purely for that person’s own sake if the other person’s good is 
ultimately sought for the sake of one’s own happiness or perfection. I will respond to 
this objection, arguing that although on the eudaimonist account the rational agent’s 
ultimate motivation is to achieve her own happiness or perfection, this does not rule 
                                         
37. Cf. ST I-II 5.1 quoted below. 
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out genuinely loving another person for that person’s own sake. Indeed loving 
another person and seeking her good as an end in itself is partly perfective of the self 
and hence required for one to achieve genuine happiness. 
1. HAPPINESS AND SELF-LOVE 
As a eudaimonist, Aquinas holds that the motivation of all human beings 
ultimately rooted in the natural desire for one’s own happiness.38 According to his 
moral psychology, this desire for happiness just is the natural and necessary 
inclination of all human beings qua rational or intellective beings to seek the ends 
which perfect them as beings of that particular kind. Aquinas explains the nature of 
happiness as follows: “By the name ‘happiness’ (beatitudo) is understood the ultimate 
perfection of the rational or intellective nature and accordingly what is naturally 
desired, since each thing naturally desires its own ultimate perfection” (ST I 62.1).39 
According to Aquinas, intellective beings, like all other beings including those lacking 
cognition, in some sense naturally desire their own good, i.e. those ends which perfect 
                                         
38. Aquinas distinguishes between natural love which is the natural and necessary desire of all 
persons for happiness, and love involving choice which concerns those things a person desires for the 
sake of happiness and indicating that in rational beings (angels and human beings) the former gives 
rise to the latter: “natural love is the principle of love of choice.”  In the case of human beings, “the 
will tends naturally towards its final end—for every human being naturally wills happiness, and all 
other desires are caused by this natural desire, since whatever one wills, he wills on account of the 
end; therefore, the love of that good which one naturally wills as an end is his natural love. But the 
love which arises from this, which is of something loved for the sake of the end, is the love of 
choice” (ST I 60.2, Cf. 82.1; I-II 1.6-7).  
39. Respondeo dicendum quod nomine beatitudinis intelligitur ultima perfectio rationalis seu 
intellectualis naturae, et inde est quod naturaliter desideratur, quia unumquodque naturaliter 
desiderat suam ultimam perfectionem. 
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or complete them as the kinds of beings that they are. Although it is clear that a non-
cognitive being, e.g. fire, doesn’t “desire,” something in the sense that cognitive 
beings do, but Aquinas holds that each created entity is naturally inclined toward an 
end which is “perfective” of it, or completes it, as a thing of a particular kind with a 
particular nature. So just as fire is, at least according to Aquinas, naturally inclined to 
rise upward since it is its nature to do so and in the sense perfective of it, so the 
intellective being is naturally inclined to seek the ends perfective of it, and these ends 
are determined by its nature as an intellective being. According to Aquinas’s natural 
teleology, intellective beings are at the highest and most sophisticated end of the 
spectrum of created beings, but nonetheless share the same teleological ordering as 
the rest of created beings, even those lacking cognition. Self-love, then, is simply one 
way of describing the natural inclination of all created beings along the spectrum to 
seek those ends which perfect or complete them as things of a particular kind with a 
particular nature. Of course, his account becomes much more complex when applied 
to human beings which have not only cognitive capacities, which they share in 
common with non-human animals, but intellective capacities.40  
Generally speaking, then, in accordance with Aquinas’s natural teleology, all 
created things are naturally inclined to pursue their own good; further, what their 
good consists in depends upon the nature of the thing itself—its completion or 
                                         
40. See, for example, ST I 60.3. 
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perfection as a thing characterized by its specifying capacities or potentialities. 
Accordingly, the good particular to human beings, creatures characterized by their 
rational or intellective capacities, is happiness, which, formally conceived, consists in 
the perfection or completion of human nature qua rational or intellective nature. 
But what precisely does Aquinas mean by perfection and why does he identify 
happiness with the perfection of the agent’s rational or intellective nature? Although I 
cannot here provide a detailed answer to this question, it is important to emphasize 
that Aquinas holds an objectivist account of human happiness or the human good 
based upon what is perfective of human beings as such.41 Only certain ends will truly 
satisfy the sorts of desires definitive of human nature inasmuch as it is essentially 
rational. Moreover, Aquinas argues that human beings can have only one final ultimate 
end as opposed to many because the final ultimate end is conceived of as that which 
completes or perfects the human being such that all of her rational desires are wholly 
fulfilled. 
Since each thing desires its own perfection, it desires something as its 
ultimate end, which it desires as its own complete and perfect good 
…Hence it is fitting that the final end so fulfill the entire appetite of a 
                                         
41. ST I 5.1 ad. 1: “Good, however, expresses the notion of what is perfected, which is 
desirable, and consequently expresses the notion of what is completed (ultimi). Thus, what is 
completely perfected is called good without qualification. But what does not have the complete 
perfection it ought to have, although it has some perfection insofar as it is in actuality, is called 
neither perfected nor good without qualification but [only] in some respect” (tr. MacDonald). Cf. 
Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, “Being and Goodness,” Being & Goodness, ed. Scott 
MacDonald (Ithaca & London: Cornell, 1991), 99-101. Again, Aquinas’s objectivist account of the 
human good will be addressed more fully in chapter 2. 
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human being that nothing else remains to be desired. This is not possible 
if something more is required for his perfection (ST I-II 1.5).42 
 
Whatever a human being desires as her final ultimate end must complete or perfect 
her such that all of her rational desires are completely fulfilled and she desires nothing 
further. In order for the final ultimate end to perfect a human being qua essentially 
rational, it must consist in those goods which pertain to her rational nature, i.e. the 
goods of intellect and will.  
Aquinas distinguishes between the formal conception of the final ultimate end 
of human beings or the human good, i.e. happiness, and the particular end in which the 
human good is realized or instantiated (ST I-II 1.7). He acknowledges that although 
each and every human being naturally and necessarily desires happiness generally 
speaking, i.e. her own complete and perfect good, not all agree about what the human 
good consists in. Nevertheless, this disagreement does not mean that there is not 
some one good, or aggregate of goods, which in fact constitutes human happiness.43 
And as indicated above, Aquinas holds an objectivist account of what the human 
good consists in, since perfect or complete happiness must fulfill human nature as a 
whole, and this depends upon certain objective features of human nature. Since 
                                         
42. Cum unumquodque appetat suam perfectionem, illud appetit aliquis ut ultimum finem, 
quod appetit, ut bonum perfectum et completivum sui ipsius…Oportet igitur quod ultimus finis ita 
impleat totum hominis appetitum, quod nihil extra ipsum appetendum relinquatur. Quod esse non 
potest, si aliquid extraneum ad ipsius perfectionem requiratur.  
43. Cf. ST I-II 4.7 ad 2. And SCM, “UE in PR” for a defense of the aggregate view of the 
final ultimate end.  
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human beings are essentially rational or intellective beings, their final good must 
consist in those goods that pertain to the intellect and will. Rational agents who do 
not have a correct conception of what is essential to human nature thereby lack 
understanding of what in fact constitutes the good life of a human being; nevertheless, 
such agents will seek happiness in apparent goods, i.e. goods they think will satisfy 
their desires. But since they fail to grasp what is essential to their nature as human beings, 
these agents will fail to attain the genuine human good or the happiness they seek.44   
Aquinas identifies this desire for one’s own happiness or perfect good with 
self-love. Accordingly, he holds that all rational agents naturally love themselves; yet, 
since some fail to love themselves in accordance with their rational or intellective 
nature, they do not all love themselves properly.45 In keeping with his objectivist 
account of the human good, Aquinas maintains that genuine self-love is essentially a 
form of intellective love. Rather than being based merely upon the agent’s prior desires 
or sensory appetites, intellective love is based upon her rational judgments about 
which objects or ends are good for her to pursue. And such judgments are based 
upon the features of the objects themselves, not merely upon the agent’s other desires 
or inclinations. Unlike sensory love which is based purely upon the agent’s desires and 
                                         
44. Aquinas of course distinguishes between the sort of happiness a human being can 
achieve by her own natural powers which Aquinas calls “imperfect happiness,” (beatitudo imperfecta) 
and the vision of the divine essence or “perfect happiness,” (beatitudo perfecta) which surpasses the 
natural capacities of a created being (ST I-II 5.5). Here, I am primarily concerned with the sort of 
imperfect happiness one can naturally without divine assistance.  
45. Cf. ST II-II 24.5 ad 3, quoted below. 
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inclinations, intellective love depends upon her prior apprehension of some good 
considered “under the common nature of good” (ST I 82.5).  
Aquinas’s account of intellective love is in keeping with his view that there are 
external or objective reasons for preferring certain objects and ends to others.46 
Aquinas provides a descriptive account of the object of the will, and hence of 
intellective love which belongs to the will, indicating that the will or rational appetite 
of every rational being is directed toward a good or apprehended good (ST I-II 8.1). 
Aquinas further indicates that the proper object of the will is the good in general, i.e. 
the good considered universally, or a particular good considered under the aspect of a 
universal good. (ST I-II 9.1; 9.1 ad 3).  
But Aquinas further argues for a normative account of the will’s proper object; 
the proper object of the will is not merely an apparent good, but the actual good. 
Only when one apprehends and wills what is objectively good or perfective of the 
rational being as such, can she attain genuine happiness (cf., for instance, ST I-II 5.1 
ad 1). The objective good, i.e. that which is good all- things-considered, is what truly 
satisfies all of the rational desires of the intellective agent and is hence the end in 
which her genuine happiness or perfection may be attained. Accordingly, the 
intellective agent genuinely loves herself to the extent that she apprehends and wills 
that which is objectively good, valuing such goods more than the merely apparent 
                                         
46. See Terence Irwin, “Aquinas: Action,” in the Development of Ethics: A Historical and Critical 
Study, vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 473-4.  
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goods which ultimately fail to perfect or complete her as a rational or intellective 
being. 
The most significant feature of Aquinas’s account of genuine human happiness 
and self-love for my purposes here is the way in which he conceives of these as 
inextricably tied up with his account of moral goodness. This connection between 
true happiness, genuine self-love and moral goodness is crucial to establishing my 
thesis that on Aquinas’s moral psychology, there is no potential problem of alienation 
of the moral agent from the things she really cares about. This is because the fully 
rational agent is inclined to pursue those ends which are genuinely constitutive of her 
happiness, that which all rational beings desire naturally and necessarily. The agent 
who understands her true essence and pursues that which perfects or fulfills her 
rational or intellective nature is in a position to attain genuine happiness. This not only 
requires attaining certain objects or ends the agent desires, but also being a certain sort of 
person and acting for the sake of the good in general. In the following two sections, I will 
develop Aquinas’s account of genuine human happiness demonstrating the centrality 
of moral virtue to his account. As I shall argue, it turns out that moral goodness and 
rational self-love are two sides of the same coin comprising human happiness. 
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2. SELF-LOVE AND VIRTUE 
As indicated above, insofar as moral virtue involves the perfection of human 
beings qua rational beings, it is also a constitutive feature of human happiness.47 
Accordingly, it is worth briefly sketching Aquinas’s account of what virtue is and its 
relation to self-love. Generally speaking, Aquinas identifies virtue with the morally 
good agent’s state of character: “the perfection of a capacity,” i.e. a capacity of the 
soul, and also with “a good habit (habitus) ordered toward action,” i.e. a good quality 
of the soul which disposes the moral agent to act for the sake of the good (ST I-
II.55.1-3). Specifically, a moral virtue is a habit or disposition of the appetitive part of 
the soul48 which inclines the rational agent to act in accordance with what is best: “and 
the best is the end, which is either the activity of a thing, or something attained by the 
activity proceeding from the capacity [of the soul],”(ST I-II 56.1).49 Virtue, then, has 
the same ultimate end as genuine self-love—true happiness, the final ultimate end in 
which all of one’s rational desires are completely fulfilled such that there is nothing 
                                         
47. My focus here is on moral virtue, i.e. that which perfects the rational appetite or will, as 
opposed to intellectual virtue which perfects either the speculative or practical intellect (Cf. ST I-II 
58.3). Here I must leave aside theological virtues, but these will play a significant role when it comes 
to the discussion of caritas, the love characteristic of friendship for God, which Aquinas takes to be a 
divinely infused virtue. 
48. Aquinas holds that the proper subject of virtue is the will or intellective appetite: “The 
subject of a habit which is called a virtue simpliciter can only be the will or in some power insofar as it 
is moved by the will” (ST I-II 56.3). Accordingly, some virtues are in the sensory powers’ appetite 
(powers of the sensory appetite) only insofar as such powers participate in reason, i.e. they have a 
natural inclination to obey reason (ST I-II 56.4). 
49. [O]ptimum autem est finis, qui vel est operatio, vel aliquid consecutum per operationem 
a potentia egredientem. 
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left to desire. And as Aquinas’s account of moral virtue makes clear, this end is partly 
constituted by the perfection of the will which inclines the rational agent to seek the 
best or final ultimate end, an activity or object in which her complete and perfect 
good consists.50 On his view, then, virtue and love generally considered (amor) are 
connected in that virtue derives from the genuine love of self insofar as it is required to 
attain the happiness or perfection of the moral agent. 
This is in keeping with the descriptive account of Aquinas’s general moral 
psychology, according to which love (amor) is the principle of any appetite or desire: 
“Every motion toward something, or rest in something proceeds from some natural 
attraction or aptitude, which belongs to the nature (ratio) of love (amor)” (ST I-II 
27.4).51 Specifically, in the case of the rational appetite, love constitutes the origin of 
any particular act of willing and thus every human action:  
Every agent acts for the sake of some end, as is said above (ST I-II 1.2). 
And the end is the good desired and loved by each one. From this it is 
clear that every action, whatever it might be, one does that action from 
some particular love (ST I-II 28.6).52 
                                         
50. Cf. ST I-I 4.4 where Aquinas argues that correctness of the will is necessary for attaining 
happiness.  
51. Omnis autem motus in aliquid, vel quies in aliquo, ex aliqua connaturalitate vel 
coaptatione procedit, quae pertinet ad rationem amoris. 
52. Omne agens agit propter finem aliquem, ut supra dictum est. Finis autem est bonum 
desideratum et amatum unicuique. Unde manifestum est quod omne agens, quodcumque sit, agit 
quamcumque actionem ex aliquo amore. 
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Given the significance Aquinas ascribes to love as the origin of desire and thus every 
human action, it is important to review precisely what he means by love considered 
generally before looking at his normative account of the particular kinds of love 
constitutive of genuine human happiness. 
Aquinas holds that love generally speaking (amor) gives rise to a sort of circular 
motion of the appetite beginning with the apprehension of a desirable object and 
becoming fully actualized when the object is attained. Love (amor) is simply the state 
of apprehending some object or end as somehow suitable or fitting (coaptatio) to the 
one loving. This apprehension of the object as such is the principle of the actual 
motion of the appetite, i.e. the desire (desiderium) of the one loving for the 
apprehended object or end. Finally, the one loving finds rest (quies) once the object or 
end loved is attained (ST I-II 26.2). Accordingly, love in general is a state in which the 
subject apprehends an object or end as somehow suitable or pleasing to it. Love, then, 
provides the explanatory principle of the appetite or desire for some object or end 
apprehended as good to be pursued. Thus, love in general is the principle or origin of 
any appetitive motion.  Intellective love is unique insofar as it pertains to the will or 
intellective appetite, and as indicated above, involves apprehending some object or 
end as good in a universal sense (ST I-II 26.1; ST I 20.1).  
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Intellective love and virtue are alike, then, in that they both have the will as 
their subject,53 and both incline the rational agent toward some object or end 
considered as good. Aquinas specifies the relation a bit further when he claims that 
virtue is not love simpliciter, but that in some respect it derives from love “inasmuch as 
[virtue] derives from the will, the first affection of which is love (amor)” (ST I-II 56.3 
ad 1).54 From this it seems reasonable to suppose that on Aquinas’s view, the morally 
good agent is one who loves those objects or ends which she correctly apprehends as 
good all things considered, and that such love motivates certain actions which 
ultimately give rise to a virtuous disposition by which she is inclined to act for the 
sake of the good considered as such.  
Moreover, we have seen that the morally good agent loves herself in the 
appropriate manner insofar as she desires those goods which fulfill or perfect her 
nature qua rational or intellective being. Aquinas holds that loving oneself entails desiring 
good for oneself (ST I 20.1 ad 3). This is simply part of his eudaimonist 
understanding of human motivation. But as we have seen, in keeping with his 
objectivist account of human happiness or perfection, he distinguishes genuine self-
love from the sort that is blameworthy insofar the latter is directed toward the sorts of 
                                         
53. Aquinas defends the view that the will is subject of virtue simpliciter (as opposed to 
relatively speaking) at ST I-II 56.3. 
54. Verbum Augustini intelligendum est de virtute simpliciter dicta non quod omnis talis 
virtus sit simpliciter amor; sed quia dependet aliqualiter ab amore, inquantum dependet a voluntate, 
cuius prima affectio est amor, ut supra dictum est. 
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goods pertaining to the rational agent’s sensory nature as opposed to those pertaining 
to reason:  
Those who love themselves are blamed inasmuch as they love 
themselves according to their sensory nature, to which they submit. That 
is not to love oneself truly according to one’s rational nature, as one 
wishes to oneself those goods which pertain to the perfection of reason 
(ST II-II 24.5 ad 3).55  
One who loves herself according to her sensory nature is ruled by her passions 
in such a way that can hinder reason and cloud her judgment about what is 
genuinely good to be pursued. Moral virtues such as temperance and courage 
incline the moral agent to submit her passions to reason providing her with the 
resolve to pursue the goods pertaining to her rational or intellective powers, 
those powers of the soul comprising her very essence as an intellective being. 
Of course, one can also be mistaken about what goods pertain to the 
perfection of reason. Hence, the intellective virtue of prudence is also necessary 
in order for the fully rational agent to correctly identify which ends are actually 
perfective of her nature and hence good to be pursued. 
Accordingly, genuine self-love characterizes the morally good agent in that she 
desires for herself the external or objective goods that will perfect her in accordance 
with her intellective nature. Hence, according to Aquinas, rational self-love is the 
                                         
55. Ad tertium dicendum quod amantes seipsos vituperantur inquantum amant se secundum 
naturam sensibilem, cui obtemperant. Quod non est vere amare seipsum secundum naturam 
rationalem, ut sibi velit ea bona quae pertinent ad perfectionem rationis. 
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principle of a virtuous disposition to act for the sake of the good and conversely, 
virtue is required for human beings to attain genuine happiness or perfection. 
3. SELF LOVE AND LOVE FOR OTHER PERSONS 
a. FRIENDSHIP IS REQUIRED FOR HAPPINESS 
We have just seen how according to Aquinas, virtue is a constitutive feature of 
happiness and of self-love properly construed. One might worry, however, whether or 
not Aquinas’s theory, as I developed it so far, is genuinely moral given that his moral 
psychology seems concerned primarily with the rational agent’s conception of what 
her own good consists in and with developing the sorts of virtues or dispositions 
which help enable her to attain the end of happiness. Many would contend that a 
moral theory involving little concern for the good or wellbeing of other persons is 
hardly worth calling a moral theory.56 Moreover, there is a general assumption that in 
order to be moral, the agent’s attitude toward another must be entirely altruistic or 
other-directed such that any self-interested motivation undermines the moral quality 
of the relation. I will deal with the former worry first, before considering whether or 
not this assumption is warranted. 
How exactly does the love of other persons fit in to Aquinas’s account of 
happiness and self-love? In what follows I will provide a brief sketch of Aquinas’s 
                                         
56. Bernard Williams contends that altruism is a necessary feature of morality, where 
altruism is defined as the “general disposition to regard the interests of others, merely as such, as 
making some claim on one, and, in particular, as implying the possibility of limiting one’s own 
projects,” (“Egoism and Altruism,” 250). I will be addressing this issue in detail in chapter 3.  
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notion of the loves characteristic of friendship (amor amicitiae), and show how such 
love, which entails desiring and acting for the good of another person for that person’s 
own sake, is a requisite feature of Aquinas’s account of the genuine happiness of the 
moral agent. Then I will look at his account of friendship from the other direction—
how self-love provides the principle or, in Aquinas’s own words, the “form and root” 
of friendship. I shall argue that although Aquinas views friendship as requisite for 
happiness and as grounded in the proper love of self, this does not entail that 
friendship is to be sought for its instrumental value, as merely a means to attaining the 
end of one’s own happiness. The love characteristic of friendship, rather, entails 
loving other persons in such a way that the moral agent desires and acts for the good 
of the other for the other’s own sake. Friendship sought merely as a means to attaining 
one’s own happiness does not constitute genuine friendship on Aquinas’s account.  
Aquinas holds that the love characteristic of friendship constitutes the most 
perfect or the paradigmatic form of love between persons. In order to see why, it is 
important to sketch his descriptive account of what friendship is and its defining 
features. Aquinas provides his most comprehensive account of friendship early in his 
career in his commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences (In III Sent. d. 27, q.2, a.1). 
Here Aquinas identifies four requisite characteristics of love for another person, and then 
specifies beyond these two further requisite characteristics of friendship.57 He begins by 
                                         
57. Aquinas’s account of the requirements of love and friendship are deeply influenced by 
Aristotle. Cf. EN VIII & IX and Aquinas’s gloss on these passages in In decem libros Ethicorum 
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describing love for another person (amor) as a relation aimed toward being united in a 
certain sense with the one loved, such that the one who loves regards the one loved in 
a manner similar to the way he regards himself insofar as he desires the good of the 
other.58 The defining characteristics of love for other persons are 1) concupiscence or 
desire for the one loved, i.e. the desire for her actual presence,59 2) benevolence 
(benevolentia) according to which the one who loves desires the good of the other, for 
the other’s own sake,60 3) beneficence (benefientia) according to which the one who 
loves acts to attain good things for the one loved; and finally, 4) concord or harmony 
(concordia) according to which the one who loves and the one loved desire the same 
things.61  
In addition to these defining features of love, friendship requires two further 
features. The first is that friends share in a mutual love such that each one loves the 
                                         
Aristotelis ad Nicomachum exposition. 
58 Cf. Aquinas’s later distinction between the kinds of union associated with love (ST I-II 
28.1). I will consider this passage in some detail in chapter 3.  
59. Here Aquinas uses the term “concupiscentia” to denote the natural inclination to attain 
some perceived good pertaining to one’s sensory nature, which he refers to as the passions (passions). 
Apprehending a particular object as pleasing to oneself constitutes the passion amor; when the object 
of amor is present, one has the passion of pleasure, and when absent, he has the passion of 
concupiscence or desire (cf. ST I-II 25.2).   
60. Later, in the Summa Theologica, Aquinas distinguishes between the love characteristic of 
concupiscence (amor concupiscentiae) and the love characteristic of friendship (amor amicitiae). Amor 
concupiscentiae is directed toward some good desired for the sake of someone else—either for oneself 
or for another to whom one wishes good, whereas amor amicitiae is directed to the other person to 
whom one wishes the good (Cf. ST I-II 26.4). Accordingly, benevolence, i.e. wishing good to 
another for the other’s own sake, is a constitutive feature of amor amicitiae.  
61. The requisite sort of harmony concerns practical rather than speculative matters.  
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other and further, each one knows that they love one another.62 The second is that they 
act out of free choice, and hence friendship love pertains to the will, as opposed to a 
passion, which pertains to the sensory appetite. Aquinas distinguishes friendship 
(amicitia) from other kinds of love (amor) in that it is similar to a habit.63 As Aquinas 
defines it, a habit is a quality of the soul disposing one toward acting either well or 
badly.64 Habits provide one of the internal principles of human actions, i.e. those 
actions which by definition proceed from reason and the will.65 Accordingly, 
friendship is a kind of mutual love between two rational agents,66 which follows from 
the free choice of each agent to actively pursue the well being of the other and to be 
united with the other in the sense of spending time together talking and engaging in 
similar activities. Because friendship entails all of these features, Aquinas calls it the 
“most perfect among those things pertaining to love.” 67   
                                         
62. Cf. Aristotle EN VIII.2. Aquinas reiterates these criteria towards the end of his career. 
Cf. ST II-II 23.1 where Aquinas describes the nature of friendship as follows: “Not every love has 
the character of friendship, but that love which is together with benevolence, when we love 
someone so as to wish good to him.” Moreover, in the case of friendship, the love must be mutual: 
“Yet neither does benevolence suffice for friendship, for a certain mutual love is required, since 
friendship is between friend and friend (ST II-II 23.1). 
63. “Friendship, according to the Philosopher (EN viii.5) is like a habit” (ST I-II 26.3). 
64. ST I-II 49.1, 3. 
65. ST I-II 1.1. 
66. For Aquinas’s view that friendship can occur only between rational agents see ST I 20.2 
ad 3. 
67. Sic ergo patet quod amicitia est perfectissimum inter ea quae ad amorem pertinent (In III 
Sent. d. 27, q.2, a.1).  
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Having provided a rough sketch of Aquinas’s account of friendship, I turn now 
to consider in what respect(s) he considers friendship to be partly constitutive of 
human happiness. Aquinas specifies the requirements for happiness in the first part of 
the second part of the Summa. Here Aquinas maintains that a properly ordered will is a 
concomitant of happiness—the happy person loves whatever he loves under the 
common notion of good (ST I-II 4.4: Cf. ST I 20.2). And it is precisely this context in 
which we must understand Aquinas’s view that friendship is required for happiness.68 
Aquinas follows Aristotle in maintaining that friendship is required for happiness not 
merely because friends can be useful or can bring one pleasure, but rather because 
friends are necessary for acting well; hence friendship between virtuous persons is the 
ideal sort insofar as it helps each friend to act in accordance with the good. 
If we are speaking about happiness (felicitas) in the present life… the 
happy person needs friends, not on account of their utility, since the 
happy person suffices for himself, nor on account of delight because he 
has perfect delight in himself through the activity of virtue, but on 
account of good action—that is to say (1) that he might do good to 
them, or (2) he might be delighted by seeing them do good, or even (3) 
that he might be helped by them to do good. For in the works of the 
contemplative life and in works of the active life, a human being needs 
the help of friends to act well (ST I-II 4.8; Cf. In Ethic ix 1894-9).69 
                                         
68. Qualification: friends are required for the imperfect happiness attainable in this life. 
However when it comes to perfect happiness consisting in friendship with God, friendship with 
other persons is a concomitant of perfect happiness insofar as it follows from the love of God (ST 
I-II 4.8 ad 3). 
69. Si loquamur de felicitate praesentis vitae, sicut philosophus dicit in IX Ethic., felix indiget 
amicis, non quidem propter utilitatem, cum sit sibi sufficiens; nec propter delectationem, quia habet 
in seipso delectationem perfectam in operatione virtutis; sed propter bonam operationem, ut scilicet 
eis benefaciat, et ut eos inspiciens benefacere delectetur, et ut etiam ab eis in benefaciendo adiuvetur. 
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According to this passage, the reason friendship is required for happiness concerns the 
ways in which it provides opportunities for the moral agent to desire and to promote 
the good. As we have seen, happiness requires both correctness of will and virtuous 
activity, i.e. living well and doing good things. Aquinas here specifies three ways in 
which friendship is required for acting well, and hence for human happiness. First, the 
moral agent’s friends are those he might benefit by seeking to promote their good. 
Since one lives his life in the companionship of his friends, he is in a special position 
not only to know what will in fact benefit his friend, but also has more opportunity to 
do so. One of the effects of love on Aquinas’s account is a real union between 
friends: “to live together, speak together, and to be united together in like things” (ST 
I-II 28.1 ad 2). Persons living in such proximity are generally in the best position to 
know and to act for the sake of the good of one another.  
Second, friendship provides the moral agent with the opportunity to delight in 
seeing his friend act virtuously. Aquinas elaborates on this in his commentary on the 
Nicomachean Ethics where he claims that since human beings are not very good judges 
of their own actions, the happy person can find pleasure in seeing his friend do good: 
“inasmuch as he seeks to study the virtuous actions of the good man who is his friend” 
(In Ethic.,1896).70 Moreover, Aquinas claims that the virtuous person delights in the 
                                         
Indiget enim homo ad bene operandum auxilio amicorum, tam in operibus vitae activae, quam in 
operibus vitae contemplativae.  
70. Sic igitur beatus indigebit talibus amicis, scilicet virtuosis, in quantum quaerit considerare 
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fact that his friend performs a good action, rather than someone with whom he is 
merely acquainted, because he considers his friend as “another oneself;” so in some 
sense, Aquinas claims, the friend views the other’s actions as if they were his own 
(ibid.).71 In addition to Aquinas’s explicit claims here, it is in keeping with Aquinas’s 
general account of the love characteristic of friendship (amor amicitiae) that the one 
who loves delights in seeing the other do good, since willing and doing good is partly 
constitutive of the other’s own happiness and good. This is because the love 
characteristic of friendship is the sort of love which promotes the good of the other 
for the other’s own sake. 
Finally, when Aquinas claims that human beings need the help of friends to act 
well, he elaborates in his commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics that it is difficult for one to 
do good continuously if he lives alone without the sort of interchange that takes place 
between friends (In Ethic.,1897-8). Certainly, it seems reasonable to think one is 
helped by the support and encouragement of friends to continue to act well over a 
sustained period. Additionally, we might suppose that certain good ends cannot be 
achieved by a person acting alone, but that such goods require friends working 
together in order to achieve them.72 Whatever the reasons, it is clear that Aquinas’s 
                                         
bonas actiones et sibi appropriatas, quales quidem sunt actiones viri boni, qui est amicus. 
71. I elaborate on the “other oneself” relation in chapter 3. 
72. John Cooper provides an extended and plausible analysis of how shared activities are 
“central to a person’s life and contribute most decisively to his flourishing.” Cf. “Aristotle on 
Friendship,” in &&&, 324-330. 
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reasons for holding that friendship is necessary for happiness in this life derives from 
his understanding that genuine happiness entails acting for the sake of the good and 
friendship provides one with optimum opportunity to do so.  
b. SELF-LOVE: THE FORM AND ROOT OF FRIENDSHIP 
Having considered why Aquinas maintains that friendship is required for 
genuine happiness and is hence a constitutive feature of self-love, I turn now to 
consider the flip side of the coin: how genuine love of self is required for friendship. 
In keeping with his general view that all human actions are done ultimately for the 
sake of one’s own happiness, i.e. her perfection and completion as a rational being, 
Aquinas claims that self-love is the “form and root” of friendship.  
Just as oneness is the principle of union, so the love (amor) by which one 
loves (diligit) one’s own self, is the form and the root of friendship, for in 
this way we have friendship for another—we cherish our friends just as 
we cherish ourselves; hence it is said in Ethic. ix, “the features belonging 
to friendship directed toward another are derived from those which are 
directed toward oneself” (ST II-II 25.4; Cf. In Ethic. ix, 1858-9).73 
With respect to the form of friendship, we have seen that genuine self-love entails 
loving oneself in accordance with her rational or intellective nature. In other words, it 
amounts to willing and seeking the good perfective of oneself as a rational or 
intellective being. According to Aquinas, then, self-love provides the form of 
friendship insofar as by loving another with amor amicitiae, i.e. the love characteristic of 
                                         
73. Unde sicut unitas est principium unionis, ita amor quo quis diligit seipsum, est forma et 
radix amicitiae, in hoc enim amicitiam habemus ad alios, quod ad eos nos habemus sicut ad 
nosipsos; dicitur enim in IX Ethic. quod amicabilia quae sunt ad alterum veniunt ex his quae sunt ad 
seipsum. 
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friendship, she seeks the good of the other in the same way that she seeks her own 
good. Hence, in the paradigmatic case of love for another person, the rational agent 
loves her friend in a manner similar to the way in which she loves herself.74 This 
entails seeking the good of one’s friend as an end in itself, such that the one loving 
desires and actively promotes the ends which contribute to the genuine happiness of 
her friend, i.e. those ends in which are perfective of his intellective nature such that 
his rational desires are completely fulfilled. This is what Aquinas means by cherishing 
one’s friend as one cherishes herself.  
Moreover, self-love provides the root of friendship insofar as it provides the 
principle for friendship. The desire for one’s own happiness or perfection provides 
the foundation for all of a person’s rational desires including the desire for friendship. 
As we saw in the passage quoted above (ST I-II 4.8), friendship is an essential part of 
a rational being’s happiness insofar as it provides the agent with the best opportunity 
to perform good actions, and performing good actions is essential to being virtuous, 
which is requisite of the perfection of the rational agent. Elsewhere, in his account of 
the theological virtue of caritas (the highest and best form of amor amicitiae), Aquinas 
indicates that the principle act of caritas is to love (ST II-II 27).75 He appeals to 
                                         
74. Cf. Aristotle, “One person is a friend to another most of all if he wishes goods to the 
other for the other’s sake…But these are features most of all of one’s relation to oneself; and so too 
are all the other defining features of a friend, since we have said that all the features of friendship 
extend from oneself to others,” (EN 1168b, tr. Irwin). 
75. I will address the theological virtue of caritas in chapter four of the dissertation. 
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Aristotle saying, “friendship consists in loving rather than being loved,” (ST II-II 
27.1sc). The love characteristic of friendship entails acting for the good of one’s 
friends. Insofar as genuine self-love or the desire for happiness requires virtue, and 
friendship is a virtue which entails acting for the good of another, the happiness of 
the rational being must include loving others, and in particular with amor amicitiae. 
Hence we can see how love of self is the root or principle from which the rational 
agent loves, and thereby actively seeks to promote the good of the one loved.  
In sum, self-love just is the desire for one’s final ultimate end: one’s own 
happiness or perfection as an intellective being, and friendship is partly constitutive of 
this end. Nevertheless, the fully rational agent does not love her friends merely as a 
means to her own happiness, due to the very character of friendship itself. One loves 
one’s friend with amor amicitiae, and an essential feature of amor amicitiae is the love of 
another person as an end in himself. Such love is characterized by benevolence and 
beneficence, both of which are other-directed qualities according to which, 
respectively, one wishes and actively promotes the good of the other. Hence, self-love is 
the principle of friendship, but friendship itself requires loving and acting for the sake 
of another for the other’s own sake. A seemingly paradoxical yet necessary feature of 
genuine self-love, then is that it is at once both directed toward the ultimate end of 
one’s own happiness and directed toward the good of another which is desired as an 
end in itself and never as merely a means.  
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D. OBJECTION: A TWO-LEVEL STRATEGY? 
On Aquinas’s view, rational agents do, as a matter of fact, seek to live in such a 
way that they believe will allow them to attain happiness, the best life for a human 
being. This is the natural inclination of all rational creatures. The fully rational agent 
seeks to order her commitments and priorities in such a way that will help her attain 
the most happiness or the best kind of life for a human being.76 Accordingly, virtue 
and amor amicitiae along with all other objects and ends of the rational agent are sought 
ultimately for the sake of the agent’s own happiness. As we have seen, love, and in 
particular the love characteristic of friendship, is an essential component of happiness, 
or the best life for a human being. But the love characteristic of friendship entails 
loving another person for that person’s own sake. Is there something incongruent about 
loving another person for her own sake if ultimately that love is sought for the sake of 
the happiness of the one loving? Can we seek the good of the other as an end in itself 
if one’s doing so is ultimately directed toward achieving one’s own happiness? 
One might think that in order to avoid this apparent conflict, one must employ 
a two-level strategy along the lines of the one Railton proposes with respect to 
consequentialism. Recall that according to objective consequentialism, one need not 
deliberate about whether or each of her actions is morally justified by meeting the 
                                         
76. Once again, I am speaking of the sort of imperfect happiness available to the agent in 
this life. I do not address here the important questions concerning perfect happiness which depends 
upon the infused virtue of caritas and pertains to everlasting life. 
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consequentialist standard of moral goodness, i.e. that each action in fact promotes the 
most overall good, so long as one is acting in accordance with being the best sort of 
person—one whose life as a whole contributes to the most overall good, even if this 
means sometimes performing the wrong action. If my arguments against this sort of 
strategy succeed, then it would be problematic if it were to turn out that Aquinas’s 
account of the love characteristic of friendship employed a two-level strategy 
according to which the love itself has intrinsic but non-moral value where the 
attainment of one’s own happiness or perfection as an intellective being is the only 
end with true moral value.  
It is worth noting that Aquinas does not think it necessary to reflect upon how 
every human action, in particular every act of loving, contributes to her own 
happiness or perfection (Cf. ST I-II 1.6 ad 3).77 Accordingly, the rational agent can 
love another for the other’s own sake without attending to the fact that doing so is 
ultimately part of attaining one’s own happiness. But even if one is not consciously 
thinking about one’s own good when desiring the good of another person, doesn’t 
Aquinas’s theory entail that, at the end of the day, the real reason one cares about the 
good of another is because doing so, ultimately, will promote one’s own good? This is 
to say that if one were to discover that promoting the good of the other for the 
                                         
77. Likewise, as indicated above, neither does Railton think that the objective 
consequentialist is required to consider the moral value of each of her actions, so long as upon 
reflection, she is able to show how they contribute to promoting the most overall good, or at least 
stem from being the sort of person who promotes the most overall good, even if this sometimes 
means performing the wrong action. 
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other’s own sake did not contribute to one’s own happiness, it would be not be 
morally required, and perhaps not even rational, for one to do so.78 
E. REPLY TO THE OBJECTION 
There is sense in which Aquinas’s theory does involve two levels. According to 
Aquinas’s moral psychology all of the fully rational person’s actions are ultimately 
directed toward attaining happiness, that which perfects and completes her as an 
intellective and relational being. The best sorts of friendship will enable her to become 
the best sort of person and hence strive toward the best life for a human being. 
Whatever does not actually contribute to her perfection as such is not rational insofar 
as it undermines her ultimate goal of attaining genuine happiness over the course of 
her life. Hence, certain kinds of love, in particular those rooted in the wrong sort of 
self-love eventually undermine the agent’s ultimate end. So if she were to consciously 
                                         
78. This is essentially a formulation of what has been referred to in the literature on 
Aquinas’s moral theory as “the problem of love.” As David M. Gallagher describes it, the problem 
involves an apparent conflict within Aquinas’s theory of love. Since loving is an act of willing and 
since every act of willing is ultimately directed toward one’s own good, then it follows that the object 
of love is always one’s own good (suum bonum). However, Aquinas also holds that the highest and 
best sort of love is the love for another person which involves desiring the good of the other for the 
other’s own sake. This kind of love, as we have seen, is what Aquinas refers to as amor amicitiae, or the 
love characteristic of friendship. Considered in light of Aquinas’s general theory of the will, 
according to which every act of willing and hence loving is ultimately directed toward one’s own 
good, it would appear that loving another for the other’s own sake is always ultimately directed 
toward one’s own good. But if this is the case, it would appear that Aquinas is being inconsistent—
one’s love for another can never really be motivated by the desire for the good of the other for the 
other’s own sake, at least not ultimately, since such love is always ultimately motivated by the desire for 
one’s own good.  Gallagher addresses the problem arguing for the thesis that the rational agent’s 
desire for his own good, or happiness, is not incongruent with loving another for the other’s own 
sake; in fact, he argues, one’s desire for happiness, a form of self-love, is what gives rise to the love 
of another for the other’ own sake. David M. Gallagher, “Desire for Beatitude and Love of 
Friendship in Thomas Aquinas.” Mediaeval Studies 58 (1996): 1-47. 
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reflect upon those loves, and to apprehend that such loves do not in fact contribute to 
her overall good, she would have good reason to give them up. 
There is another sense, however, in which Aquinas’s theory does not rely upon 
any sort of two-level strategy. This is because there is a clear-eyed sense in which one 
may ultimately aim at her own perfection, and yet recognize that this entails loving 
another for the other’s own sake. The difference between the two-level strategy deployed 
by Railton and Aquinas’s account of amor amicitiae, is that Railton considers one’s loves 
and friendships to possess intrinsic yet non-moral value. But for Aquinas amor amicitiae 
possesses both kinds of value—it is a moral relation in that it is directed toward two 
ends: 1) a sort of union with the beloved, and 2) the good of the other which is 
desired for the sake of the other. This other-directed component is an essential 
feature of amor amicitiae and is what makes the love relation morally valuable in its own 
right. So, although love of self provides the ultimate motivation for all of the rational 
agent’s commitments and actions, the love characteristic of friendship entails loving 
the other for the other’s own sake where the good of the other is an end in itself. 
Aquinas can consistently hold that loving another for the other’s own sake is an end 
in itself and also that self-love is the ultimate motivation for all that an agent does. 
There is a priority involved insofar as all actions of the fully rational agent are 
ultimately directed toward attaining happiness, but not conflict insofar as amor amicitiae 
involves acting for the good of the other for the other’s own sake and doing so is partly 
constitutive of the agent’s own happiness. Thus, Aquinas’s account, unlike Railton’s, 
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does not ultimately require the employment of a two-level strategy. Aquinas doesn’t 
try to take the subjective part out of love by requiring that it ultimately meet some 
impartial or universal standard. Amor amicitiae is morally valuable in its own right 
without being ultimately evaluated from some impersonal impartial standard of 
morality according to which the agent’s actions are ultimately evaluated in terms of 
promoting the most overall good. 
To see how this is so, we might reconsider the case of Juan and Linda. On 
Railton’s account, spending the money on a ticket to see Linda instead of writing the 
check to OXFAM is a morally wrong act, even if it may be justified by virtue of Juan’s 
being the sort of person who prioritizes the needs of his wife even when doing so fails 
to meet the universal criterion of promoting the most overall good. But on Aquinas’s 
account of amor amicitiae, there is no such conflict. Juan’s decision to prioritize the 
needs of his wife is morally good insofar as it entails acting for Linda’s good for Linda’s 
own sake. Juan is right to prioritize Linda’s needs since he has a special commitment 
to her as his wife. As we shall see in chapters three and four, there is moral value in 
prioritizing the needs of those to whom we have a special commitment. Hence, on 
Aquinas’s theory, there need not be any sort of potential conflict between promoting 
the good of the persons one loves and acting in accordance with what is morally right.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE FRANKFURTIAN APPROACH: LOVE IS NOT  
SUBJECT TO MORAL EVALUATION 
Aquinas holds that love is rational in the sense that it is responsive to the 
individual’s apprehension of what is the good to be pursued.1 He holds that there are 
normative reasons for love based upon the value of the one loved and according to 
which love is rationally and morally evaluable as appropriate or inappropriate with 
regard to what one loves. I shall argue that Aquinas’s account of the relation between 
love and rationality is more compelling than that of Harry Frankfurt who denies that 
love is a response to the perceived value of the one loved and that our loves are 
normatively evaluable. On Frankfurt’s view, love is a higher order desire to support 
and sustain a first order desire, which is evaluable only in terms of one’s more basic 
desires and, as such, is not subject to rational or moral evaluation. Aquinas, on the 
other hand, holds that in beings capable of cognition, love (amor) generally speaking 
entails the apprehension of some object or end as somehow suitable or fitting to the 
one who loves. Moreover, in rational or intellective beings, love pertaining to the will 
(dilectio) has as its formal object the good universally considered or some particular 
                                         
1. I am primarily concerned with Aquinas’s account of love as it pertains to the will (dilectio) 
since this is the kind of love of which friendship (amicitia) is comprised. As the previous chapter 
demonstrates, friendship constitutes the paradigmatic form of love between persons, and is hence 
the most interesting form pertaining to Aquinas’s moral psychology. Nevertheless, in order to 
elucidate love as it pertains to the will, it will prove useful to see how this informs his account of 
love in general (amor in the wider extension of the term) as well as his account of sensory love (amor 
in more narrow technical sense of the term), which pertains to the sensory appetite. 
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individual considered under the aspect of the good. According to Aquinas, the one 
who loves apprehends what is loved as good to be pursued, and love is deemed 
appropriate or not according to whether or not the object or end actually is good to 
be pursued and whether or not this love should occupy the place in the agent’s 
motivational structure that it does. 
In this chapter I will explain Frankfurt’s account of love as a sort of desire 
which at the most basic level has no reasons other than the fact that loving itself is 
important to us as human beings insofar as it gives our lives meaning and purpose. 
After suggesting what I take to be some of the most compelling features of his 
account of love, I will argue that his account of love is ultimately unsatisfactory—love 
is responsive to reasons, and is hence rationally and morally evaluable, even at its most 
basic level. Then I will explicate Aquinas’s descriptive account of love between 
persons (i.e. rational or intellective beings), focusing in particular on the love 
characteristic of friendship (amor amicitiae), which constitutes the paradigmatic case of 
love for another person indicating how, contra Frankfurt, such love is not ultimately 
rooted in desire, but is an appetitive response to what the agent’s intellect presents as 
good to be pursue. Finally, I will argue that Aquinas provides a more satisfactory 
account of love as something which is rationally and morally evaluable in terms of the 
value of the one loved and the place that love occupies in the moral agent’s 
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motivational structure.2 Unlike Frankfurt, Aquinas holds that there are normative 
reasons for loving persons, and for ordering our loves in a particular way. Two of the 
central questions I intend to address are 1) what makes love normatively appropriate? 
And 2) what sorts of love relationships are to be prioritized in one’s motivational 
structure and why? 
A. FRANKFURT ON LOVE AND REASON3 
Frankfurt’s descriptive account of love is rooted in a Humean understanding of 
the will according to which human motivation is ultimately to be explained in terms of 
an agent’s beliefs and desires. Frankfurt, of course, is well known for his analysis of 
the self in terms of hierarchically ordered desires; his work on love is an extension of 
this understanding of the nature of our wills and our motivational essences. Love, he 
suggests, plays an essential role in the lives of human beings as that which sets our 
final ends, defines our volitional boundaries and hence constitutes our very identities 
as individuals. Frankfurt argues for a desire-based account of love according to which 
it plays a foundational role in the motivational structure of human beings. On his 
                                         
2. Aquinas’s view that love has normative value is in keeping with the view that love “has 
traditionally been regarded as being rational and as admitting of degrees of moral excellence,” 
Gabrielle Taylor, “Love” (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76, 1976): 154. 
3. Reasons of Love (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). This book is based upon the 
Romanell-Phi Beta Kappa Lectures which Frankfurt delivered at Princeton in 2000 under the title 
“Some Thoughts about Norms,Love, and the Goals of Life” and again as the Sherman Lectures at 
University College London in 2001. My exposition of Frankfurt’s account of love is also drawn from 
his articles “Autonomy, Necessity, and Love” and “On Caring,” in Necessity, Volition, and Love 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 129-141, 155-180; and “Some Mysteries of Love,” 
Lindley Lecture (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2001). The page numbers in the parenthetical 
references will refer to Reasons of Love unless otherwise indicated. 
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account, love is a configuration of the will constituted by various relatively stable 
volitional dispositions and constraints which govern a person’s attitudes and conduct 
in accordance with what he loves. Frankfurt identifies love as a particular mode of 
caring: “Among the things that we care about there are some that we cannot help 
caring about; and among the things we cannot help caring about are those that we 
love” (“On Caring,” 165). Caring about a particular object or state of affairs, as 
Frankfurt describes it, consists in having and identifying with a higher-order desire to 
support and sustain a first-order desire for it. It is not merely a matter of wanting it, or 
even wanting it more than other things; it requires further a willing commitment by 
which a person sees to it that a particular desire continues to play a significant role in 
the order of his preferences. This commitment entails a disposition to actively support 
and sustain the desire as part of one’s motivational structure. Moreover, this higher-
order desire for the first-order desire to be sustained is not some external force by 
which a person happens to be moved at some time or another such as an addiction or 
a passion; rather, it is a desire with which a person identifies insofar as he considers it to 
express what he truly wants.4 
                                         
4. Frankfurt maintains that it is through caring that a person gives himself volitional 
continuity, a stable disposition to be motivated in particular ways, and thereby takes an active role in 
the constitution of his own agency. Love, on his account, is like other modes of caring insofar as it is 
essentially volitional as opposed to being affective or cognitive. Frankfurt describes it as “essentially 
a somewhat non-voluntary and complex volitional structure that bears both upon how a person is 
disposed to act and upon how he is disposed to manage the motivations and interests by which he is 
moved” (“On Caring,” 165). The will of one who loves is ordered such that the good of some 
beloved ideal or object plays a foundational role in ordering his priorities and in guiding his behavior. 
Frankfurt conceives of love, moreover, as a sort of concern for the good of the beloved which he 
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Frankfurt rejects rationalist accounts of love according to which love is a 
response to some perceived value. He maintains that love itself provides the 
foundation of one’s motivational structure and provides human beings with a source 
of reasons; nevertheless when it comes love, in particular our most basic loves, love 
itself has no reasons. A particularly striking aspect of Frankfurt’s account of love is his 
rejection of the rationalist view that love essentially consists in the recognition and 
appreciation of the inherent value of one’s beloved. On his view, love is not most 
basically a response of the lover to the perceived value of the beloved.5 This is not to 
deny that the beloved is valuable to the lover, but to deny that the perception of value 
is a necessary condition for the formation and grounding of love. According to 
Frankfurt, the essential relation between love and value is that our loving is what 
makes something to be of particular value to us: “It is not necessarily as a result of 
recognizing their value and of being captivated by it that we love things. Rather, what 
we love necessarily acquires value for us because we love it” (Reasons of Love, 39). Hence, 
the value a lover identifies in his beloved derives from and depends upon the love itself. 
Among human relationships, Frankfurt considers the paradigmatic instance of love to 
                                         
characterizes as both essentially disinterested in that it involves caring about the beloved object for its 
own sake rather than for the sake of some other good, and volitionally constrained in that it is not a 
concern over which a person has direct and immediate voluntary control. 
5. Frankfurt’s view that love is not based upon a response to value stands directly opposed 
to David Velleman’s account of love (based upon the notion of Kantian respect) as most centrally 
an “arresting awareness” of the inherent value of the beloved which the lover is in the special 
position of “really seeing.”  See J. David Velleman. “Love as a Moral Emotion.” Ethics 109 (1999): 
338-374. I will examine Velleman’s account of love more closely in the next chapter.  
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be the kind of selfless devotion a parent has toward her infant or small child. He 
suggests that this sort of love is not based on the evaluation of the child’s inherent 
value, but that parent’s love is what causes the parent to attribute the value to the 
child that she does. He observes “[t]he particular value I attribute to my children is 
not inherent in them but depends upon my love for them. The reason they are so 
precious to me is simply that I love them so much” (40).  Frankfurt contends, 
moreover, that this relation between love and the value of the beloved holds generally, 
even accounting for the value to us of our own lives. We do not value living as a result 
of recognizing and appreciating the intrinsic value of our lives; rather it is due to the 
very fact that we love living that our lives possess such great value for us. Love then, 
as construed by Frankfurt, is not derived from value; it is, rather, the source or creator 
of value.  
The claim that the particular value to us of what we love is the result of our 
loving somewhat plausible with respect to certain sorts of cases. One of Frankfurt’s 
primary arguments concerns the importance to us that we care about, or even love, 
some thing or another. What grounds our care isn’t the value of the object one cares 
about, but the importance of caring in general. That we care about something is what 
provides our lives with meaning or purpose, and causes us to flourish as the kinds of 
beings who, by nature, need to have a sense of purpose. For instance, my Dad loves 
to play golf. Accordingly, golf is something that is important to him. His love for golf, 
however, is not based upon the intrinsic value of the game itself (although the game 
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may have a certain kind of intrinsic value), but rather in the fact that golf is something 
that he cares about. But the value of golf is not based upon its importance in general, 
but rather in the importance of caring about something whether it is golf or some other 
thing. Frankfurt’s claim that caring, or loving, is itself what is important seems right 
when it comes to this sort of case.  
However, there are other sorts of cases in which is it not ultimately the 
importance to us of caring about something that accounts for the value of love, but the 
intrinsic value of the object of our caring or love. This is particularly true in cases 
concerning the love for other persons. Certainly it is true that it is important to us as 
human beings that we care about certain other persons. But there is a deeper sense of 
importance attached to cases of loving other persons, insofar as such persons are 
intrinsically valuable apart from whether we love them of not. The intrinsic value of 
persons is not ultimately rooted in our most basic desires, but in the fact that each 
person is valuable in their own right, and hence we have reasons to love them. Even 
in Frankfurt’s paradigmatic case of the love of a parent for a small child or infant, the 
value of our caring is not merely based upon their value to us, but in the fact that the 
child is valuable full stop, regardless of our caring. Granted the parent may not come 
to love the child on the basis of recognizing her intrinsic value, but should recognize 
that she has intrinsic value, and would have such value even if, for some reason or 
another, the parent failed to recognize it. The value of the child is not ultimately based 
upon her value to the parent or to anyone else for that matter. Accordingly, contra 
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Frankfurt, we have normative reasons for loving our children, and indeed other 
persons we love, based ultimately in their intrinsic value, not merely the value we 
attribute to them rooted, which is rooted in our most fundamental desires. 
In opposition this sort of claim about the normativity of love based upon the 
inherent value of the one loved, Frankfurt goes on to make a much stronger and more 
surprising claim about the relation between love and value. Love itself, he claims, is the 
ultimate source of what he refers to as “terminal” or “inherent” value.6 This is 
because, on his view, love is what provides us with final ends: ends we seek not 
merely for their instrumental value, but for their own sake. And final ends are 
important to us insofar as they are necessary for us to engage in purposeful activity 
diachronically over the course of our lives and thereby make our lives meaningful (51-
5). In the following passage, Frankfurt describes how love meets the human need for 
final ends by virtue of generating terminal or inherent value: 
Love is the originating source of terminal value. If we loved nothing, 
then nothing would possess for us any definitive and inherent worth. 
There would be nothing that we found ourselves in any way constrained 
to accept as a final end. By its very nature, loving entails both that we 
                                         
6. Frankfurt does not explain here precisely what he means by these terms and so it is 
difficult to determine whether he is justified in conflating them. Presumably by “terminal value,” he 
means final value since he holds that it is by loving something that we make it a final end, i.e. a 
terminus. However, this seems to me quite distinct from having inherent value, which may be taken 
to mean something like intrinsic value, i.e. the value of something in itself apart from the subjective 
attitudes of another. Frankfurt’s view is that the intrinsic value of something, which has to do with 
the type rather than the amount of value it possesses, is quite irrelevant to our caring: there are many 
intrinsically valuable objects and ends which we are under no obligation to care about (12-13). His 
point is that by caring, we make certain objects and ends important to us so that they come to acquire 
inherent value for us irrespective of whether or not or how much intrinsic value they have. 
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regard its objects as valuable in themselves and that we have no choice 
but to adopt those objects as our final ends. Insofar as love is the creator 
both of inherent or terminal value and of importance, then, it is the 
ultimate ground of practical rationality (55-56). 
Frankfurt thus comes to a significant yet contentious conclusion about the 
foundations of practical rationality. In setting our final ends, love is not only the 
source of inherent value; it is also the source of the standards of practical reason. 
Even more provocative is Frankfurt’s suggestion that love is what provides the 
ultimate source of reasons justifying our moral principles.7  
He is fully aware that his position is contrary to the views of philosophers who 
claim that certain objects and states of affairs have inherent value entirely independent 
of anyone’s subjective attitudes or volitional dispositions. However, he denies that this 
claim has any relevance to matters which pertain to the grounding of practical reason. 
Even if some object or state of affairs has intrinsic value and so is worthy of pursuing 
as a final end, this would not entail that anyone has an obligation to pursue it as such, 
regardless of how great its inherent worth. Frankfurt contends that the claim that 
things have inherent value independent of any subjective considerations, if true, 
“would still provide no account at all of how people are to select the ends that they will 
pursue” (57). On his view, the question of how a person’s ends are appropriately 
                                         
7. Frankfurt denies not only that there are certain final ends which reason requires us to 
adopt, but also that reason provides the ultimate justification of our moral principles. He suggests 
instead that the ultimate ground is determined by what we love: “In the end…the most fundamental 
source of moral normativity is not in our rationality but in our love for the condition and style of life 
that moral principles envisage,” “Rationalism in Ethics,” in Autonomes Handeln: Beitrage zur Philosophie 
von Harry G. Frankfurt. Ed. Monika Betzler (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 2000): 272. 
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established is not primarily a question concerning value, but rather is a question 
concerning that which a person considers to be of importance. Frankfurt considers it a 
“serious mistake” to think that the importance of some object or end is authentic just 
in case that object or end has value apart from one’s caring about it (“Importance,” 
93). It is not the independent value of something which makes it important to us; the 
direction of fit, he thinks, is quite the opposite: it is our valuing something that makes 
it important. On Frankfurt’s view, then, an adequate response to the question of how 
our ends are appropriately established must take into account what that person cannot 
help but to consider important to himself, that is, it must take into account what a 
person loves; but the inherent value of the object of love is not what determines it 
importance.  
The notion of importance plays a significant role in Frankfurt’s account of 
caring (and love); hence, we should be clear about the distinct (although compatible) 
notions that he distinguishes between (“Importance,” 92). One way something can be 
important to us is independent altogether of whether or not we care about it. For 
instance, I may not care about the fact that I am working in an asbestos infested 
library. This may simply be because I am unaware that the library contains asbestos, or 
because I am unaware of the possible negative effects the asbestos will have upon my 
health. I fail to recognize its importance to me and so do not care about it. Frankfurt’s 
primary interest, however, is with a different notion of importance. Something may be 
important to us by virtue of the very fact that we care about it. For instance, my sister 
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is important to me by virtue of my caring about her. If I did not care about her, she 
would not have the place of importance in my life that she does. 
Accordingly, Frankfurt points out two distinct sorts of justification to which 
one may appeal as grounds for thinking that something she cares about is worthy of her 
caring. The first sort would involve appealing to the independent importance of some 
object or end and, on the basis of this, deciding that it is worth caring about. But the 
second sort would not require her to suppose the object or end is independently 
important to her at all. She may be justified in caring about something simply by 
virtue of the fact that caring about it is itself something that is important to her.8 In 
cases where the importance to us of something is due to our caring, the critical 
question to ask is not whether the object is independently important to us such that it 
warrants our caring, but whether we are warranted in making the object important to 
us by caring about it. This, Frankfurt contends, can only be justified “in terms of the 
importance of the activity of caring as such” (“Importance,” 93). We might then ask 
here what grounds the important of the activity of caring. Is it simply that we care 
about caring? If is something more, i.e. that we care about certain things in their own 
right, then it would appear that our justification for caring about those things might 
depend upon something other than our most fundamental desires. In this case it 
would appear that we care about the things we do for because apprehend them as 
                                         
8. Cf. the above example of the importance of golf to my Dad. 
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having some sort of value apart from our caring, not merely because caring about 
some thing or another is important to us. But this seems to imply that we have 
reasons for caring about certain things, quite independent of the fundamental desire 
for meaning or purpose in our lives.  
This is contrary to Frankfurt’s claim that our caring is important to us is in 
itself apart from the independent importance of the object “primarily because [it is 
our caring about something which] serves to connect us actively to our lives in ways 
which are creative of ourselves and which expose us to distinctive possibilities for 
necessity and for freedom,” (“Importance,” 93). Our caring about something or 
another regardless of what it is meets our basic desire for meaning and is hence what 
constitutes our volitional identities. And this, according to Frankfurt, is what defines 
the very essence of our identities as persons. 9 
In The Reasons of Love Frankfurt makes an even stronger claim about the relation 
between caring and importance: “It is by caring” he says, “that we infuse the world 
with importance” (23). If we cared about nothing, nothing would have any 
importance to us. Frankfurt further claims that loving, as the mode of caring which 
essentially involves caring about something as an end in itself (but not as something 
                                         
9. Frankfurt has an interesting and complex account of how our caring, and more basically 
our loving, is constitutive of our personal identities. Although I won’t be able to pursue these issues 
here, David Velleman provides an intriguing critique of Frankfurt’s account of identity in which he 
denies that we have “motivational essences” of the sort which define our individual essences as 
persons. See his “Identification and Identity,” in Contours of Agency, Ed. Sarah Buss and Lee Overton. 
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002. 104-123. See also Frankfurt’s reply in the same volume. 
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with intrinsic value independent of our loving it), is of fundamental importance to us 
insofar as it sets our final ends, thus making it possible for us to have sustained 
commitments and pursuits. In providing our volitional lives with continuity, final ends 
are essential for us to have the sorts of goals which make our lives meaningful and 
purposeful. Furthermore, our loving, insofar as it sets our final ends, is the very source 
of reasons by which our volitional and practical lives are directed.  
On the flip side of this coin, Frankfurt insists that our loving, at least when it 
comes to our most basic loves, is not itself subject to rational evaluation. Practical 
reasoning is involved in setting our final ends only insofar as it can help us to identify 
what it is that we love (55, fn. 9). But with respect to what we love, where we are 
satisfied or wholehearted in our love, Frankfurt insists that questions concerning 
whether our loving is warranted or whether it might be better for us to love 
something else instead are not questions we can (practically speaking) take seriously 
(49). Our disposition to be wholeheartedly satisfied in what we love, Frankfurt 
contends, does not depend upon any rational assessment of our love; rather, it 
depends upon a sort of confidence we have in our own volitional character (50). 
This notion of confidence plays a fundamental role in Frankfurt’s conception of 
practical reasoning. As he sees it, the final end or terminus of our practical reasoning 
is not truth about the value of what we love; the final end, rather, is confidence in our 
own volitional characters, characters constituted by love itself. Barbara Herman 
succinctly and precisely summarizes Frankfurt’s position as follows: “the norms of 
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practical reflection are a guide to confidence, not truth—that is, to confidence in 
ourselves as valuers, not to any truth about value.”10 It is at this point of confidence in 
ourselves and in our loving that we reach the substratum of practical reasoning. 
Hence when we are wholeheartedly satisfied with our loving, that is, when our wills 
are undivided with respect to what we love, there is nothing in us to oppose our love 
with the result that we would seriously attempt to alter our wills by trying to stop 
loving what we do or to love differently. What we love at the most fundamental level 
provides the final end, the terminus, of practical reasoning, but love itself—at the end 
of the day—has no reasons.  
But is this really the end of the story? I intend to show that it is not. Although 
the sorts of desires associated with love are not usually the result of some process of 
rational deliberation, either conscious or unconscious, they are nonetheless desires 
which are responsive to reasons. And reasons, it seems plausible to think, are 
grounded in truth about value.11 I shall begin by addressing the first part of this claim: 
that love consists in the sorts of higher-order desires which are themselves responsive 
to reasons.  
                                         
10. Barbara Herman, “Bootstrapping,” in Contours of Agency, ed. Sarah Buss and Lee Overton 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002), 261. Frankfurt himself praises Herman’s account of his 
position as “not only extraordinarily comprehensive and accurate,” but also as “sensitive and 
insightful, presenting [his] views in ways that bring out quite vividly just what they amount to and 
what they count for.” See his “Reply to Barbara Herman” op. cit. 277. 
11. Here I am in agreement with Herman although I do not follow her in holding that the 
connection between reasons and values is best explained by Kant’s “more metaphysically contentful 
notion of the will.” 
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Frankfurt’s claim that love has no reasons cuts to the core of rationalist 
accounts of human motivation insofar as he takes the objects of a person’s non-
voluntary pre-rational desires, objects of desire which are effectively immune to 
rational evaluation, to be the objects and ends in which all of the other objects of 
desire are ultimately desired. But for Frankfurt it is not the objects of our basic desires, 
but the desires themselves which constitute our final ends. Contrary to Frankfurt, I 
contend that although it is certainly true that most basic desires or loving constitutes a 
source of reasons it is a mistake to deny that love itself, which he identifies with 
volitional desire, is a response to the perceived value of the object love and as such 
rationally (and morally) evaluable. Hence, I intend to argue against Frankfurt and 
show why it is more plausible to think that we have normative reasons for loving what 
we do such that we can be wrong in loving certain objects or ends, or giving them the 
place in our motivational structure that they occupy. Accordingly, in this section, I will 
explore why I find it compelling to think that the higher-order desires Frankfurt 
associates with love are the sorts of desires which themselves are responsive to 
reasons concerning the value of the object and ends loved, and which are evaluable 
with respect to whether or not such objects or ends possess genuine intrinsic value, 
rather than merely with respect to our more basic desires.12 I will consider why it 
                                         
12. In his discussion about Frankfurt’s account of identification, Richard Moran appeals to 
the distinction between brute desires and the more complex and sophisticated sorts of desires which 
depend upon our evaluative judgments. He suggests that it is by virtue of their being responsive to 
reasons that we are active with respect to some of our desires in such a way that they can be said to 
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seems plausible to think that love involves the sorts of desires which arise from our 
rational judgments about what is worthwhile or good to be pursued. The first reason 
is that it makes sense that when there is a lapse of reasons for loving, the loving itself 
may no longer be considered normatively appropriate.13  
To see how this is so, it will prove useful to consider a hypothetical example 
involving someone who is wholeheartedly satisfied in her loving, but comes to 
discover some terrible truth about the character of the person she loves, a discovery 
which gives her reason to oppose her love and to alter the priority the love occupies 
in the structuring of her motivations and preferences. Consider a case in which a 
grown woman with a close and loving relationship with her father comes to discover 
that all of her life she had been mistaken about the sort of person her father really is. 
Not only does she love her father, but also her young son, whom she also loves, has a 
deep and abiding mutual bond with him as his grandson. The loving commitments 
between these family members could be accurately described as wholehearted—there 
is no uncertainty or ambivalence which would cause them to seriously question 
                                         
really belong to us. See his article “Frankfurt on Identification: Ambiguities of Activity in Mental 
Life” in Contours of Agency. Ed. Sarah Buss and Lee Overton (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002) 
189-217. This sort of distinction between desires is now well established in the literature. Cf. 
Thomas Nagel’s distinction between “motivated” and “unmotivated” desires in the Possibility of 
Altruism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), Stuart Hampshire’s distinction between 
“thought-dependent” and “thought-independent” desires in Freedom of the Individual (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1975), T.M. Scanlon’s “judgment-sensitive” attitudes, with specific 
reference to desire in What We Owe Each Other (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998). 
13. Cf. Niko Kolodny, “Love as Valuing a Relationship,” 168. 
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whether they should love differently than they do. That is until the woman makes the 
shocking and dreadful discovery that long ago her father had committed unthinkable 
war crimes, crimes which included the cold-blooded murder of innocent children 
(approximately the age of her son) with respect to which he is unrepentant.14 No 
doubt such a discovery would lead to deep conflict within her. It is likely that she may 
come to doubt her filial commitment to her father and perhaps come to oppose her 
love for him. Upon realizing the truth about her father’s character, the woman finds 
that a reason for her love, namely, that she knows her father’s character and knows 
him to be a good man, is not based in the truth. Thus an important reason for her 
love is undermined and she comes to question whether her love is normatively 
appropriate. She may find that she can no longer support or sustain her desire to be in 
a close relationship with him and decide it best that she and her son cease any 
interaction with him. After all, he is not the man she has always believed him to be. 
Of course this situation is extreme, as it would no doubt have to be in a case 
describing someone who comes to oppose a love with respect to which she has 
previously been wholeheartedly satisfied. My primary interest in this example 
                                         
14. This example is inspired by Costa Gravas’s 1989 film Music Box about a Hungarian 
immigrant accused of heinous war crimes committed nearly fifty years prior to his indictment. His 
daughter, a lawyer, agrees to defend him hoping to prove his innocence, but ends up discovering 
that the allegations against her father are true when she finds a picture of him executing a young boy, 
the age of her son (his grandson). The screenwriter, Joe Eszterhas, a native Hungarian who 
immigrated to the US when he was six, bases the story on his memories of growing up in the post-
Holocaust years. He recalls, “You have no idea how terrible it is to discover that your own people 
did these horrendous things…For my generation of Hungarian kids, the question ‘What did you do 
in the war, daddy?’ had potentially nightmarish implications.” 
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concerns how such opposition is best explained. Frankfurt would presumably 
attribute the opposition to an inner conflict among a person’s most basic desires. 
Upon discovering her father’s true character, the woman’s love for her father comes 
into conflict with another of her loves, a more basic love such as her love for her son, 
self-love, or even her love for an abstract ideal such as justice. Whatever the real 
conflict may be, Frankfurt’s account of it is unsatisfactory. We have seen that he 
describes the sort of internal conflict which may afflict a person with respect to her 
most basic desires and commitments as symptomatic of a lack of confidence. But here 
we run into an apparent circularity at the center of his account. Frankfurt describes 
the internal conflict which may occur between a person’s basic desires in terms of a 
crisis of confidence. But this crisis of confidence he explains as an internal conflict 
between a person’s basic desires. So it appears that, in effect, wholeheartedness and 
confidence amount to very nearly the same thing. If this is right, then it would seem 
that the notion of confidence is not really playing any sort of explanatory role at all. 
But perhaps Frankfurt does not intend for it to do so. This may be because, on his 
considered view, no explanation is necessary or even possible. Our most basic loves 
do not admit of explanation, except perhaps in terms of biology or natural selection. 
But it is more plausible that the inner conflict the woman experiences is better 
understood as a response to the lapse of reasons for her love. By allowing that the 
higher-order desires comprising love are the sorts of desires responsive to our 
evaluative judgments, we can arrive at a more satisfactory explanation of how it is that 
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someone could come to oppose a love with respect to which she has antecedently 
been wholeheartedly satisfied. I submit that this opposition is best explained as the 
result of the agent’s having formed an evaluative judgment that her love was ill 
founded, based upon a falsehood. And this judgment has given her reason to oppose 
her love and the motivations associated with it inasmuch as she deems the love no 
longer normatively appropriate.15 
Vis-à-vis Frankfurt, it is plausible to think that questions concerning whether or 
not something we love is itself independently valuable are not only legitimate, but also 
indicate something significant about our individual characters. A notable problem 
which Frankfurt’s account of value and importance cannot resolve is the possibility 
that we could be objectively mistaken in making something valuable to us which does 
not have independent or objective value, or in making something more valuable to us 
than is warranted. To see why this is a problem, we might consider Charles Dickens’s 
well-known character Pip Pirrip. Recall that Pip grew up in lowly circumstances prior 
to receiving a substantial income from an unknown benefactor under the expressed 
terms that he become a gentleman, “in a word a young fellow of great expectations.”16  
                                         
15. Frankfurt would not deny that evaluative judgment is involved in some respect. He may 
say that the woman’s love for her father is judged inappropriate in virtue of conflicting with her 
other more basic loves.  It isn’t evaluation per se that Frankfurt wishes to avoid; rather he wishes to 
avoid evaluation which is not grounded in what we love. Contrary to this, I am suggesting that our 
love is subject to standards of evaluation which are independent from our loves, i.e. standards related 
to the worth or value of the object loved as good to be pursued. 
16. Great Expectations; Oxford World Classics, ed. Margaret Cardwell, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998) 135. 
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Pip, partially as the result of his fixation on Estella, the cold-hearted prodigy of the 
eccentric Miss Havisham, comes to despise any of his prior associations with anything 
she (Estella) might consider “common,” including his dear friend Joe whom he 
describes retrospectively as always steady, always faithful, “amiable, honest-hearted, 
duty-doing.” 
It is worth noticing that the story is told from the perspective of an older more 
mature Pip who, with the benefit of hindsight, has come to realize that his deepest 
commitments and loves were misplaced. In the pursuit of social status, he valued the 
esteem of a person who did not value him and which turned out not to be genuinely 
valuable, or at least not more valuable than the person he forsook in order to pursue 
that esteem. It is with deep regret that the mature Pip recalls how he rejected his most 
faithful friend for the sake of his infatuation and ambition. This regret, of which we 
can certainly find plenty of real life examples, is one reason why it is plausible to think 
that there is an objective sense of value which does not derive from our caring, and 
that this sense of value is essential to what makes certain objects and ends genuinely 
worthy of our care or of our love. Of course, Frankfurt may give a different analysis 
of Pip’s regret. He may say, for instance, that because our loves are subject to change 
one may come to negatively assess what he previously took to be of value. In this way, 
Frankfurt could explain the case without relying on the idea that the younger Pip was 
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objectively mistaken.17 But this sort of explanation is unsatisfactory. Why would Pip 
regret what he did if at the time that he did it, he was acting in accordance with the 
reasons his love provided him? It is not simply in virtue of loving differently that the 
mature Pip considers his past actions regrettable, but his awareness that even at the 
time of these actions, he was mistaken in valuing what he did to the exclusion of what 
was of genuine intrinsic value.  
In light of this regret, it seems right to think that our loving itself is something 
which can be correctly described as subject to our rational evaluation of what is 
normatively appropriate or inappropriate. We can think reflexively about our loves, 
and assess whether or not we are warranted in making particular objects or ends 
valuable to us by loving them. As I have suggested above, it is in virtue of the rational 
capacity to reflect upon our desires and to assess their appropriateness that human 
beings have a certain kind of control over what it is that we make valuable to 
ourselves by our loving. If we come to recognize that our loves conflict with our 
considered judgments about what is good to be pursued, we have reason to oppose 
our loves and to love differently. This is in light of the fact that our love and the 
position it occupies in our motivational structure is subject to rational evaluation; if 
we come to see that our reasons for loving are unfounded such that the love is 
deemed normatively inappropriate, we should be moved to alter that love.  
                                         
17. I am grateful to E.S. Elizondo for compelling me to consider this possible reply to my 
example.  
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In response to the claim that reasons are a response to perceived value, 
Frankfurt reiterates his own view that “values track love and that love—if we look to 
the end of the story—has no reasons.”18 Another reason to think this view is mistaken 
is to consider it from the perspective of the one loved. Here we will consider another 
literary example, in this case, Jane Austen’s remarkable heroine Elizabeth Bennett. 
Recall the first time Elizabeth is proposed to by Mr. Darcy.19 Darcy proclaims his love 
for her after having struggled in vain against his better judgment. He rehearses all of 
the reasons why he should not love her—“his sense of her inferiority--of its being a 
degradation—of the family obstacles which judgment had always opposed to 
inclination.” Elizabeth responds with justified indignation to his declaration of love, 
“I might as well enquire why with so evident design of offending and insulting me, 
you chose to tell me that you liked me against your will, against your reason, and even 
against your character.”20 What is striking about this interaction is just how 
unsatisfying it would be, from the perspective of the one loved, to believe that 
someone loved you despite his rational assessment of your value.21 This I submit is 
                                         
18. See his “Reply to Barbara Herman,” in Contours of Agency, ed. Sarah Buss and Lee 
Overton (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002) 276.  
19. Of course Frankfurt may object to this example since it involves romantic love which he 
thinks cannot provide a very illuminating example of love insofar as it is complicated by passions 
and other self-interested desires with respect to the beloved object. However, those issues are not of 
any real relevance to the features of the example which I am primarily interested in here.  
20. Pride and Prejudice (New York: Knopf, 1991) 175-176. 
21. It might be objected that loving someone despite one’s assessment of the independent 
value of the beloved is the very ideal of unconditional love. This I think is wrong. Unconditional 
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because it is partly constitutive of genuine love that is involves the recognition and 
appreciation of the independent and inherent value of the beloved—a value that does 
not depend merely upon the subjective attitudes of the lover.22 Although Frankfurt 
may be right that love does not generally originate from a positive assessment of the 
value of the beloved, it is a mistake to think that our love is not in some way 
grounded in our perceptions of the independent value of what we love. In cases 
where a person’s love does not reflect his considered judgments about the 
independent value of the beloved, something strikes us as inappropriate about it. All 
this is not to say that love consists in the response to the perceived value of the beloved, 
at least not entirely. Rather, it is to say that, normatively speaking, recognition of the 
independent value of the beloved is a minimum condition of love.  
Frankfurt’s primary insight is that love itself is of central importance to us and 
to the ordering of our motivations insofar as it specifies what we pursue as final ends; 
but for this very reason, it seems to me that our loving must be subject to normative 
standards beyond those set for us by other things we love. Because of the importance 
                                         
love does not involve making an otherwise worthless object into something valuable to us. Rather, it 
involves being committed to someone, recognizing and appreciating their intrinsic value, in spite of 
the things they may do which incline us to give up on them. I shall consider this in the final chapter 
on Aquinas’s conception of charity (caritas). 
22. What Darcy feels for Elizabeth at this point does not appear to be love, but rather some 
sort of blind passion, the kind Gabrielle Taylor identifies with infatuation: “[Infatuation] is the very 
suitably linked with the type of desire which may lead a man to act against his better judgment, while 
the type of want ascribed to love accounts for the view that the lover tends to value what he loves,” 
(“Love,” 156).  
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to us of loving, it strikes us as morally inappropriate to love something we cannot 
reasonably consider to be valuable in its own right, that is, something we do not 
consider to be intrinsically worth pursuing. There are rational constraints upon the 
sorts of objects we can appropriately consider to be final ends if we are to live 
genuinely happy and morally praiseworthy lives.23 Although it is no doubt true that we 
make things important to us by loving them, and hence make valuable to us the things 
we love, it must also be true that to be fully rational, a person must love things that 
are themselves independently worth valuing and thus the kinds of things that can we 
rationally assess as good to be pursued. Thus while Frankfurt is certainly right in what 
he affirms—our loves do create value and in doing so provide a source of reasons, he 
is wrong in what he denies—that there are reasons for love such that our loves are 
rationally and even morally evaluable not merely in terms of other more basic loves, 
but in terms of the intrinsic value of their object. Love is normatively appropriate or 
inappropriate depending upon the genuine value of its object. This is precisely what 
Aquinas affirms in his account of love and its role in human motivation to which I 
now turn.  
                                         
23. Frankfurt takes this into account when he considers an example in which what a person 
cares about is avoiding stepping on cracks in the sidewalk. The error this person makes, he explains, 
is “not that he cares about something which is not really important to him. Rather, his error consists 
in caring about, and thereby imbuing with genuine importance, something which is not worth caring 
about.” And the reason it is not worth caring about, he maintains, is that “it is not important to the 
person to make avoiding the cracks in the sidewalk important to himself,” (“Importance,” 93). But 
here he is trading on an ambiguity between the objective and subjective senses of importance. It 
seems much more plausible to think that the error consists in making something subjectively important 
to oneself which has no objective importance or value. 
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B. AQUINAS ON LOVE AND REASON 
I have suggested that one of Frankfurt’s central insights is his identification of 
love both with the final ends of human beings and with the starting point of practical 
reason—a move that strikes some contemporary moral philosophers as quite distinct 
and innovative. However, it is interesting that, centuries earlier in the history of 
philosophy, love played much the same dual role as the originating principle of 
practical reason and as that which provides us with our final ends. The primacy of 
love to practical rationality is a hallmark of much medieval ethical thought, although 
with this crucial difference: insofar as practical rationality is understood as being 
closely tied with morality, love and moral virtue are inextricably connected; indeed, 
love constitutes the very centerpiece of Aquinas’s moral psychology. In the latter half 
of this chapter, I shall argue that Aquinas offers a more compelling theory of love 
according to which our loves are subject to objective rational constraints, but which 
preserves Frankfurt’s central insight that love is a primary source of reasons in the 
lives of human beings and, as such, is a creator of value.  
On Aquinas’s account, love is responsive to reasons and is rationally and 
morally evaluable in terms of this relation. This is true both with respect to the kinds 
of love which belong to the rational appetite or will which follow directly upon the 
judgment of reason, but even with respect to the passion, amor, which belongs to the 
sensory appetite and is causally explained in terms of one’s sensory apprehension of 
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what is suitable or fitting to the one loving.24 In the next section I shall consider 
Aquinas’s descriptive account of love in general in order to make clear it’s general 
structure. Then I shall consider amor in the stricter sense of the term as that which 
belongs to the sensory appetite. On Aquinas’s view, even the passion amor is 
responsive to reason and morally evaluable to the extent that it is subject to one’s 
rational judgments about the good to be pursued. As the principle of the other 
passions, amor plays a crucial role in the emotional life of the individual. Finally, I shall 
consider love as it pertains to the rational appetite or will. Aquinas calls this 
intellective love (dilectio) because it involves choice about what the intellect apprehends 
as the good to be pursued. Intellective love is most important as it provides the 
centerpiece of Aquinas’s moral psychology and is the primary sort of love between 
persons.  
1. AQUINAS ON LOVE IN GENERAL  
I begin with a descriptive account of the various kinds of love Aquinas 
distinguishes between before moving on to consider the normative features of love 
                                         
24. Aquinas’s most comprehensive treatment of amor comes in the Treatise on the Passions (ST 
I-II 22-48) where he begins by identifying it as something belonging to the appetite (ST I-II 23.1). 
Appetite (appetitus) in its most general sense simply denotes the inclination or a natural tendency of 
any given thing (living or non-living) toward some end: “An appetite is nothing other than a certain 
inclination toward something on the part of what has the appetite.” (ST I-II 8.1). As I explain below, 
the metaphysical picture underlying Aquinas’s account of appetite is rooted in his natural teleology: 
everything that has a substantial form, by virtue of that form, has a natural inclination toward some 
end to which it is particularly well-suited; this basic inclination is a thing’s natural appetite (appetitus 
naturalis). The natural appetite thus serves as an internal principle of motion by which an object is 
inclined toward some end suitable to its nature. 
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and its relation to rationality. According to Aquinas, amor in general and dilectio or 
intellective love in particular are appetitive responses to the cognitive apprehension of 
some object or end as good and something to be pursued. His theory does allow for a 
certain sort of subjectivity—we may love what we apprehend as valuable and in doing 
so make it valuable to us. Still, there is an objective constraint upon what counts as a 
proper object of amor: the cognitive valuation of the object must be rationally justified 
if the appetitive response is to be considered appropriate. On Aquinas’s view, amor is 
rationally and morally evaluable not only in terms of the actual value of the object to 
which it is directed, but also in terms of the relation of its relation to reason. Aquinas 
holds that amor, generally speaking, is morally good when it follows from a true 
judgment of reason.  
The term amor as employed by Aquinas has both a broad and a narrow 
extension. While the narrow extension is limited to the passion belonging to the 
sensory appetite, the broad extension includes intellective love or dilectio which 
belongs to the rational appetite or will.25 For purposes of elucidation I begin by 
sketching relevant features of his more general account. According to Aquinas’s 
psychology, the souls of human beings and non-human animals have both cognitive 
powers by which they apprehend information about the world, and appetitive powers 
                                         
25. Aquinas distinguishes between four terms, each of which pertains in some sense to the 
notion of love: amor, dilectio, caritas, and amicitia. He uses the term amor in a general sense which 
includes dilectio and caritas: dilectio involves choice and so pertains to the will; caritas denotes a certain 
perfection of love inasmuch as it is directed toward the highest good, i.e. God. In its most proper 
sense amor is a passion which belongs only to the sensory appetite of cognitive beings (ST I-II 26.3). 
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by which they are inclined towards a particular object or end apprehended as good to 
be pursued or away from an object or end apprehended as bad. Generally speaking, 
amor just is the internal source or principle of any appetitive motion toward an object 
or end apprehended as good to be pursued.26 Aquinas ascribes a unique principle of 
motion, i.e. a unique kind of love, to each kind of appetite: natural appetite which is 
shared in common by all things by virtue of their substantial forms, sensory appetite 
which is shared in common by all cognitive creatures (i.e. non-rational animals and 
human beings) by virtue of cognition, and intellective appetite which is proper to 
human beings insofar as it follows upon the judgment of reason.  
In each one of these appetites, the thing which is called love (amor) is the 
principle of motion tending toward the end loved. But in the natural 
appetite, this sort of principle of motion is the natural suitedness 
(connaturalitas) of the appetite toward the end to which it tends, which 
can be called natural love (amor naturalis), just as the natural tendency of a 
heavy body downward towards the center place [of the earth] (ad locum 
medium) by virtue of its weight (gravitatem) can be called natural love. And 
similarly, the apprehension of some good as suitable (coaptatio) to the 
sensory appetite or to the will, that is, the approval (complacentia) of the 
good so apprehended, is called either sensory love (amor sensitivus), or 
intellective or rational love. Therefore, sensory love is in the sensory 
                                         
26. Aquinas’s most comprehensive treatment of amor comes in the Treatise on the Passions (ST 
I-II 22-48) where he begins by identifying it as something belonging to the appetite (ST I-II 23.1). 
Appetite (appetitus) in its most general sense simply denotes the inclination or a natural tendency of 
any given thing (living or non-living) toward some end: “An appetite is nothing other than a certain 
inclination toward something on the part of what has the appetite.” (ST I-II 8.1). The metaphysical 
picture underlying Aquinas’s account of appetite is rooted in his natural teleology: everything that 
has a substantial form, by virtue of that form, has a natural inclination toward some end to which it 
is particularly well-suited; this basic inclination is a thing’s natural appetite (appetitus naturalis). The 
natural appetite thus serves as an internal principle of motion by which an object is inclined toward 
some end suitable to its nature. 
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appetite, just as intellective love (amor intellectivus) is in the intellective 
appetite (ST I-II.26.1).27 
So natural love, the internal source or principle of the subject’s natural inclination 
towards a particular end, just is the subject’s natural suitedness (connaturalitas) for the 
end to which it is inclined by its very form or nature. Hence the weight (gravitas) of a 
boulder, the internal principle by which it is naturally inclined downward, may be 
conceived of as the boulder’s “natural love.” All things, according to Aquinas have 
natural love for some object or end to which it is naturally suited by virtue of its 
substantial form, i.e. that by virtue of which each thing is what it is, and which causes 
the existence of each thing simpliciter (as opposed to the accidental form which causes 
the thing to exist as such, e.g. qualities such as white or hot).28  
The substantial form of a human being is the rational soul since the rational 
soul is what causes the human being to be a human being and without which the 
human being would not exist as a thing of its kind. Human beings are thus inclined 
toward happiness, the end for which they are naturally suited in accordance with their 
essentially rational natures. While it seems odd to apply the term amor to the gravitas of 
a boulder, it is important to keep in mind the direction in which Aquinas tends to 
                                         
27. In appetitu autem naturali, principium huiusmodi motus est connaturalitas appetentis ad 
id in quod tendit, quae dici potest amor naturalis, sicut ipsa connaturalitas corporis gravis ad locum 
medium est per gravitatem, et potest dici amor naturalis. Et similiter coaptatio appetitus sensitivi, vel 
voluntatis, ad aliquod bonum, idest ipsa complacentia boni, dicitur amor sensitivus, vel intellectivus 
seu rationalis. Amor igitur sensitivus est in appetitu sensitivi, sicut amor intellectivus in appetitu 
intellectivo. 
28. ST I 76.4 
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build his account of the more obscure aspects of human psychology by beginning 
with the more general theory about the natural order of things and showing how this 
general theory applies in the more complex case of human beings.29  
Accordingly, his metaphysical teleology provides the basis upon which Aquinas 
goes on to provide an account of amor in the proper sense of the term, i.e. as a passion 
of the sensory part of the soul. As we have seen, Aquinas holds that the natural 
inclination of any given thing is grounded in its substantial form, and this internal 
inclination is what moves a thing toward an end suitable or fitting to it as a thing of its 
kind.  
Much behavior of human beings and non-human animals, however, cannot be 
explained simply in terms of natural inclinations, but must take into account other 
factors by which they are moved to act in particular ways, such as the manner in 
which they respond to features of the environment taken in via the senses. Due to 
their perceptual capacities, cognitive beings are capable of engaging the world in more 
complex ways and this requires a richer set of explanatory principles. Hence, Aquinas 
claims, “forms are found in a more elevated way than in those things which lack 
                                         
29. Robert Pasnau provides the following explanation of Aquinas’s methods: “One might 
suppose that this ascription of appetite [and by extension amor] to all of nature is some kind crude 
anthropomorphism, the dead-end project of explaining nature in terms of concepts that have a place 
only human psychology. In fact, Aquinas’s project is precisely the opposite. He is not trying to bring 
psychology to bear on the rest of nature, but rather to use his general theory of the natural order to 
understand human beings…Human beings are a part of the natural order, and work much like other 
members of that order,” Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002): 201. 
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cognition,” (ST I 80.1). The forms of sensory particulars apprehended either through 
the senses or through the imagination (and hence called apprehended forms), provide 
a further source of motivation in cognitive beings. This apprehension of sensory 
particulars as goods to be pursued or evils to be avoided can, under the right 
conditions, influence the sensory appetite thus giving rise to an inclination toward or 
away from the apprehended object. In nonrational animals, certain appetitive 
responses are hard-wired, so to speak. The appetitive inclination follows immediately 
upon the apprehension of the appetitive object and (barring certain perceived 
obstacles) the animal acts accordingly. For instance, the dog perceiving the bone as 
desirable is automatically inclined to pursue it, or the sheep perceiving the wolf as 
inimical is automatically inclined to flee.30 In the case of human beings, however, we 
shall see that the intellect plays a fundamental role not only in how we apprehend 
particular sensory objects, but also in the ways we respond to the inclinations to 
which they may give rise. Aquinas refers to such inclinations of the sensory appetite as 
the passions (passiones) (ST I-II 22.2). In the case of human beings even the passions 
can be evaluated as normatively appropriate or inappropriate based upon whether or 
not they are in accordance with right reason.  
Among the passions, Aquinas maintains that amor is first in the order of 
execution (as opposed to the order of intention) insofar as it plays the initiating role in 
                                         
30. Of course the account is much more rudimentary than this explanation suggests. The 
dog sees the bone and simply goes for it without any universal concept such as “desirable.” 
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the appetitive motion toward an object or end apprehended as good to be pursued. 
The stages of the appetitive motion toward an apprehended good are as follows: 1) 
amor is the appetite’s natural affinity (aptitudo or proportio) for the object apprehended 
as good to be pursued. Hence it is the principle of motion which gives rise to 2) desire 
or concupiscence (concupiscentia), the actual motion of the appetite toward the object or 
end. Upon attaining the beloved object or end, the appetite is brought to its ultimate 
resting point, 3) joy or delight in the beloved object (ST I-II 25.2; Cf. 23.4, 26.2).31  
Hence, in the order of execution, the actual motion of the appetite, amor is first, 
although the converse is true with respect to the order of intention, since “good has 
the nature of an end, which is prior in the intention, but posterior in execution” (ST I-
II. 25.2).32  
Aquinas considers amor to be the principle of motion in the sensory appetite 
and hence as primary among the passions.33 Although it is in his treatments of the 
passions where he describes the appetitive motion which amor sets in motion, the 
                                         
31. Manifestum est autem quod omne quod tendit ad finem aliquem, primo quidem habet 
aptitudinem seu proportionem ad finem, nihil enim tendit in finem non proportionatum; secundo, 
movetur ad finem; tertio, quiescit in fine post eius consecutionem. Ipsa autem aptitudo sive 
proportio appetitus ad bonum est amor, qui nihil aliud est quam complacentia boni; motus autem ad 
bonum est desiderium vel concupiscentia; quies autem in bono est gaudium vel delectatio. 
32. Bonum autem habet rationem finis, qui quidem est prior in intentione, sed est posterior 
in consecutione. 
33. The analogy with motion, however, is limited in its ability to accurately describe the 
nature of love. The analogy appears to suggest that love ceases once the beloved object is attained 
and the appetitive motion comes to rest in delight or joy. However, this appearance is misleading. 
On Aquinas’s view, love and desire remain even when the lover has attained the beloved object. 
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same appetitive motion is attributed mutatis mutandis to the intellective appetite and 
hence to intellective love or dilectio to which I will return in section C. First, however, 
given that the passions, and in particular the passion amor play a significant 
motivational role in Aquinas’s moral psychology, it will prove useful to look briefly at 
Aquinas’s account of the passions, and how, even at the sensory level, amor is 
normatively appropriate or inappropriate in terms of the suitability of its object and its 
relation to right reason. 
2. AMOR THE PASSION  
Passions, according to Aquinas, are occurrent affective mental states of the 
sensory part of the soul.34 A passion is an occurrent state insofar as it involves the 
apprehension of an external principle which causes a sort of change within the subject 
and which endures only so long as the external principle continues to influence her. 
More specifically, a passion is an intentional state of the sensory appetite: it is directed 
toward a formal object in terms of which the passion is specified. For instance, the 
formal object of fear is a future evil (or what is apprehended as a future evil).35 
Moreover, passions involve a target, that is, a particular object (either physically present 
                                         
34. I am here indebted to Peter King’s elucidation of Aquinas’s account of the passions. 
King explains the account by way of analogy with perception highlighting the parallel structure 
between the cognitive and appetitive capacities of the sensory part of the soul. See his “Aquinas on 
the Passions,” in Aquinas’s Moral Theory ed. MacDonald & Stump (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1999): 102-110. 
35. Anthony Kenny has influenced contemporary work on the emotions by highlighting the 
role of intentionality of the passions in medieval thought. Action, Emotion, and Will (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), 191ff.  
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or present to the imagination) toward which the passion is directed.36 This is what 
separates a passion from more general feelings or sensations such as dread or anxiety; 
whereas these general feelings are not directed towards anything particular, the 
passion fear is directed to a particular, for instance, my apprehension of the wolf 
growling from ten feet away and preparing to attack.  
Further, Aquinas maintains that some sort of transformation always 
accompanies the passions, qua motions of the sensory soul, to the body (ST I-II 22.1, 
3; Cf. ST I 75.3). Corporeal creatures, both human beings and non-human animals, 
are subject to physical changes, and such changes are partly constitutive of a passion. 
Just as the sheep has a physical impulse to flee upon the sight of the wolf, so the 
human being may experience a rush of adrenaline, or an increased heart rate or some 
other bodily change which gives rise to the feelings characteristic of fear. According to 
the preceding conditions, then, we might generally characterize Aquinas’s account of a 
passion as a complex psychophysiological motion involving three essential 
components: (1) the apprehension of an intentional object (i.e. a particular object 
apprehended either by the senses or the imagination as something to be pursued or 
avoided), (2) the inclination of the sensory appetite toward or away from the object 
                                         
36. The term “target” is used here as a technical term designating the actual object toward 
which the passion is directed. Cf. de Sousa, 115-116. The term, as used in this context, originates in 
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1951). 
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apprehended, and (3) a physiological change in the subject resulting in the characteristic 
feeling of the passion. 
I have indicated that as cognitive beings both non-human animals and human 
beings are subject to passions. I should however stress that the passions of human 
beings as essentially rational creatures have a degree of complexity not found in their 
non-rational counterparts. According to Aquinas’s Aristotelian psychology, human 
beings are unique insofar as they have rational souls comprised of increasingly complex 
hierarchically structured powers or potentialities specified in terms of their functions. 
The most basic of the powers, possessed by all living things, is the nutritive power by 
virtue of which humans grow and reproduce. The sensory power, possessed by all 
animals capable of cognition, is that by virtue of which they perceive and are moved. 
The most complex and sophisticated power, possessed uniquely by human beings and 
specifying what is essential to them, is the intellective power by virtue of which they 
engage in higher-level cognitive and affective activities. These traditional distinctions 
play an important explanatory role in Aquinas’s psychology, but may at times obscure 
the fact that Aquinas views the soul as a unity —it is the whole animal which 
apprehends, is moved, acts and, in the case of human beings, also thinks and 
understands. Aquinas holds that these distinct powers or capacities influence one 
another in various manners because they are all parts of the same soul.  
A human being possessed of a rational soul has two distinct sources of 
motivation: one sensory and the other intellectual. Yet even the sensory appetites of 
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adult human beings are more sophisticated than those of small children and non-
human animals insofar as they are inclinations or appetites of a rational soul and, as 
such, are rationally permeated and permeable. Consequently, Aquinas’s theory allows 
that animals and small children have passions; nevertheless, the passions of fully 
rational adult human beings may be marked by a level of sophistication not possible in 
the case of non-rational beings. For purposes of this paper, I restrict discussion to the 
passion amor as it occurs in adult human beings, since their passions are most of all 
subject to rational evaluation. 
We have seen that the passions in general are characterized by at least three 
conditions: the apprehension of a particular intentional object, an inclination toward (or 
away from) the object, and some sort of bodily change. In the case of amor, the formal 
object of love is a sensory good apprehended through either the senses or the 
imagination. Its target is a particular: the individual object loved. Aquinas further 
specifies sensory amor as the aptitude (coaptatio) or affinity (complacentia) of the sensory 
appetite for a particular good apprehended as good and to be pursued (ST I-II 23.1). 
This apprehension or cognition of a sensory good, then, constitutes a necessary 
condition of amor. Citing Augustine’s claim that “no one is able to love something 
unknown,”37 Aquinas argues that cognition (cognitio) of a sensory object as pleasurable or 
good is what gives rise to amor: 
                                         
37. Nullus potest amare aliquid incognitum (de Trin X 1).  
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Good is a cause of amor in that it is its object. But good is not an object 
of appetite unless it is apprehended. And so love requires some 
apprehension of the good which is loved. On account of this, Aristotle 
says that the bodily vision is a principle of sensory amor…Hence 
cognition is a cause of amor for the same reason as the good, which 
cannot be loved unless it is cognized (ST I-II 27.2).38 
Aquinas identifies the cause of amor with its proper object which, as we have 
seen, is a sensory good (ST I-II 27.1), but a sensory good cannot be loved 
unless it is cognized; hence, cognition of a sensory object apprehended either 
through the senses or the imagination is a precondition of amor.  
But mere cognition is not sufficient to give rise to the passion; the object 
loved must be cognized in a particular light: as good, not in the universal or all-
things-considered sense or good, but in the particular sense of being 
pleasurable or enjoyable and to be pursued as such. This apprehension of the 
sensory object as good, however, need not involve a full-blown judgment of 
reason. The passions in general are appetites or inclinations which arise from 
sensory cognition and require a sort of perceptual evaluation of a sensory object, 
rather than a universal or all-thing-considered judgment. Hence, passions are 
                                         
38. Bonum est causa amoris per modum obiecti. Bonum autem non est obiectum appetitus, 
nisi prout est apprehensum. Et ideo amor requirit aliquam apprehensionem boni quod amatur. Et 
propter hoc philosophus dicit, IX Ethic., quod visio corporalis est principium amoris sensitivi…Sic 
igitur cognitio est causa amoris, ea ratione qua et bonum, quod non potest amari nisi cognitum. 
Aquinas elucidates this passage from Aristotle in his commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics: 
“Pleasure at the sight of a woman is the beginning of love for her; for no one begins to love a 
woman unless he has been first delighted by her beauty,” (In Ethic., 1824). 
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more analogous to forms of perception than to forms of judgment insofar as 
they belong to the sensory power of the soul. 
Aquinas’s general theory of the passions holds in common certain features of 
what many contemporary philosophers classify as cognitivist theories of the 
emotions.39 These theorists maintain that emotions require an attitude directed at a 
proposition and identify emotions as judgments of value.40 As we have seen, Aquinas’s 
theory of the passions does not fall under a description of this sort, since 
propositional attitudes are functions of the intellective rather than the cognitive power 
of the soul. But as Ronald de Sousa suggests, propositional attitudes are not the only 
cognitive states. De Sousa proposes a cognitive account inspired by a model of 
perception rather than judgment according to which: “emotions are genuine 
representations not just of the inside world of the body but also, through that, of the 
external world of value. As representations, they have a mind-to-world direction of 
                                         
39. In trying to locate where Aquinas’s theory belongs in contemporary taxonomy, it is 
important to stress that the sense of the term “passion” as employed by Aquinas is not identical to 
the contemporary sense of the term “emotion;” many phenomena which we now refer to as 
emotions fail to meet Aquinas’s criteria for what constitutes a passion. Nevertheless, it seems right 
to think that Aquinas’s passions constitute at least a significant subset of the emotions. So, roughly 
speaking, it seems plausible to classify Aquinas’s theory of the passions as a “cognitivist theory,” 
insofar as it involves regarding some object or end as good or as bad. 
40. Theories of this sort are championed by Robert Solomon, “Emotions & Choice,” in 
Explaining Emotions, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkley: University of California Press, 1980): 251-
281 (although more recently he has expressed that he finds the term “cognitivist” to be infelicitous, 
“Emotions, Thoughts, and Feelings,” 2004); see also Martha Nussbaum, “Emotions as Judgments 
of Value and Importance,” Thinking about Feeling, ed. Robert Solomon (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004): 183-199. 
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fit.”41 In other words, the emotion analogous to a representation of some object 
which an agent desires something which she does not possess, and thus seeks to bring 
the world in line with her desire. Attributing a true “mind-to-world fit” to emotions 
involves a sort of “rightness” or “criterion of success” in terms of the formal object 
of the emotion and is thus a normative account of the emotions. On this picture, an 
emotion can be evaluated as appropriate or inappropriate with respect to some 
objective property of its target in a manner akin to how we evaluate perceptions as 
correct or incorrect according to their “fit” with the external objects cognized. Hence, 
emotions are objective in the sense that, like sense perception, they are not merely 
projections of our desires but rather can be determined as “correct” or “incorrect” 
depending upon whether or not they correspond to features of the actual world.  
Aquinas’s view of the passions resembles that of de Sousa inasmuch as it is a 
normative account according to which the passions involve a sort of “evaluative 
perception,”42 of their targets, and are objective insofar as, like perceptions, they are 
intended to correspond to the actual world. The appropriateness or inappropriateness 
of a passion in general, and amor in particular, depends upon the objective value of the 
sensory object toward which it is directed. Moreover, on Aquinas’s account, although 
                                         
41. Ronald de Sousa, “Emotions: What I Know, What I’d Like to Think I Know, and What 
I’d Like to Think,” Thinking about Feeling, ed. Robert Solomon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004): 61.  
42. I borrow this term from Peter King, “Late Scholastic Theories of the Passions,” Emotions 
and Choice from Boethius to Descartes, ed. Henrik Lagerlund and Mikko Yrönsuuri (Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic, 2002): 230. 
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the passions are inclinations of the sensory appetite and depend upon sensory 
cognition, they are nevertheless rationally and morally evaluable in terms of more 
universal rational judgments about the good. According to Aquinas’s moral 
psychology, the passions of the sensory appetite are connected to the intellect in such 
a way that a person’s universal rational concepts and her beliefs about value should 
influence how she conceives of and responds to particular objects apprehended 
through sensory cognition. Hence, while the passions, including amor, are not 
themselves propositional attitudes, they are nevertheless subject to the more universal 
or all-things-considered judgments of the intellect. Amor, then, is rationally and 
morally evaluable in terms of 1) whether or not the evaluative perception of the 
beloved object accords with the agent’s universal judgments about what is good and 
to be pursued, and 2) the veridicality of the evaluative perception. 
3. INTELLECTIVE LOVE 
Aquinas distinguishes between amor strictly so-called, a passion of the sensory 
soul which is aimed at a particular sensory good the agent apprehends as desirable, 
and dilectio or intellective love, which belongs to the will and includes a prior choice 
(ST I-II.26.3; cf. ST I-II.26.1, quoted above). Intellective love is a response to the 
intellective judgment of some object or end believed to be good in a universal or all-
things-considered sense.43 Terry Irwin has recently called attention to Aquinas’s 
                                         
43. Dilectio designates a simple act of the will, or intellective appetite, and hence is the sort of 
love which pertains not only to human beings as rational creatures, but also to God and to the 
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understanding of intellective love as based upon external (as opposed to internal) 
reasons: “reasons whose goodness does not consist simply in their relation to other 
desires of the agent.”44 Rather than being based merely upon the agent’s prior desires, 
intellective love is based upon her rational judgments about which objects or ends are 
good for her to pursue. And such judgments are based upon the features of the 
objects themselves, not merely upon the other desires or inclinations of the agent.  
Unlike sensory love which is based purely on one’s desires and inclinations, 
intellective love depends upon the rational agent’s prior cognition of an object or end 
“under the common notion of good,” (ST I 82.5). His account of intellective love 
indicates that Aquinas recognizes that there are external or normative reasons for 
preferring certain objects and ends over and above others; and moreover, that this is 
the case with regard to the best or complete good of human beings. Accordingly, as a 
form of intellective love, caritas, the love of a person for God, is based upon the 
agent’s external reasons for desiring God. Aquinas identifies caritas as the very 
perfection of love since it is directed toward the highest good (ST I-II 26.3). As form 
                                         
angels, beings which are not subject to passions (ST I 20, 60; ST I-II 22.3 ad3, 59.5). 
44. See Terry Irwin, “Aquinas: The Ultimate End,” in the Development of Ethics (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 
2007): 473. 
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of intellective love, caritas is based upon the agent’s external reasons for desiring 
God.45 
The appetitive motion initiated by intellective love or dilectio shares the same 
basic structure as amor considered generally, but its specifying features increase the 
complexity of the account. We have seen that as the form of love belonging to the 
will, Aquinas identifies the object of dilectio not as a particular sensory object 
apprehended as good to be pursued, but rather as an object or end apprehended as 
good in a universal or all-things-considered sense. The fact that it is directed toward 
the good considered universally may seem to suggest that Aquinas views the object of 
dilectio as impersonal—an object or end of a certain sort, rather than this particular 
object or end of the relevant sort.46 However, although Aquinas understands the 
formal object of dilectio to be the good considered universally, this does not does not 
necessarily exclude loving an individual for his or her unique qualities or attributes, or 
on the basis of some sort of relationship. While the formal object of dilectio may in fact 
be some impersonal universal good, e.g. justice or mercy, it may just as well be some 
particular object or end recognized as good in a universal or all-things-considered sense. 
This latter possibility has important implications for Aquinas’s account of the love 
characteristic of friendship (amor amicitiae), the paradigmatic sort of love one has for 
                                         
45. I will provide a more detailed account of caritas and the normative role it plays in the 
motivational structure of the fully rational agent in the following two chapters. 
46. I will expand upon the particularity of love’s objects in chapter three.  
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other persons, in that the love of another person for her own sake requires the object of 
dilectio to be a particular individual not merely an abstract or universal concept.  
We have seen how, in the Summa Theologica, Aquinas distinguishes between amor 
strictly so-called, a passion of the sensory soul aimed at a particular sensory good 
which the agent apprehends as good to be pursued, and dilectio or intellective love, 
which belongs to the will and includes a prior choice (ST I-II.26.3). Elsewhere, 
Aquinas identifies dilectio as the most perfect or complete form of amor insofar as it 
belongs to the intellective appetite and involves free choice about the object to be 
loved: 
Since amor pertains to the appetite, it follows that the order of the 
appetite is the order of amor. However, the most imperfect appetite, the 
natural appetite which lacks cognition, brings about nothing other than a 
natural inclination. Above this is the sensory appetite, which follows 
cognition, but does not include free choice. But the highest appetite is 
that which includes both cognition and free choice: for this appetite 
moves itself in a certain respect, and hence the love which pertains to 
this appetite is the most perfect and is called dilectio, inasmuch as by free 
choice it discerns what is to be loved (DDN 4.9).47 
As an act of the will, dilectio is based upon a prior intellective judgment that the 
beloved object or end is good to be pursued.48 It is distinct from sensory amor by 
                                         
47. Cum enim amor ad appetitum pertineat, secundum ordinem appetituum est ordo 
amorum. Est autem imperfectissimus appetituum, naturalis appetitus absque cognitione, quod nihil 
aliud importat quam inclinationem naturalem. Supra hunc autem est appetitus sensibilis, qui sequitur 
cognitionem, sed est absque libera electione. Supremus autem appetitus est qui est cum cognitione et 
libera electione: hic enim appetitus quodammodo movet seipsum, unde et amor ad hunc pertinens 
est perfectissimus et vocatur dilectio, inquantum libera electione discernitur quid sit amandum. 
48. Dilectio designates a simple act of the will, or intellective appetite, and hence is the sort of 
love which pertains not only to human beings as rational creatures, but also to God and to the 
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virtue of its object. Whereas the object of the sensory appetite is a particular sensory 
object apprehended as good to be pursued, “the will concerns the good under the 
general notion of the good (sub communi ratione boni),” (ST I 82.5). The passage suggests 
that the object of the will need not be a universal, i.e. the good in general, although the 
good in general is the formal object of the will. What is required is that when the will 
aims toward some individual object or end, it does so by considering the individual 
under the general notion of the good, i.e. the universal good. So in order to will any object 
or end, the agent must apprehend it as good, i.e. as sharing in the good in general or the 
universal good. This capacity is unique to intellective beings insofar as it requires one 
to apprehend the universal good and of particular goods as instances of the universal 
good. 
A further feature of dilectio is that it is an act of the will involving choice (electio) 
about particular objects or ends the agent pursues as directed toward her final good, 
i.e. happiness. On Aquinas’s account of human action, choice just is the act of willing 
something the rational agent takes to be ultimately ordered toward the final or 
complete end of happiness. Choice is substantially an act of the will or rational 
appetite, but it follows necessarily upon the judgment of the intellect arrived at 
through the process of deliberation about particular objects and ends to be pursued as 
                                         
angels, incorporeal beings which are not subject to passions, but nonetheless are motivated by certain 
affections (ST I 20.1 ad 1, 60.1-2, 82.5 ad 1; ST I-II 22.3 ad 3, 59.4 ad 2-3, 59.5 ad 3).  
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directed toward the final ultimate end.49 Aquinas holds that human choice is free since 
its immediate object is not the most perfect good, i.e. happiness, which all human 
beings are naturally and necessarily inclined to pursue. Rather, the objects of choice 
are particular objects or ends judged by the intellect to as good to be pursued insofar 
as they are ordered toward the perfect and complete good: 
Choice, however, since it is not about the end, but about those things 
which are for the end…does not concern the perfect good, which is 
happiness, but other particular goods. And so a human being chooses 
not from necessity, but freely (ST I-II 13.6).50  
Since there are various ways one might choose to pursue the perfect and complete 
good, human beings are free to choose among various courses of action and 
competing goods in order to achieve the ultimate goal of happiness. Accordingly, 
dilectio inasmuch as it involves choice, concerns particular objects freely chosen and 
apprehended as goods ordered toward one’s complete and perfect good or happiness. 
On Aquinas’s view, then, intellective love is based upon her rational judgments 
about which objects or ends are good for her to pursue, i.e. those which are pursued 
as part of one’s final ultimate end or completion, rather than being based merely upon 
the agent’s prior desires. Such intellective judgments are based upon the features of 
the objects themselves, not merely upon the other desires or inclinations of the agent. 
                                         
49. ST I-II 13.1. 
50. Electio autem, cum non sit de fine, sed de his quae sunt ad finem, ut iam dictum est; non 
est perfecti boni, quod est beatitudo, sed aliorum particularium bonorum. Et ideo homo non ex 
necessitate, sed libere eligit. 
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Aquinas’s account of dilectio indicates his recognition that there are normative reasons 
for preferring certain objects and ends over other objects and ends; and moreover, 
that this is the case insofar as the particular objects and ends are pursued as those 
which are constitutive of the formal notion of the best or complete good of human 
beings.51 Such love is normatively appropriate to the extent that the agent’s 
apprehension of particular goods and the good in general correspond to the actual 
value of such goods and whether or not such goods actually contribute to the final or 
ultimate end for human beings.  
Aquinas thus provides a normative account of the proper objects of love 
according to which our loves are rationally and morally evaluable in terms of whether 
or not they actually do promote the final ultimate ends of human beings. His theory 
of love, like that of Frankfurt, takes into account the significance of love in 
determining our ultimate ends and thus determining the volitional or motivational 
structure of rational agents. However, Aquinas’s account is more plausible than 
Frankfurt’s desire based account of love. This is because he takes our loves to be 
normatively evaluable in terms of whether or not they actually correspond to an 
objective account of what human happiness ultimately consists in. On Frankfurt’s 
desire based account of love, our loves are evaluable only in terms of whether or not 
they cohere with our most basic desires, but as we have seen, such desires are not 
                                         
51. See Irwin, 498-501. 
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themselves rationally or morally evaluable. This leaves his view open to the objection 
that our most basic desires may not actually correspond to what ultimately completes 
or perfects us as beings of a certain sort. A person whose desires fail to correspond to 
what genuinely satisfies the person as an essentially rational being will set for herself 
the wrong sorts of ultimate ends. Although such ends may imbue her life with 
meaning and purpose, as Frankfurt suggests, they will fail with respect to perfecting 
and completing her as a being whose nature is essentially rational and whose genuine 
good consists in attaining that which will actually satisfy her desires as such.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 GENERIC STRATEGIES FOR RECONCILING THE CONFLICT 
In order to view friendship and love as genuinely moral, some contemporary 
philosophers have found it necessary to downplay its interested, personal and partial 
aspects and to reconceive true friendship and even love as grounded in or justified by 
certain impersonal and impartial qualities of the one loved, such as the content of her 
character or even something so generic as her essentially rational nature. In order to 
avoid a potential psychological conflict between love and morality, such philosophers 
have attempted to rethink love and friendship as impersonal or impartial insofar as 
they take the paradigmatic cases of love to be based upon and justified by the 
recognition of some general rather than particular good of the one loved. 
Jennifer Whiting employs such a strategy in developing her account of Aristotelian 
virtue friendship in terms of “impersonal friendship.”1 She characterizes her account 
as impersonal in the sense that the content of the friend’ character is what initially 
justifies the agent’s concern for her; that is, the friend’s character is what makes her 
worthy of one’s concern. In a similar vein, David Velleman appeals to the Kantian 
notion of respect, arguing that what we respond to in loving a person is simply her 
bare rational essence, where this is identified with her capacity for valuation.2 
                                         
1. Whiting, “Impersonal Friends,” Monist 74 (1991): 3-29. “The Nicomachean Account of 
Philia” in The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Richard Kraut (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell, 2006), 276-304.  
2. Velleman, “Love as a Moral Emotion,” Ethics 109 (January 1999): 338-374. 
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According to Velleman, love is impartial, and hence moral, in the sense that it is a 
response to the value shared by all persons qua rational beings. Both Whiting and 
Velleman agree that certain contingent circumstances or particular qualities play an 
explanatory role in determining whether one chooses this as opposed to that particular 
person as the object of concern. Nevertheless, both philosophers hold that it is the 
appreciation of the generic features of the other that provide normative or justificatory 
reasons which ground one’s concern. 
In the first part of this chapter, I rehearse the most significant features of 
Whiting’s and Velleman’s generic accounts of love and morality arguing that such 
views are mistaken in the general assumption that love and friendship must be 
grounded in or a response to some impersonal feature in order to be justified. This is 
not to deny that there is an important connection between impersonal features of the 
one loved and the best forms of friendship. No doubt certain generic features provide 
the background conditions for the sort of love or concern constitutive of friendship. 
Still, it is not the case that one’s concern for another qua virtuous or qua rational being 
is what makes the kind of love characteristic of friendship morally praiseworthy.3  
After considering Whiting and Velleman’s generic accounts of what justifies or 
grounds love, I argue that Aquinas, in keeping with the Aristotelian tradition, presents 
                                         
3. The love characteristic of friendship is a particular kind of love which entails not only a 
sort of union with the other, but also the desire for the good of another for the other’s own sake. It 
is this kind of love with which I am here concerned and which I refer to even when I simply use the 
term “love.” 
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us with a more psychologically compelling and morally desirable account of love, its 
desires, and its motivations. According to Aquinas, the love characteristic of 
friendship certainly entails the apprehension of the value of the one loved both as a 
rational being and also as one who possesses (at the very least) the capacity for virtuous 
character. Nevertheless, although the apprehension of the value of the other provides 
an important background condition for this sort of love, such apprehension does not 
play a central role in what makes the love characteristic of friendship an essentially 
moral phenomenon. Aquinas’s account of such love does not take certain generic 
features of the other to be what justifies or grounds one’s love. Rather, what makes 
loves morally praiseworthy is not primarily the valuing of generic features of the 
other, but the desires and subsequent actions which support and sustain the love 
characteristic of friendship—the desire to promote the objective good of another for 
the other’s own sake, where the objective good consists in the perfection or 
completion of the other as a rational and relational being. I argue that the good of the 
other can be valued independently even if desiring her good is partly constitutive of 
one’s own good.4 
In this chapter, I appeal to Aquinas’s moral psychology in making the argument 
that the love characteristic friendship is morally praiseworthy not primarily due to the 
                                         
4. Cf. Lawrence Blum’s account of what makes a friendship morally praiseworthy in 
Friendship, Altruism & Morality, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980). He contends that “the 
moral excellence of friendship involves a high level of development of the altruistic emotions of 
sympathy, concern, and care—a deep caring for and identification with the good of another from 
whom one knows oneself to be clearly other,” (70).  
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impersonal features of its object, but due to the very nature of such love itself. I argue 
that the love characteristic of friendship is inherently personal insofar as it is directed 
toward a particular person with whom the agent has a special relationship regardless of 
certain generic features of the other which may or may not have played an initial role 
in motivating the agent to choose that person as an object of concern. Moreover, it is 
essentially partial inasmuch as, paribus ceteris, it involves prioritizing the good of those 
persons with whom we have a close personal relationship over those whom we do 
not.  
Although it is generally uncontested that an essential feature of the love 
characteristic of friendship is concern for the good of the other as an end in itself, one 
of the primary assumptions motivating Whiting’s generic account of friendship in 
particular is that the agent’s concern for the good of the other must be altogether 
disinterested or altruistic in order to be morally praiseworthy.5 I argue that this 
assumption is unfounded. Although the love characteristic of friendship necessarily 
entails loving the other for the other’s own sake, it also entails loving oneself 
appropriately where doing so is partly constituted by possessing certain virtues 
necessary to attain happiness or fulfillment as a human being. One of these virtues is 
                                         
5. Whiting acknowledges her debt to Thomas Nagel’s Possibility of Altruism in developing her 
generic strategy of understanding the relation between the one loving and the one loved as 
impersonal in the paradigmatic sort of friendship. Cf. “Impersonal Friends,” 21. 
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the sort of disinterested concern for the good of another entailed by the love 
characteristic of friendship. 
In the best kinds of love, the moral agent seeks her own good or perfection as 
her final ultimate end, where this is partly constituted by desiring the good or perfection 
of the persons she loves as an end in itself. The primary aim of this chapter is to show 
how Aquinas develops the Aristotelian account of friendship into a compelling 
account of love according to which one’s concern for another is genuine and morally 
praiseworthy while at once constituting part of one’s own good. Hence, in the latter 
half of the chapter, I highlight relevant features of Aquinas’s account of the love 
characteristic of friendship arguing that it is plausible to think the best kind of love for 
another person is at once disinterested insofar as it entails desiring the good of 
another as an end in itself and interested in the sense that doing so is partly 
constitutive of one’s own good or perfection as a human being. Loving other persons 
as ends in themselves is entailed by the virtue of caritas, the most important of the 
virtues in that it is what enables human beings to attain their final ultimate end. 
A. GENERIC ACCOUNTS OF THE RELATION BETWEEN LOVE AND MORALITY 
1. WHITING ON “IMPERSONAL FRIENDSHIP” 
 Whiting advocates a particular interpretation of an Aristotelian model of 
friendship according to which the agent’s concern for her friend is initially justified by 
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certain features of that person.6 She opposes the Aristotelian model generally speaking 
to what she calls a “brute” model of friendship, according to which such concern is 
ultimately groundless insofar as it depends entirely upon whether the agent happens 
to have such concern in the first place.7 The advantage of the Aristotelian model, 
Whiting contends, is that the agent’s concern is initially justified by certain features of 
the other person: “We may approve of someone’s character, projects and 
commitments and so come to think her worthy of our concern,” (“Impersonal 
Friends,” 7). Thus far, Whiting’s view seems right. As opposed to the brute model 
according to which the agent has no reasons justifying her concern, on the Aristotelian 
model the agent does have reasons for concern based upon certain characteristics of 
the other. Accordingly, the agent’s concern is grounded in characteristics of the other 
which are relatively independent of the agent herself, that is characteristics the other 
person would have regardless of her relation to the agent (8). 
 Whiting points out that an essential feature of the Aristotelian model of 
friendship is the conception of one’s friend as “another self,” in accordance with 
which one’s concern for another is the same in kind as concern for oneself. She 
                                         
6. With respect to Whiting’s account, it is worth emphasizing that the sort of friendship she 
has in view is that between non-related adult persons. As is explained below she contends that such 
friendships, unlike familial or civic relations, are paradigmatically justified by appeal to the character 
of the other person, and it is in this sense that she considers friendship to be impersonal. I am 
grateful to Charles Britain for helping me to clarify this.  
7. According to the model of “brute friendship,” one’s initial concern for her friends neither 
admits of nor demands justification. Such concern is simply something we come to have (Note that 
this is precisely the position endorsed by Harry Frankfurt discussed in the previous chapter).  
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distinguishes between what she calls generic and the egocentric strategies for interpreting 
the Aristotelian account of sameness in kind of concern for oneself and others. 
Whiting opposes the egocentric strategy according to which the nature of one’s 
concern for another essentially depends on having the right sort relationship between 
oneself and the other in the sense that the good of the other is considered to be a part 
of or an extension of one’s own good (IF, 9).8 Whiting contends that the problem with 
understanding the good of another as literally part one’s own is that it entails valuing 
the other’s good as one’s own (IF, 10). She finds this objectionable because it appears to 
undermine the Aristotelian notion of valuing the good of one’s friend for the friend’s 
own sake since one’s concern for her friend is ultimately justified in reference to one’s 
own good.9 In other words, the so-called egoistic reading of understanding of the 
sameness in kind of concern for oneself and others is problematic insofar as it 
precludes having the sort of concern for the other which is altogether disinterested.10  
                                         
8. Here her primary target is Terry Irwin’s account of Aristotle’s conception of the character 
friend in EN 1170b14-19 as “another self.” Cf. Aristotle’s First Principles, 389-399. 
9. She further explicates this worry in her more recent account of Aristotelian philia where, 
for instance, she claims pace Cooper, that Aristotle’s account of the reasons one has for friendship 
cannot be one’s own perfection or self-realization: “If [Aristotle] allows this to serve as the reason 
for the agent’s having friends in the first place, he threatens to undermine the primacy of wishing 
and doing well to another for the other’s sake. For even if having friends involves some sort of 
wishing them well for their sakes, it is problematic for the agent to take as her reason for having 
friends the fact that doing so is the only (or the best) way to achieve the sort of self-knowledge or 
self-awareness in which her eudaimonia consists,” (“Philia,” 296). For Cooper’s account of the 
Aristotelian claim that friendship is required for human happiness insofar as it provides the 
conditions for self-awareness or self-realization, see “Aristotle on Friendship,” 317-324. 
10. Although there may be parallels with the contemporary notion of egoism, I think it is 
somewhat anachronistic to apply the term to Aristotle’s teleological conception of happiness, given 
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Having rejected egocentric accounts of the sameness in kind account of oneself and 
others, Whiting defends what she calls a generic strategy which involves viewing certain 
features the agent shares in common with another as the ground for her concern. 
Justification for the agent’s concern for the other is the same in kind as concern for 
herself insofar as the ground for concern is based in such common features. Whiting 
explains that the account is generic in that it is based upon common features or 
characteristics as opposed to the uniqueness or particularity of the other.11 She 
acknowledges that there is a certain range of specificity when it comes to the 
characteristics the agent shares in common with the other person: the agent’s concern 
may be based upon something so generic as shared humanity, or something more 
particular such as certain life projects or goals. The crux of the view, however, is that 
the agent’s ground for concern for another person is like the ground for concern for 
oneself not due to the relation of the other to oneself, but rather some common 
generic feature.  
 Moreover, Whiting’s particular version of the generic strategy is character-based. 
She takes the relevant common characteristic justifying both concern for oneself and 
                                         
the disparity between contemporary notions of happiness and the Greek conception of eudaimonia 
which entails possessing certain qualities of character which are essentially other-directed. Cf. Annas 
on the inappropriateness of accusing ancient eudaimonist theories as being egoistic. The Morality of 
Happiness (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993): 322-323. 
11. Whiting calls attention to a virtue of her account vis-à-vis qualitative theories of love: 
“The ‘generic’ label calls attention to this strategy’s tendency away from the characteristics which 
distinguish us from one another and so away from the fetish concern with uniqueness characteristic 
of modern discussions of friendship,” (8). 
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concern for the other to be the content of one’s character. Appealing to Aristotle’s 
paradigmatic form of friendship, i.e. friendship based upon virtue, she contends that 
concern for another is the same in kind as self-concern insofar as it is based upon the 
appeal to character. Accordingly, Whiting labels her view as ethocentric as opposed to 
egocentric since the normative paradigm for concern for another is the sort of self-
concern the virtuous person has for himself. Whiting interprets Aristotle’s claim that the 
virtuous person loves his friend as “another self” to mean that he loves her not simply 
as an extension of himself, but as a person who is like him in the relevant respect, 
namely, as one who possesses virtuous character. Accordingly, she takes Aristotle to 
be claiming that self-love and hence love of another is impartial in the following sense: 
“insofar as self-love properly construed involves the virtuous person’s love for herself 
qua virtuous, and insofar as a genuinely virtuous agent will value virtue as such, the 
virtuous agent should love other virtuous agents in much the same way that she loves 
herself (i.e. qua virtuous).”12 By construing Aristotle’s view in this way, Whiting claims 
to surmount problems raised by egoist readings where concern for another is 
ultimately grounded in self-concern. This, she insists, undermines a key criterion of 
Aristotelian friendship, i.e. the desire for the good of another for the other’s own 
sake. 
                                         
12. “Philia,” 293. 
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 In sum, Whiting’s view is that “the substance or content of another’s character (as 
distinct from its relationship to one’s own) is the ground for concern,” (11). She 
contends that the advantage of her generic character-based strategy of understanding 
the sameness in kind one’s concern for oneself and another is that it allow us 
appreciate her understanding of the Aristotelian criterion of friendship:  
If I value my own good and the activities in which it consists not as mine 
but rather that of a person of a certain sort, then I can value my friend’s 
good and the activities in which it consists in the same way I value my 
own without having to value them as mine, (10). 
Whiting takes it that her interpretation of Aristotle’s view allows that the agent’s 
concern for the good of the other is disinterested in a way that she considers morally 
desirable. The agent values the good of her friend in the same way as she values her own 
good without valuing the good of the other as part of her own.  
2. PROBLEMATIC FEATURES OF WHITING’S ACCOUNT 
As a preliminary note, my project differs from Whiting’s in that I am not 
primarily concerned with the initial justification of friendship, but with what the love 
characteristic of friendship consists in on the part of the one loving and what it required 
to support and sustain one’s ongoing concern for the good of the other.13 Further, 
where Whiting speaks of “friendship,” a relation between two persons, my focus is on 
“the love characteristic of friendship,” which pertains not to the relation but to the act 
                                         
13. See Whiting’s preliminary note concerning the difficulty of translating the abstract Greek 
noun “philia” most often translated by the English term “friendship,” and the verb from which it is 
derived, “to philein,” which she contends is best rendered by the term “to love,” Cf. “The 
Nicomachean Account of Philia,” 276-77.  
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of love itself. Nevertheless, despite this apparent difference the subject matter with 
which we are both concerned is alike in the relevant respect since is also concerned 
with act characteristic of friendship, i.e. the act of loving on the part of the friend.
14
 
Contrary to Whiting, I contend that the most important feature concerning the moral 
evaluation of the love characteristic of friendship is not how it is initially justified, but 
what such love entails—that is, supporting and sustaining concern for the good of 
one’s friend for her own sake, regardless of how such concern is initiated.15  
I find it more psychologically plausible to think we choose our friends not on 
the basis of something so impersonal as the friend’s virtuous character, but rather 
upon certain likenesses they have to us (similar interests, projects, etc.), likenesses that 
may, but need not be, primarily character-based. This is not to deny that if we were to 
find the other person boorish or utterly reprehensible, we would have reason to 
oppose becoming friends with her regardless of common interests we might share. I 
                                         
 
15. As I shall argue below it seems equally if not more important to the normative evaluation 
of self-love and friendship to consider how one is justified in continuing to love oneself and hence 
others with whom one already has an established friendship. Whiting herself claims only that once a 
friendship is established “the friendship relation itself... is taken to provide reasons for concern 
additional to those (if any) existing prior to its establishment” (“IF” 7). It is my contention that the 
ongoing concern for the good of the other for the other’s own sake is not primarily justified by the 
virtuous character of the other, but has more to do with the established relationship between the agent 
and her friend. Cf. Diane Jeske: “I am justified in caring about my friend because she stands in the 
friendship relation to me, because I happened, perhaps for no clearly defined reason, to start caring 
in the first place,” “Virtue, Friendship and Impartiality,” (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. 
LVII, no. 1, March 1997): 64. According to Jeske, one’s initial concern for another is more brute 
than Whiting would allow, but the justification of friendship is not based upon how is initially comes 
about; rather, it has more to do with the sort of relationship the agent has with her friend. 
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agree with Whiting that character is a relevant factor in how we choose, and how we 
should choose our friends, but I don’t agree that it is the primary factor. The other 
person must meet certain standards of character in order for the agent to rationally 
consider her as a potential friend, but I do not find it plausible to think that the 
character of the other person is primarily what makes the love characteristic of 
friendship morally praiseworthy. Rather, the character of the other is merely a 
background condition for the justification of friendship. 
 The question I find most significant when it comes to the moral evaluation of 
the love characteristic of friendship is not how friendship is initially justified, but 
rather, what it means to value the good of another for the other’s own sake. This is clearly 
an essential condition for genuine friendship on Aristotle’s account.16 Whiting 
contends, however, that one does not legitimately meet this condition if ultimately the 
friend’s good is considered in some respect as part of one’s own good: “I can aim at 
my friends’ ends in the same way I aim at my own only if I aim at them as 
independent goods and not as parts of my own,” (10). On her view, then, in order to 
truly value the good of the other it must be pursued entirely independently of its relation 
to the agent’s good.  
 Of course, on a eudaimonist account, valuing the good of one’s friend as part 
of one’s own need not entail valuing it instrumentally as a means to one’s own good. 
                                         
16. EN 1155b30. 
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Whiting points out that one way theorists have attempted to reconcile the 
requirement of valuing the good of another as part of one’s own good with valuing it 
for it’s own sake is to maintain that valuing the good of another for the other’s own 
sake is what makes it part of one’s own good (IF, 9). She contends, however, that this 
strategy fails since it is doesn’t provide an account of what explains or justifies my caring 
about the other for the other’s own sake and it is this, not its being part of one’s own 
good, that does the argumentative work: 
So if—as the avoidance of brute concern seems to require—there is 
something in the object that justifies my concern, then insisting on the 
importance of the object’s being part of my good involves 
misrepresentation: it yields only the appearance and not the substance of 
egocentricity (10). 
Whiting’s complaint is that despite appearing to justify concern for another for the 
other’s own sake in terms of its being part of one’s own good, the real justificatory 
work nevertheless must lie in valuing impersonal or generic features of the other. In 
essence, Whiting is claiming that either one’s concern for the other is a brute fact and 
hence does not admit of justification, or it is justified in terms of certain generic or 
impersonal features of the other.  
 It is true that valuing the good of another for it’s own sake must be explained by 
the apprehension of the other as good in some respect, otherwise we would have no 
reason for valuing her good as an end in itself. But I question the extent to which 
apprehension of the other as good is what justifies concern for her good. Again, the 
apprehension of another as good in some respect and hence worthy of concern 
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provides an important background condition for valuing the good of the other, but is 
not the primary factor in what makes our valuing morally praiseworthy. Moreover, it 
seems plausible that the reasons for one’s concern are often grounded in more brute 
characteristics than Whiting would admit.  
 Although there must be reasons explaining one’s concern for her friend,17 such 
reasons need not be as impersonal or generic as Whiting insists in order to be justified 
or even explained. We will see that on Aquinas’s account of love generally speaking, 
and a fortoriori, of the love characteristic of friendship, love just is the apprehension of 
the other as suitable or pleasing to the agent and this is what gives rise to desire to be 
united to the other. Such apprehension may be based upon more generic character-
based features, but it may also be based upon more particular and personal features of 
the other which the agent approves of, for instance, her sense of adventure, her love 
of film or something more personal or particular such as a quirky sense of humor. 
Whether the features of another which initially explain the agent’s concern are more 
impersonal and generic or whether they are more personal and particular, the salient 
feature in the moral evaluation of the love characteristic of friendship is that the agent 
loves another and values the good of the other for her own sake.  
 Whiting sees that according to most accounts of Aristotle’s eudaimonist theory 
of human motivation, all of the agent’s concerns and actions are ultimately rooted in 
                                         
17. Cf. Chapter three of this dissertation. 
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the desire for one’s own happiness or perfection as a rational agent insofar as all human 
beings ultimately aim toward aim for this.18 But Whiting is wrong to think that 
Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia must be interpreted otherwise in order to be a 
genuinely moral theory. Eudaimonism is a normative theory according to which the 
rational agent aims at what is best or what is fine (kalon) in an objective or external 
sense, and this essentially entails other-directed desires for the objective good of one’s 
friends.19 Accordingly, although the agent’s actions and aims are ultimately directed 
toward her own happiness or objective good, this is perfectly consistent with and in fact 
entails desiring the objective good for the other independently of one’s own good. Hence, 
Whiting’s contention that the so-called egoist strategy of understanding sameness in 
kind between concern for self and concern for the another undermines the condition 
of valuing the good of the other for the other’s own sake is unfounded.  
 Further, there is a problem with Whiting’s generic character-based strategy for 
understanding the sameness in kind between self-concern and concern for another. 
Whiting acknowledges that her account of character-relative reasons justifying 
                                         
18. Whiting actually denies that eudaimonism entails acting ultimately for the sake of one’s 
own final good or ultimate end. She suggests, “it is compatible with what Aristotle says that an agent 
at least sometimes, perhaps often, takes the eudaimonia of others as the ultimate end for the sake of 
which she acts in the sense that she aims at their eudaimonia simply as such (and not as parts of her 
own),” “Philia,” 277. Although I cannot address this interpretation of eudaimonism here, this seems 
highly implausible as a reading of Aristotle’s teleology and as an interpretation of the eudaimonism 
in general. 
19. Cf. Annas: “The agent acts out of self-concern, but where this is concern for oneself as a 
rational agent aiming at the fine, this will take the form of other-directed and moral action,” 260. 
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friendship is open to the criticism that the agent is required to value the good of her 
friend as well as her own good as “a particular person of a certain sort and not as the 
good of this particular person of the relevant sort,” (11). On Whiting’s ethocentric 
account, the relevant feature justifying one’s concern is the sort of person the other 
is—specifically the agent’s concern is justified when it is directed toward a person 
with virtuous character. There is no justificatory reason for developing concern for one 
virtuous person rather than another; the fact that we choose one person rather than 
another is simply a matter of epistemic and circumstantial contingencies.  
 But Whiting’s ethocentric account seems psychologically implausible insofar as 
it seems contrary to our actual reasons for developing and maintaining an ongoing 
concern for particular people: we love particular people not because they are persons 
of a certain sort, i.e. virtuous, but because they are the individuals that they are and 
with whom we stand in a particular relationship—we value the good of this particular 
person because her relationship to us plays the primary role in explaining and 
justifying our ongoing concern for her good.  
 Of course, when it comes to non-related adults persons, one’s relationship with 
another cannot be what initially justifies (or explains) concern for her. But as I have 
indicated, the initial justification of concern for my friend is not what I take to be the 
salient feature with respect to what makes such concern morally praiseworthy. Rather, 
the morally salient feature is my ongoing concern for her good and this is justified in 
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terms of my being in the right sort of relationship with her.20 I am justified in loving 
Lizzie because of my shared history with her as someone with whom I have spent a 
good deal of time, shared common interests, and engaged together in particular life 
projects. It is much more plausible to think I am justified in my concern for her as this 
particular person, as opposed to being a particular person of a certain sort. Although 
the friendship was not initially based primarily upon my apprehension of her as 
someone with virtuous character, my concern for her is justified because she is now 
my friend, someone with whom I have an established relationship which justifies my 
ongoing concern for her well being. 
  In defense of her generic character-based strategy of understanding the 
sameness in kind between concern for oneself and that of one’s friends, Whiting 
appeals to Aristotle’s account of the virtuous person’s attitude toward herself as 
providing the normative paradigm for her attitude toward her friends (IF, 14-15). The 
virtuous person’s self-concern is unlike the self-concern of just anyone, since the 
virtuous person correctly understands who she is, and hence treats herself correctly.21 
                                         
20. Part of the problem of Whiting’s account is that she fails to consistently distinguish 
between different kinds of reasons for friendship: justificatory reasons and explanatory reasons. As 
Jeske puts it, “The justification of my concern for my friend…depends upon his standing in a 
certain relationship to me, so my relationship to [my friend] provides justificatory reasons for my 
continuing to care about him,” (65). Also see Niko Kolodny for the justificatory role of relationships 
in “Love as Valuing a Relationship,” (the Philosophical Review 112.2, 2003): 135-189. 
21. Of course Whiting would agree that there is a sense in which self-love is what Annas 
describes as “psychologically primary,” (254-255), appealing to Aristotle’s claim that “Each person 
wishes good to himself most of all,” (1159a11-12). But Whiting’s point is that one’s initial concern 
for self isn’t justified simply by virtue of being psychologically primary; rather it is justified rather 
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Whiting takes Aristotle’s account of the virtuous person’s attitude toward herself as 
the normative paradigm for her attitude toward her friends to provide a promising 
strategy for responding to the objection to her account of impersonal friendship 
according to which one values the good of her friends because of their virtue rather 
than because they are the particular individuals they are.   
 Taking into account the agent’s concern for herself from the subject’s point of 
view, Whiting points out how important it is for a person to think well of herself and 
to think that her activity is not only valuable but also morally acceptable. She appeals 
to examples from psychological literature of the sort of cognitive dissonance 
experienced by those who doubt he value or moral acceptability of their actions, and 
hence tend to blame their bad behavior or vices on circumstances beyond their 
control as a psychological mechanism used to maintain a positive view of themselves 
(IF, 16-17). Whiting appeals to such a mechanism and the fact that when they fail 
people suffer from guilt, depression and even engage in self-destructive behavior as 
providing evidence against the view that people care about themselves no matter what 
kind of character they might have.  
 Certainly, Whiting is correct that persons with bad character do in fact 
experience cognitive dissonance and do in fact despise themselves insofar as their 
base character and bad behavior are morally blameworthy. But it is most plausible to 
                                         
when one comes to apprehend the value of her own virtuous character. So self-love can be at once 
psychologically primary, and initially justified by the recognition of one’s virtuous character. 
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think that such cognitive dissonance and self-loathing is the result of the rational 
agent’s concern for self. One who antecedently failed to be concerned about herself 
simply wouldn’t care about whether her character or behavior is valuable or morally 
acceptable. Contra Whiting, it is more likely that the agent’s self-concern is justified by 
virtue of the fact that, insofar as she is a rational being, she does care about herself 
because she already stands in a particular relationship with herself. For this reason, she 
despises in herself the negative character qualities and bad behavior, and this is what 
leads to cognitive dissonance. No doubt the fully rational or virtuous agent loves 
herself properly to the extent that she takes herself to possess genuine value in 
accordance with her true nature qua rational and moral being, and to the extent that 
she engages in activity she conceives of as objectively valuable in promoting that 
which is fine or praiseworthy.  
 Still, the agent’s concern for herself may be ill conceived insofar as she fails to 
grasp her true nature as a rational and moral being. Such a person will fail to recognize 
what her good actually consists in, and thus will fail to demonstrate the right kind of 
concern for her character and fail to love herself in accordance with her true good. 
Nevertheless, the agent has a special reason to care about herself and her behavior 
because she is herself, i.e. this particular person. The heavy drinker for example may 
continue to make excuses and when the excuses fail, he may in fact fall into despair, 
depression, and further self-destructive behavior. But it is out of concern for himself 
that he may also (as many alcoholics do) come to the decision not to engage in such 
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morally problematic and destructive behavior. Such persons after hitting “rock 
bottom,” may decide that they want to become better people and overcome their self-
destructive tendencies out of concern for their own good for himself as well as the 
good of those he cares about insofar as they stand in a particular relationship to him.  
By appealing to the subject’s point of view, Whiting highlights an important 
feature of the moral psychology definitive of eudaimonism, namely that each person 
desires his own objective good as his final ultimate end, and each person’s objective 
good consists in part in possessing virtuous character. But the fact that people who 
have less than virtuous character and engage in bad behavior attempt to justify 
themselves or fall into depression and become self-destructive doesn’t do the 
argumentative work Whiting suggests, i.e. showing that only virtuous persons 
demonstrate genuine self-concern.  Rather, it seems more plausible to think that all 
persons provided they come to see what their objective good consists in, desire to 
become virtuous, because as a matter of psychological fact each person is concerned 
for herself and her wellbeing. As is evident in the case of the heavy drinker, one’s self-
concern is not due to his being antecedently virtuous, but because he is stands in a 
particular relationship to himself. Accordingly, although Whiting is correct to identify a 
significant connection between virtuous character and genuine self-love, it seems 
more plausible to think the rational agent desires her own good insofar as she is this 
particular person, i.e. himself, rather than on the basis of being a person of a certain 
sort, i.e. one who (already) possesses virtuous character.   
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Finally, it seems that Whiting’s account of character-based friendship sets the 
bar too high in that it describes an ideal which very few person’s actually attain, 
especially given Aristotle’s account of virtue as something quite rare and acquired over 
time through the repetition of morally praiseworthy actions. Granted, Whiting admits 
as much: “character-friendship is an ideal which even the best of our ordinary 
everyday friendships may only approximate,” (IF, 15). But providing an account of 
the justification of friendship in terms of an ideal seems much too high-minded. 22 On 
Whiting’s account, it would appear that the majority of human beings fail to meet the 
criterion according to which concern for themselves and their friends is morally 
praiseworthy, given that so few of us possess virtuous character in the Aristotelian 
sense. And if we do attain such an ideal, it is only after a long process of habituation.23 
One problem with evaluating the moral worth of friendship in terms of the ideal 
virtue friendship is that it tends to downplay the morally praiseworthy attitudes and 
                                         
22. Here I am in agreement with Jeske’s contention that “Character friendship is a tempting 
ideal, but, I think, it is clear that it betrays our actual moral experience, and overestimates the role of 
choice in the determination of friends,” 22. 
23. The range of persons considered to be initially justified in loving themselves is simply too 
narrow on Whiting’s account. Take for instance the merely continent person, or even the 
incontinent person. Such persons, according to Aristotle, know what rational and morally 
praiseworthy action consists in, and wish to perform such actions. The continent person succeeds, 
but does not do so from a stable disposition or virtuous character. Nevertheless, the fact that the 
continent person performs the right actions and wishes to do so presupposes that she loves herself, 
and is moreover justified in loving herself. Even the incontinent person is justified in loving herself 
to the extent that she wants to perform the right sorts of actions, even though she fails to do so. In 
both cases I suggest that self-concern entails the desire to become virtuous and that desire is enough 
to justify concern for self and others, despite the fact that she has not attained the ideal of 
possessing a virtuous character. 
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actions of less than virtuous persons who, despite their moral shortcomings 
nevertheless have genuine concern for their friends as ends in themselves. 
 A further question to consider is precisely what Whiting means by “character-
based” friendship. It is worth noting that in her earlier article “Friends and Future 
Selves,” Whiting construes character broadly as including not just moral excellences, 
but all of the qualities for which a person may be praised. Such qualities may include 
athletic or artistic ability, empathy, industry, etc. 24 But clearly someone with artistic or 
athletic ability is not necessarily morally virtuous or excellent. Although such persons 
demonstrate certain excellences, they need not be excellences of character. If Whiting 
still holds to this broad notion of virtue or excellence in “Impersonal Friends,” then 
her account of what justifies one’s concern for another is more true to our actual 
experience, given that we tend to be drawn to other persons for a variety of reasons 
not necessarily related to their virtuous character. But then it is less clear why concern 
for another based upon these sorts of non-moral excellences ought to be considered 
morally praiseworthy. 
3. VELLEMAN ON “LOVE AS A MORAL EMOTION” 
J. David Velleman provides an account of love similar to Whiting’s account of 
friendship insofar as he describes love of as the valuing of another based upon her 
                                         
24. “Impersonal Friends,” 4; cf. “Friends and Future Selves,” The Philosophical Review Vol. 95, 
no. 4 (Oct., 1986): 572-3.  
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generic and impersonal features.25 On his account, love in general is subject to moral 
appraisal because, as he understands it, love is a rational response to impartial features 
of the one loved. Accordingly, Velleman claims that the apparent psychological 
conflict between love and morality can be reconciled by “rethinking the partiality of 
love.”26 Like Whiting, Velleman attempts to avoid a certain problematic feature of 
qualitative theories of love according to which the person is loved for accidental 
features such as her charm or beauty, or her “yellow hair.”27  Love, he contends, is 
morally praiseworthy to the extent that is based upon the impartial nature of a person 
as a rational being, given his view that rationality comprises the very essence of a 
person. Accordingly, Velleman’s descriptive account of love is even more impersonal 
and impartial than Whiting’s in that he holds love is a response not to the substance 
or content of the character of the person qua virtuous, but rather to something as 
altogether generic as the person’s essence qua rational being. On his account love is 
not a partial response to particular person considered as valuable in herself and to the 
one who loves her given the nature of their relationship; rather, it is an impartial 
                                         
25. Note that the accounts are not altogether parallel. Whiting’s argument concerns the initial 
justification for developing a friendship with another based on the content of her character. 
Velleman’s argument has to do with what love is and the impersonal value of its object. What the two 
views share in common is the assumption that what the agent is responding to in the normative 
paradigm of friendship or love is some generic feature of the one loved, and moreover, that the 
impersonal and impartial nature of one’s concern is what makes such concern moral. 
26. “Love as a Moral Emotion.” Ethics 109 (1999): 338-374. 
27. An allusion to Yeat’s poem “For Anne Gregory,” n. 83. Anne, the protagonist of the 
poem, does not want to be loved for accidental features such as her yellow hair, but for herself and 
for herself alone.  
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response to a person qua rational. Hence, for Velleman, love is moral insofar as it 
entails the valuation of a generic feature of personhood, i.e. an instance of rational 
nature.  
In elucidating his descriptive account of the nature of love, Velleman appeals to 
Iris Murdoch’s account of love as “an exercise of justice and realism and really looking” 
(343).28 He identifies a connection between this sort of attention and the Kantian 
notion of respect, the respect due to all persons as the appropriate response to their 
value as beings with essentially rational natures.29 Velleman appeals to the Kantian 
ideal of the “rational will,” which Kant identifies as the intelligible essence of a person 
indicating that this is the person’s “true or proper self” (344). Hence a person, by 
virtue of her true nature as an instance of rational nature is “a self-existent end,” 30 
and, as such, is the proper object for reverence and respect. Velleman qualifies his 
account of the valuation of a person’s rational essence suggesting that it amounts to 
                                         
28. I cannot here address the plausibility of his reading of Murdoch, but for an argument 
that Velleman misrepresents her account of love see Elijah Millgram, “Kantian Crystallization,” 
(Ethics 114, no. 3): 511-513. 
29. Anticipating the objection that Kantian respect amounts to an attitude toward moral law 
and thus has nothing to do with love for a person, Velleman argues that when Kant speaks of 
reverence for the law, he is really speaking about an attitude toward a rational being, or more 
precisely, an “idealized rational will” (344). On his interpretation of Kant, love for the law just is 
love for a person; hence he thinks it possible to compare the Kantian notions of reverence and 
respect with the moral attitude of love for a person. Both are responses to the value of persons as 
rational natures. I shall not here be concerned with the plausibility of Velleman’s interpretation of 
Kant, but with his general account of the nature of love. 
30. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:437. On Velleman’s interpretation, self-existent 
ends are “the objects of motivating attitudes that regard and value them as they already are,” unlike 
other ends which are “the objects of attitudes that value them a possibilities to be brought about” 
(357-358). 
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the capacity to be actuated by reasons, a capacity which Kant identifies with the 
capacity for a good will. Velleman specifies this capacity not in terms of intellect, even 
practical intellect, but rather as “a capacity of appreciation or valuation—a capacity to 
care about things in that reflective way which is distinctive of self-conscious creatures 
like us” (365). He thus juxtaposes the Kantian notions of reverence and respect with 
the phenomenon of love arguing that love, like respect, is a kind of valuation of what 
is essential to all human beings as instances of rational nature. But the difference 
between love and respect, Velleman suggests, is that respect is the “required 
minimum,” response to the value of a person qua rational, whereas love is the 
“optional maximum,” response to one and the same value (366). 
Velleman claims that what is essential to love “is that it disarms our emotional 
defenses toward an object in response to its incomparable value as a self-existent 
end,” (365). In the case of love for another person, he claims that love, like Kantian 
respect, is an “arresting awareness” of value in a person which entails treating persons 
as ends in themselves. But where Kantian respect amounts to arresting self-love and 
thus preventing one from using another person as a means to achieving one’s self-
interested aims, Velleman contends that love “arrests our tendencies toward 
emotional self-protection from another person…Love disarms our emotional 
defenses; it makes us vulnerable to the other,” (361).  The response to the value of the 
other as a rational nature, i.e. the recognition of the capacity for valuation like our 
own, is what creates the possibility for loving another by allowing the agent to 
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suspend his emotional defenses opening up the possibility of “really looking,” and 
thus putting himself in the vulnerable position of seeing the other as capable of 
valuation and love. Velleman thus takes love to be impartial and, in his view, morally 
praiseworthy, insofar as its object is the value of a person qua instance of rational 
nature which he takes to be the essence of personhood, and thus an essential quality 
of all persons. Nonetheless he recognizes we do not respond to all persons with love. 
He suggests that there may be many reasons for this. One reason is that we are 
“imperfect interpreters” of the expressions of personhood and such expressions are 
themselves imperfect. He appeals to the constitutional limitations of human beings: 
we can only love so many persons, given the sort of emotional resources love 
demands. Thus Velleman contends that there are “many reasons for being selective in 
love, without having to find differences of worth among possible love objects” (372). 
Velleman criticizes attempts of contemporary analytic philosophers to provide 
an adequate account of love insofar as they are committed to analyzing love in 
conative terms (351-353). He contends that the underlying problem is the failure of 
such philosophers to adequately distinguish between aims and ends. Conceiving of love 
in terms of an aim to be achieved obscures the proper object of love, which he insists 
is not a result to be achieved, but rather the beloved person herself understood as 
self-existent end. Velleman indicates that contemporary philosophical analyses of love 
miss the mark because of the assumption that love is to be analyzed in terms of an 
aim (354). He claims that this assumption leads to the erroneous conception of love 
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according to which “love is a particular syndrome of motives—primarily, desires to 
act upon, or interact with, the beloved” (352-3). He characterizes contemporary 
analyses of love as in terms of an attitude directed toward the result of “benefiting and 
being with” the one loved.31 Such analyses, Velleman thinks, suggest that, “love is 
essentially a pro-attitude toward a result, to which the beloved is instrumental” (354). 
He finds such views objectionable insofar as they fail to treat the one loved as a “self-
existent end.” Rather than viewing love in terms of an attitude toward a result, 
Velleman suggests that we should view it as an attitude toward a person, namely the 
beloved herself. As a self-existent end, a person has incomparable value—a value she 
possesses by virtue of her rational nature. On his view, conceiving of love as a way of 
valuing persons (as opposed to a desiring to achieve particular results) is the key to 
describing it appropriately in moral terms.  
4.  PROBLEMATIC FEATURES OF VELLEMAN’S ACCOUNT 
Velleman’s account of the moral evaluation of love differs from Whiting’s 
character-based account in that he takes all persons insofar as they are instances of 
rationality to be worthy objects of love, and hence does not limit those considered 
worthy of our love (or friendship) to virtuous persons. This may view may appear a 
less elitist and hence a more desirable theory of what makes love morally 
praiseworthy. Still, Velleman’s account of love as a moral emotion seems inadequate 
                                         
31. See, for example, Gabrielle Taylor, “Love,” 156-157. See page 352 for Velleman’s 
caricature of analytic philosophers on the nature of love.  
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as a description of what really constitutes the nature of love—love is more 
appropriately thought of as the valuation of an individual person valued as such not, as 
Velleman contends, the valuation of a person as an instance of rational nature. Moreover, 
the person loved is valued as special by virtue of her individual worth, and also on 
account of the relationship of the one who loves with the one loved. Velleman’s 
description of love as a valuation of a person qua essentially rational is not only too 
generic, but it’s also unrealistic to think that love is an attitude toward “an idealized 
rational will.”32 
One of the primary worries concerning Velleman’s account of love as the 
valuation of an essentially rational nature is that it is response to a value with respect 
to which any one person is no different from another.33 Hence, it would appear that 
his explanation of love cannot account for certain descriptive features of love, in 
particular that the one who loves values the one loved as special and as irreplaceable. 
                                         
32. It is worth noting that Velleman is providing a descriptive account of love generally, (in 
opposition to the sort of conative analysis of love he attributes to the contemporary philosophers), 
rather than providing an account of the sort of love which can be considered moral: “I am inclined 
to say that love is likewise the awareness of a value inhering in its object; and I am also inclined to 
describe love as an arresting awareness of that value. This description of love seems right, to begin 
with, as a piece of phenomenology, just as the conative analysis of love seems implausible, to begin 
with, on phenomenological grounds. Love does not feel (to me, at least) like an urge or impulse or 
inclination toward anything; it feels rather like a state of attentive suspension, similar to wonder or 
amazement or awe,” (360). 
33. In one sense Velleman’s account of love and morality is more plausible than Whiting’s, 
insofar as he does not limit the scope of the persons one is justified in loving to those with a 
virtuous disposition. But in another sense, his account of the proper object of love is too broad, 
insofar as he holds that every person is equally a candidate for love merely by virtue of their rational 
capacities, and it is simply a matter of accident that one comes to “really see” the rational essence of 
certain persons as opposed to others.  
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Anticipating this sort of worry, Velleman appeals to the Kantian distinction between a 
dignity and a price indicating that the value of a person as a self-existent end is the 
former rather than the latter (364). Whereas something valued in terms of a price 
admits of comparison and can be replaced by something of equivalent value, the value 
of a person must be understood in terms of a dignity. By virtue of possessing this sort 
of value, the individual person is to be valued in such a way that his worth cannot be 
compared to that of any other person. Thus Velleman contends, “the value that we 
must attribute to every person requires that we respond to each person alone, partly 
by refusing to compare him with others. The class of persons just is a class whose 
members must be appreciated as individuals rather than as member of a class,” (367, 
emphasis mine). The point is that although one judges all persons to possess the same 
value by virtue of their rational nature, the mode of appreciation in response to such a 
value requires that one appreciate the individual person “in and by himself.” Hence, 
Velleman contends that one may attribute the same value to each person while still 
viewing each individual person as irreplaceable.34  
Velleman holds that the value of each individual person is incomparable to that 
of other persons; still he does not give a plausible etiology of how one comes to love 
certain persons as opposed to others. This is particularly evident when it comes to 
                                         
34. Velleman appears to overlook the fact that attributing “the same value” to each 
individual implies the very sort of comparison which he rejects as inappropriate. I am grateful to 
Scott MacDonald for pointing out this inconsistency in Velleman’s account. 
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parental love. If Amy and John have a child it is unlikely to think that they come to 
value her as an instance of rational nature. Their love for the child as irreplaceable is 
evident long before they develop an appreciation for her worth as an instance of 
rational nature. Rather, she is irreplaceable to them by virtue of being their child.35 Of 
course they are delighted when the child develops certain personal characteristics and 
exhibits behaviors that are reflective of a rational nature, but it is unlikely that such 
characteristics and behaviors serve as the basis of their initial or ongoing valuation of 
her. Moreover, Velleman’s account of the etiology of love cannot account for cases 
where a person is never able to actualize their rational capacities. Even if Amy and 
John’s child turned out to have severe mental disabilities which precluded her ability 
to actualize her rational capacities for valuation and love, it is far from unreasonable 
to think that they would love her anyway as is evident in the case of so many parents 
who love and dedicate their lives to the care of such a child, indicating the inherent 
value of the child despite the fact that she will never be able to develop the rational 
capacities that Velleman takes to comprise the “true and proper self.”36 
                                         
35. Velleman may well respond that parental love is not the sort of love he has in mind on 
his account. When ruling out romantic love, he qualifies what sort of love counts as moral: “When I 
say that love is a moral emotion, what I have in mind is the love between close adult friends and 
relations—including spouses and other life-partners” (351). But why rule out parental love, 
especially given that such love is plausible conceived of as paradigmatic given the sort unselfish 
concern for another it so often entails? Here the confusion concerning the various sorts of love 
among contemporary philosophers is glaringly apparent, given that others, viz. Frankfurt, takes the 
love of a parent for his or her small child to be the paradigmatic form of love.  
36. Such cases of loving an infant or a mentally disabled child deserve further consideration, 
and unfortunately I cannot elaborate upon them here. It should be noted, however, that such cases 
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But quite apart from the case of parental love, Velleman’s descriptive account 
of love doesn’t seem to capture how one comes to love one’s friends nor does it 
provide a plausible account of the maintenance or continuation of such love. First, 
one rarely comes to love one’s friends qua instance of rational nature, even where that 
is understood to be the capacity for valuation and love. Rather, one comes to find 
certain characteristic of a person attractive to oneself for various reasons, many of 
which have nothing to do with serving as “an expression or symbol or reminder of his 
value as a person,” (371). Moreover, it is not merely finding certain characteristics of a 
person attractive that initially grounds one’s love for one’s friends, even those 
characteristics which seem most promising as indications of a person’s essentially 
rational nature. One must interact with the other in order to develop the sort of 
concern characteristic of genuine love.37 For instance, I may admire and respect 
President Obama as a result of observing certain characteristics indicative of his 
rational nature, but my appreciation of these characteristics don’t give rise to love or 
friendship, given that I have never personally interacted with the man. And the 
characteristics and behavior of certain persons I do love often do not necessarily serve 
as reminders of their essentially rational nature. Yet I continue to love them and to 
                                         
are special and do not represent paradigmatic instances of love, in particular the kind of love 
characteristic of friendship. Typical instances of love involve valuing the rationality and moral 
agency of the persons one cares about. Still, it is important to consider that even those incapable of 
actualizing such capacities are nevertheless worthy of our love.  
37. Cf. Kolodny, 174-175.  
 154 
recognize their essential worth as the individuals they are, as well as their worth to me 
as persons with whom I have a shared history and ongoing commitment. 
 Secondly, Velleman’s account of what makes love moral is open to the same 
problem as Whiting’s account of character based friendship—the assumption that 
what makes love moral is the valuation of an impersonal albeit essential feature of the 
one loved, in Velleman’s case the idealized rational will. However, his insistence on 
the impartiality of love obscures certain normative features of love by failing to 
account for the priority or preference we ought to give certain persons as opposed to 
others.38 It is not only that one ought to love certain persons in particular, but also 
that one ought to love certain persons in particular ways. Velleman’s account cannot 
distinguish the different kinds of love we ought to have for our child as opposed to 
our lifelong friend, or our spouse. If love just is a response to a person’s rational 
nature, it doesn’t seem to give us reason to respond differently in different kinds of 
relationships and to develop the levels and kinds of concern appropriate to each. 
 In what follows, I will argue that Aquinas provides a more compelling account 
of love. On his view that love is somehow impersonal or impartiality that makes it a 
morally praiseworthy, but rather what love demands of us. This does not amount to 
merely “arresting our emotional defenses” thereby making us vulnerable to the other. 
What makes love moral, rather, is that it involves committing ourselves to another 
                                         
38. Ibid, 177. 
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and making her happiness and wellbeing an ongoing priority to us. This entails not 
only valuing the one loved as an end in herself, but further, a “going out” from 
oneself to take up the concerns of the other as our own. Moreover, Aquinas provides 
normative reasons for the level and kinds of concern we ought to have for another in 
accordance with the sort of relationship we have with her. His theory of love accounts 
for the fact that that love by its very nature is personal and partial; nevertheless he 
provides normative reasons for why we ought to love all persons, albeit in a more 
general and impartial manner. 
B. AQUINAS ON WHAT MAKES THE LOVE CHARACTERISTIC OF FRIENDSHIP 
MORALLY PRAISEWORTHY  
One virtue of Aquinas’s account of love is that it is broad enough to include 
many different kinds, marking out a certain range of phenomena to which amor 
corresponds which are in keeping with general accounts of what we would call love. 
Aquinas distinguishes between several types of love (amor understood in its general 
sense), identifying the love characteristic of friendship (amor amicitiae) as the 
paradigmatic type of love for another person. He provides a descriptive analysis of the 
psychological phenomena characteristic of various sorts of love. On Aquinas’s 
account, certain kinds of love are moral. But what does it mean for love to be moral? 
In one respect, love is the sort of thing that is subject to moral evaluation inasmuch as 
there are proper objects of love and improper objects of love, depending upon the 
objective goodness of such objects. When it comes to the love of persons, the ordering 
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of our loves is subject to moral evaluation: we should love certain persons more than 
others on the basis of their moral goodness or virtue in a certain sense. Nevertheless, 
Aquinas’s account differs from that of Whiting’s Aristotle insofar as we have 
normative reasons to love more those who are more closely connected to us than those 
who are more virtuous.  
When it comes to love of persons, love characteristic of friendship is morally 
praiseworthy insofar as it entails desiring what is good for the other for the other’s own 
sake. However, this gives rise to a particular problem concerning whether love must 
be strictly motivated by other-directed concern in order to count as morally 
praiseworthy, or whether it the other-directedness of our love can be ultimately 
motivated by happiness or eudaimonia as its final ultimate end. Contra Whiting, I 
argue that love need not be fundamentally other-directed in order to count as moral, 
since ultimately self-directed aspect of love aims at an objective good—the perfection 
of the moral agent which entails desiring the good of another for the other’s own 
sake.  
There is a certain amount of overlap between these accounts of the relation 
between love and morality, and Aquinas does not always make clear what he precisely 
has in mind, but I will attempt as far as possible to distinguish the different respects in 
which he considers love to be morally praiseworthy. Since the paradigmatic form of 
love, amor amicitiae, concerns love for another person, such love will serve as the focus 
of this section of the chapter. However, it will prove useful to rehearse the features 
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central to his account of amor in general in order to grasp what distinguishes the kinds 
of love he considers morally praiseworthy. 
My ultimate aim is to show how, according to Aquinas, the love characteristic 
of friendship is morally praiseworthy inasmuch as it is essentially other-directed, but 
that the other-directed aspect of love need not and should not preclude it’s being 
sought ultimately part of one’s own good. Moreover, I will argue that such love is an 
essentially personal and partial relation insofar as the one loved is valued in and of 
herself rather than qua virtuous or qua instance of rational nature. Nevertheless, 
insofar as the love characteristic of friendship belongs to the will, and the formal object 
of the will is the good considered in a universal or all things considered sense, such 
love is directed toward a particular person apprehended by the subject as good in some 
respect (although not necessarily as morally virtuous, as Whiting would have it), and 
to this extent may be viewed as taking into account an impersonal point of view. Still, 
the immediate object of love is this particular person as apprehended as good in some 
respect. The subject’s ongoing concern for the particular individual is primarily based 
in upon her relationship to the one loved.  
I begin with a distinction crucial to understanding Aquinas’s account of the 
love characteristic of friendship which will provide insight into why the ongoing 
concern constitutive or this sort of love is morally praiseworthy not because it is 
directed toward a person considered as virtuous, but because it is directed toward a 
particular person with whom one is closely connected. Then I will consider his 
 158 
normative account of the proper order of love which not only allows for but also 
requires partiality insofar as we have reasons to prioritize the love of certain persons 
with whom we are specially related.  
1. AMOR AMICITIAE AND AMOR CONCUPISCENTIAE 
On Aquinas’s account, the best kind of love one person can have for another is 
amor amicitiae  (where amor is construed in the broad sense of the term). This sort of 
love belongs not to the sensory appetite as does the passion love (amor construed in 
the strict sense of the term), but to the will or rational appetite of a human being and 
thus necessarily involves choice.39 Amor amicitiae is a form of dilectio or intellective love. 
Because it belongs to the will, the objects of dilectio and its forms are directed toward a 
good conceived of universally, either some general good such as justice, or a particular 
object or end apprehended as good in a general or universal sense. One might worry, 
however, that since the object of the will is some object or end apprehended as good, 
that love (dilectio) and hence the love characteristic of friendship (amor amicitiae) must 
be ultimately directed toward some impersonal object or end or generic good in the 
manner suggested by Whiting and Velleman. Aquinas’s account of the love 
characteristic of friendship as a form of dilectio appears to suggest that the one loved is 
loved primarily qua good rather than per se. Hence, it would seem that Aquinas’s 
                                         
39. ST I-II 26.3. 
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account of amor amicitiae, the paradigmatic form of love for another person, is 
impersonal after all. 
To draw such a conclusion, however, is unwarranted. Dilectio is indeed a 
response to the apprehended value of the beloved object or end. Hence one’s 
apprehension of the object loved as something good to be pursued is a necessary 
condition for dilectio since dilectio pertains to the will and one cannot rationally will or 
love something unless it is apprehended as good in some respect. Accordingly, dilectio 
requires that the lover recognize the good instantiated in a particular individual in 
order for that individual to be its object. But according to Aquinas, the good 
considered in a universal sense is not the immediate object of love but rather its formal 
object.40 The immediate object of dilectio, however, is not the good in general, but a 
particular individual which the agent apprehends as good in this general or formal sense. 
Hence, even though dilectio is directed toward an individual of a particular sort, the 
individual per se is the immediate object of love, whereas the universal good 
instantiated in that individual is its formal object.41  
                                         
40. Dilectio belongs to the will and the formal object of the will is something apprehended as 
good. Cf. ST I-II 8.1, 8.1 ad 2. 
41. To be sure, Velleman doesn't explicitly appeal explicitly to this sort of distinction 
between formal and immediate object of will. Perhaps if he were to do so, his account of the object 
of love would be more plausible. He might say that love is impartial insofar as its formal object is the 
rational essence of the person loved, where the immediate object is the particular person loved qua 
rational being. It is a weakness of his account that Velleman appeals only to the impartial features of 
love excluding particular, non-accidental reasons we have for loving this person rather than another.  
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Aquinas describes amor amicitiae as a species of dilectio insofar as it belongs not 
to the sensory appetite but to the rational appetite or will of a human being. It is a 
special form of dilectio insofar as its object must be someone or something to which 
the agent can wish good for the other’s own sake. Although in one sense, the agent can 
wish good to a non-rational being such as a beloved pet, paradigmatic cases of amor 
amicitiae concern love for other persons since only persons can partake in higher sorts 
of goods constitutive of happiness given their essentially rational nature. To see why 
Aquinas holds that only persons are the proper objects of amor amicitiae, it will prove 
useful to carefully examine a distinction crucial to Aquinas’s account of love. Aquinas 
first introduces the distinction between love characteristic of concupiscence or desire 
(amor concupiscentiae), and the love characteristic of friendship (amor amicitiae) in his 
treatise on the passions (ST I-II 26.4), although this may appear somewhat misleading 
given that amor amicitiae is not a passion since it belongs to the will. He distinguishes 
amor amicitiae from amor concupiscentiae by virtue of the end toward which each is 
directed:  
The motion of love (amor) tends toward two ends, namely toward the 
good which one wishes to someone, either to himself or to another, and 
toward the one to whom he wishes good. Accordingly, one has amor 
concupiscentiae for the good he wishes to someone, and has amor amicitiae 
for the one to whom he wishes good (ST I-II 26.4).42 
                                         
42. Sic ergo motus amoris in duo tendit, scilicet in bonum quod quis vult alicui, vel sibi vel 
alii; et in illud cui vult bonum. Ad illud ergo bonum quod quis vult alteri, habetur amor 
concupiscentiae, ad illud autem cui aliquis vult bonum, habetur amor amicitiae. 
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According to this passage, amor concupiscentiae, the love characteristic of desire, 
ultimately refers to the sort of desire one has for an object one wishes for another, or 
for oneself. Aquinas explains that this is the sort of love one might have for non-
rational objects such as wine or horses since one does not wish goods to such objects 
for their own sakes, but for the sake of someone else. Hence, when x loves y with 
amor concupiscentiae, x loves y either for the sake of x (i.e. herself), or for the sake of some other 
person z. Consider, for example, my love of a good ice wine. In loving the wine I do 
not wish good to the wine; rather, I wish good either to myself, or to someone else 
whom I believe will take pleasure in the wine.43 In the case of amor amicitiae, on the 
other hand, x loves z for the sake of z where z is something I wish good to for it’s 
own sake.44 For example, when I love my sister with amor amicitiae, I wish good to her 
for her sake, not for the sake of any good that may accrue to me or to anyone else by 
loving her.45 Moreover, it is my sister who is the immediate object of my love, not the 
                                         
43. It might be said that I wish good to the wine by treating it with care in order to preserve 
its integrity, but this is only because I want the wine to be well preserved for my own enjoyment or 
the enjoyment of my friend. 
44. For the most part, Aquinas reserves the term “amor amicitiae” for the love of another 
person, but this account need not be limited to persons. I can, for instance, wish good to my dog 
caring about her wellbeing for her own sake, without referring her good back to myself. However, as 
indicated above, it would be irrational to wish my dog the highest good of happiness or eudaimonia 
since rational beings are capable of this end. 
45. Of course on a eudaimonist account of human motivation all acts are undertaking for the 
sake of one’s final ultimate end, but this need not and indeed does not preclude loving another for 
her own sake insofar as the acts associated with amor amicitiae are not instrumental but either partly 
constitutive or a specification of one’s own happiness. Upon reflection one may see that this is so, 
but generally one’s own happiness is not the direct motivator in loving another with the love 
characteristic of friendship. Cf. Scott MacDonald, “Ultimate Ends in Practical Reason.” 
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good I wish to her. Notably, there is a sense in which I also love myself with amor 
amicitiae; this is precisely what I do in wishing my own good.46  
One may love another person merely with the love characteristic of desire (amor 
concupiscentiae), but this would not be to love that person for his own sake but rather as 
a good one wishes to oneself. For example, one might love someone simply because 
she finds him amusing and his company pleasurable. However, in this sort of case, the 
one loving fails to love the other for the other’s own sake; she loves him as a means to 
her own pleasure or delight rather than as an end in himself. 47 Of course in the love 
characteristic of friendship, the one loving does delight in the one loved, but her 
concern extends beyond her own good to the good of another which is sought for the 
sake of the other, as will become clear in Aquinas’s account of how amor amicitiae and 
amor concupiscentiae are related to one another. Aquinas goes on in the passage to 
explain how the two kinds of love are inextricably connected but in such a way that 
the latter is subordinate to the former: 
This division is made in accordance with what is prior and what is 
secondary. For that which is loved with amor amicitiae is loved simply and 
                                         
46. In this case x loves x for the sake of x. 
47. There are certain parallels between this and Aristotle’s description of friendship based 
upon pleasure. However, it is not the case that such friendship on Aristotle’s account is entirely 
instrumental. One can wish good to the other for the other’s own sake, even in the pleasure 
friendship, although this sort of friendship is not complete as is the friendship based upon virtue, 
where the good one wishes to the other are those goods pertaining to virtue and partly constitutive 
of the other’s happiness.  
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per se, whereas that which is loved with amor concupiscentiae is not loved 
simply or on account of itself, but it is loved for another.48 
In loving someone with amor amicitiae, then, there is always some desired good which 
is not loved primarily for its own sake, but rather for the sake of another who is loved 
for her own sake.  
In his illuminating study of the relation between knowledge and love in the 
moral theology of Aquinas, Michael Sherwin has suggested that amor amicitiae and amor 
concupiscentiae are not actually two forms of love but one, stating that “human love 
always has two components, one of which is subordinate to the other.”49 While 
Sherwin is right to think that the two forms of amor always occur together in a 
hierarchical form, his interpretation is somewhat misleading insofar as it is at odds 
with how Aquinas himself distinguishes these forms as at least conceptually distinct 
from one another. Appealing to Aristotle’s account of friendship of which 
benevolence is a characteristic feature (Cf. EN viii 2, 3), Aquinas contrasts the two 
forms of amor as follows: 
Not every kind of amor has the character of friendship (amicitia), but amor 
which is together with benevolence (benevolentia), namely, when we love 
someone in such a way that we wish good to her. But if we do not wish 
                                         
48. Haec autem divisio est secundum prius et posterius. Nam id quod amatur amore 
amicitiae, simpliciter et per se amatur, quod autem amatur amore concupiscentiae, non simpliciter et 
secundum se amatur, sed amatur alteri. (Cf. ST I 60.3 where Aquinas distinguishes between loving 
something as a subsisting good, i.e. in that we wish well two it, and loving something as an inherent 
or accidental good, i.e. that which we wish to another). 
49. Michael Sherwin, By Knowledge and by Love: Charity and Knowledge in the Moral Theology of St. 
Thomas Aquinas (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005) 75. 
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good to the thing loved, but we wish its good for ourselves, just as we 
are said to love wine or a horse or something of that sort, it is not love 
characteristic of friendship (amor amicitiae), but love characteristic of a 
certain desire (cuiusdam concupiscentiae), for it is ridiculous to say that 
someone has friendship for wine or for a horse (ST II-II 23.1).50 
As the passage suggests, Aquinas conceives of the two forms of amor as clearly 
distinct. Only amor together with benevolence (benevolentia), i.e. wishing good to 
another for her own sake, has the character of friendship.51 Nevertheless, there is 
always a sense in which benevolence is present, even when it is not explicit. For in 
wishing the good of the wine or the horse for myself, I could be thought of as 
showing benevolence to myself. So it is not the wine or the horse in this example 
which I love with amor amicitiae, but rather (in a certain sense) myself. Hence, in loving 
an object with amor concupiscentiae, in effect I love myself with amor amicitiae. Accordingly, 
Sherwin is correct in claiming that in each instance of amor, there is both a good loved 
for the sake of someone else or oneself (amor concupiscentiae), and that for the sake of 
which the first good is loved (amor amicitiae). While these two forms of amor are not 
the same, as Sherwin claims, they always occur together. What Aquinas’s account of 
                                         
50. Non quilibet amor habet rationem amicitiae, sed amor qui est cum benevolentia, quando 
scilicet sic amamus aliquem ut ei bonum velimus. Si autem rebus amatis non bonum velimus, sed 
ipsum eorum bonum velimus nobis, sicut dicimur amare vinum aut equum aut aliquid huiusmodi, 
non est amor amicitiae, sed cuiusdam concupiscentiae, ridiculum enim est dicere quod aliquis habeat 
amicitiam ad vinum vel ad equum. 
51. However, as suggested above (cf. note 42), the one to whom one wishes good for its 
own sake need not necessarily be another person. In the case of the horse, I can desire the hay (and 
go buy it) for the horse’s sake. Aquinas seems to overlook this possibility in the passage quoted, 
however, it is implied by his tripartite analysis of love described elsewhere. I am grateful to Scott 
MacDonald for pressing me to consider this further.  
 165 
the hierarchy of amor concupiscentiae and amor amicitiae suggests is that amor always 
presupposes a tripartite structure: x loves y on account of z (or on account of x). 
Hence, any instance of amor concupiscentiae entails amor amicitiae. But the hierarchy is not 
limited to particular goods like wine or horses. It also applies to more universal goods 
such as virtue, happiness, or even caritas, i.e. the love characteristic of friendship for 
God.  
2. CARITAS AND AMOR AMICITIAE 
 In keeping with the Christian tradition to which he belongs, Aquinas believes 
that the most significant of personal relationships is an individual’s relationship with 
God. Union with God is the final ultimate end, the highest good in which human 
beings find their fundamental desire for happiness wholly fulfilled. Such union with 
God is made accessible to a human being through the theological virtue caritas52—viz. 
the love of a person for God, or more precisely, friendship toward God (amicitia ad 
Deum). Caritas is the disposition or virtue which directs a human being to her final and 
complete end in which she is united in intimate and everlasting friendship with God.  
Aquinas insists that even the universal good of caritas cannot be loved with amor 
amicitiae since it must be loved derivatively, either for one’s own sake or for the sake 
of someone else, in this case God.  
                                         
52. Caritas is generally translated as the English word “charity.” However, since the English 
translation has many related but distinct senses (for instance, benevolence or generosity to the poor), 
I shall leave the Latin untranslated so as to preserve its specifically Christian association with the 
love a human being has for God and for his neighbor.  
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 Aquinas makes this point clearly in addressing the question of whether we 
should love caritas out of caritas: 
In accordance with friendship, something is loved in two ways. In one 
way, as the friend himself for whom we have friendship and to whom 
we wish good things, and in the other way, as the good that we wish to a 
friend. It is in this way and not the first that caritas is loved out of caritas, 
because caritas is the good that we wish for all things which we love 
(diligere) out of caritas. And the same is the case with happiness and other 
virtues (ST II-II 25.2).53 
So caritas itself is not loved with amor amictiae. Rather, one loves God with amor amicitiae. 
Caritas, along with all other virtues, and even one’s own happiness, is not loved simply 
and per se, but always on account of the person to whom one wishes these goods (which 
in the case of caritas is ultimately God). The reason is that universal goods such as the 
virtue of caritas and the final ultimate end of happiness are impersonal goods; the love 
amor amicitiae is paradigmatically directed toward persons, i.e. rational beings capable of 
partaking in the highest and best goods. So while it is true that one loves a good one 
wishes to another, this good is not the immediate object of amor amicitiae. Amor 
amicitiae entails wishing good to another for the other’s own sake, which is precisely 
what makes such love morally praiseworthy.54 
                                         
53. Per amicitiam autem amatur aliquid dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut ipse amicus ad quem 
amicitiam habemus et cui bona volumus. Alio modo, sicut bonum quod amico volumus. Et hoc 
modo caritas per caritatem amatur, et non primo, quia caritas est illud bonum quod optamus 
omnibus quos ex caritate diligimus. Et eadem ratio est de beatitudine et de aliis virtutibus. Cf. Car. 
VIII ad 16. 
54. This will be important for understanding how, when it comes to the love of persons out of 
friendship, even though every person aims at their own happiness as their final ultimate end, the 
truly happy person loves God more than self in the most complete or perfect form of love, i.e. caritas. 
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 Aquinas’s account of amor amicitiae could be construed as somehow impersonal 
insofar as it entails apprehending the person loved as good in some sense. But the 
apprehension of a person as morally virtuous or even as an instance of an essentially 
rational nature is not what makes such love morally praiseworthy. Rather, the moral 
value of amor amicitiae must be attributed to its being the sort of love which entails 
desiring the good of another person for that person’s own sake.  
3.  AMOR AMICITIAE AND SELF-INTEREST  
 Thus far I have argued that the morally praiseworthy feature of amor amictiae as 
depicted by Aquinas is not that its object is impersonal, but that it entails desiring the 
good of one’s friend for the sake of the friend. Nonetheless, on Aquinas’s account of the 
best kind of love between persons, the good of the other is only one of two ends 
which comprise the love characteristic of friendship. In his description of love and its 
effects in the Prima Secundae, Aquinas indicates that one of the ends of love is the 
fulfillment of the agent’s own desire for a certain sort of union with the one loved (ST 
I-II 28.1).  
 Accordingly, Aquinas distinguishes love from pure benevolence insofar as it 
has a twofold end: 1) the good of the beloved friend which is desired for the friend’s 
own sake, and 2) the culmination of one’s love in some sort of union with the beloved 
                                         
I will consider this in more detail in the final chapter.  
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friend.55 This latter end is in a certain sense a form of amor concupiscentiae, since it is 
directed toward fulfilling the desire of the one loving.  
 Of the two ends the agent desires in the act of loving, the first is essentially 
benevolent or other-directed, but the second is essentially self-directed. The agent 
desires to be united with the other for her own sake. So although amor amicitiae entails 
wishing and promoting the good of another for the other’s own sake, it still has an 
essentially self-interested component given Aquinas’s complete account of the ends of 
love. The desire for union makes it such that love, even the best kind, is partially but 
essentially self-interested, and hence may not be considered by some as a moral 
phenomenon after all. At best, it entails a sort of mixture of motives. After 
delineating Aquinas’s distinction between kinds of union and their relation to love, I 
argue that the desire for union does not after all undermine the essentially moral 
nature of amor amicitiae. 
4.  AMOR AMICITIAE AND UNION 
In his account of the effects of love, Aquinas appeals to three kinds of union 
which comprise the appetitive motion: 
For a certain union is the cause of love. And this is substantial union with 
regard to the love with which one loves oneself, but with regard to the 
love with which one loves other things it is a union of similitude. Also there 
                                         
55. In his analysis of Aquinas’s account of God’s love in SCG, Norman Kretzmann argues 
that understanding love solely in terms of benevolence, i.e. desiring the good of the other for the 
other’s own sake, is “drastically incomplete.” A complete account of the love characteristic of 
friendship must also include of what he calls univolence, i.e. desiring or willing some sort of union 
with the person loved for her own sake. Cf. The Metaphysics of Theism, 241-242. 
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is a certain union which is essentially love itself. This is the union according 
to the bond of affection. This is compared to substantial union in that the 
one who loves stands in relation to the object loved as he stands to 
himself in the case of amor amicitiae, but as to something belonging to 
him in the case of amor concupiscentiae. Finally, a certain union is the effect 
of love. And this is real union, which the one who loves seeks with regard 
to the object of love (ST I-II 28.1 ad 2).56 
As the passage indicates, Aquinas sees the different kinds of union as related to love 
in three ways: 1) the cause of love is substantial union (unio substantialis) as it pertains to 
the love of oneself, or the union of likeness (unio similitudinis) as it pertains to love of 
another, 2) union according to the bond of affection (unio secundum coaptationem affectus) 
just is love, and 3) real union is the effect of love when the object of love is attained.  
As concerns the union of likeness (unio similtudinis), Aquinas distinguishes two 
different kinds: the actual possession of similar qualities, and the potential possession of 
certain qualities which one does not possess, but is inclined toward. He indicates that 
he former kind of likeness is the cause of amor amicitiae while the latter is the cause of 
amor concupiscentiae. The kind of likeness Aquinas identifies as the cause of the love 
characteristic of friendship, then, is the possession of a similar qualities between two 
persons “as if possessing one form,” (quasi habentes unam formam) such as shared 
humanity or something more particular (ST I-II 27.3).  
                                         
56. Quaedam enim unio est causa amoris. Et haec quidem est unio substantialis, quantum ad 
amorem quo quis amat seipsum, quantum vero ad amorem quo quis amat alia, est unio similitudinis, 
ut dictum est. Quaedam vero unio est essentialiter ipse amor. Et haec est unio secundum 
coaptationem affectus. Quae quidem assimilatur unioni substantiali, inquantum amans se habet ad 
amatum, in amore quidem amicitiae, ut ad seipsum; in amore autem concupiscentiae, ut ad aliquid 
sui. Quaedam vero unio est effectus amoris. Et haec est unio realis, quam amans quaerit de re amata. 
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Accordingly the union of likeness causes the union according to the bond of 
affection, or love itself. In the above passage and in the earlier passage quoted above 
describing the appetitive motion to which love gives rise (ST I-II 26.2), Aquinas uses 
the term coaptatio to identify love, a term which refers to a bond or apprehension of 
something as somehow appropriate or suitable to oneself. In the case of amor amicitiae, 
this bond is caused by the apprehension of sort of similarity between oneself and the 
one loved. Elsewhere, Aquinas uses the term complacentia, which adds to coaptatio the 
connotation of finding the object pleasing to oneself, and thus suggests how love 
gives rise to the desire which culminates in real union.57  
With respect to amor amicitiae, the union of likeness entails that the person loved 
stands to the one loving in such a way that the one loving stands to himself. The one 
who loves wishes good to his friend in the same manner that he wishes good to 
himself. He treats the friends as he treats himself as a result of his love for the other 
caused by the possession of similar qualities as indicated above. This may include 
certain similarities shared by family members, such biological ties or a common 
history, or those shared by friends such as similar tastes, concerns, goals, or projects. 
The kind of love one has for the other varies in accordance with the different kinds of 
shared similarities.  
                                         
57. The suitability (coaptatio) of the sensory appetite or the will to some good, that is, the very 
state of finding the good thing pleasing (complacentia boni) is called either sensory amor, or intellective 
or rational amor. Therefore sensory love is in the sensory appetite just as intellective love is in the 
intellective appetite (ST I-II.26.1). 
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Finally, real union (unio realis) involves the actual presence of the beloved 
object. In the case of the love characteristic of friendship this involves spending time 
with the one loved, sharing in conversation, mutual goals and projects, and other 
important life activities. In real union, the appetitive motion comes to rest in the 
pleasure or joy one takes in being with the other.58 Still, it is worth noting that even 
when the motion of love is realized in real union with the other, love itself, i.e. the 
union of affection, does not cease; love is present during the entire appetitive motion, 
remaining even when its object is attained. Hence, whether the beloved is present or 
absent, love endures (ST I-II.28.1).   
So we have seen that it is central to Aquinas’s account of love that it is partly 
constituted by the agent’s desire to be united with the other, and for this reason 
cannot be entirely disinterested. Union between the lover and the beloved is one of the 
two ends of the love characteristic of friendship; it is this end in which the appetitive 
movement of love comes to rest when the one who loves experiences pleasure or joy 
in the culmination of his love. The potential worry that Aquinas’s account of love as a 
desire directed toward union with another is that love is really a form of amor 
concupiscentiae: the agent desires such union for his own good and not for that of the 
other. Hence although amor amicitiae is disinterested insofar as it entails wishing for 
                                         
58. Aquinas indicates that pleasure or joy attendant upon such union is last in the order of 
execution, but first in the order of intention and as such constitutes the aim of the motion of love. 
Cf. ST I-II 25.2. 
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and promoting the good of the other for the other’s own sake it appears to be 
interested given that as a form of love, the agent aims toward a sort of union with the 
one loved which terminates in the agent’s own pleasure or delight (Cf. ST I-II 25.2 
delineated above). 
 This objection, however, is unfounded. Aquinas provides a complete account 
of what the best kind of love between persons plausibly consists in insofar as it entails 
both desire for the good of one’s friend and the desire to be united with her in some 
respect. It is morally praiseworthy in that it entails desiring the good of one’s friend 
for her own sake, but this in no way precludes the desire for the enjoyment of being 
united with her. Indeed the desire for and the actual union may partly constitute not 
only one’s own good but also that of the other.59 Both friends benefit from such 
union given that it is part of the objective good of each friend to be united in some 
sort of fellowship with another person. So although it is part of the good of the agent 
to enjoy a sort of union with the other, such union itself also benefits the other. 
Hence there is no real conflict between the two ends toward which amor amicitiae is 
directed.60  
                                         
59. “It is the privilege of friends to take joy in one another’s presence, in living together, and 
in conversation,” (SCG I.91). Cf. Aristotle, EN IX 1171b29-1172a1.  
60. In considering the love characteristic of friendship as an essentially moral phenomenon, 
it is worth noting precisely how Aquinas conceives of the two ends of love by virtue of where they 
are placed in his taxonomy. The first end, i.e. the good of the other which is sought for the other’s 
own sake, is explained in question 26 of the Prima Secundae where Aquinas is considering the very 
nature of love itself.  In the fourth article where he distinguishes amor amicitiae from amor concupiscentiae, 
Aquinas indicates that an essential feature of the former is that its end is the good of the person 
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5. AMOR AMICITIAE AND ECSTASY (EXTASIS) 
In addition to union, one of the other effects of love Aquinas identifies is 
ecstasy (extasis), which he uses in the sense of being placed outside of oneself (ST I-II 
28.3). In his account of ecstasy, Aquinas indicates another respect in which amor 
amicitiae is other-directed in a way that amor concupiscentiae is not, and is as such an 
essentially moral phenomenon. One kind of ecstasy pertains to the appetitive power 
insofar as the appetite is moved beyond oneself toward another. In Aquinas’s words, 
“someone is said to undergo ecstasy (extasis) when the appetite of that person is 
carried toward another person, in some sense going out from oneself” (ST I-II 28.3).61 
Love causes ecstasy by moving a person toward another simply, in such a way that is 
does not refer back to his own desire for union but essentially involves wishing and 
doing good to the other for the other’s own sake. 
Aquinas’s account of the distinction between amor amicitiae and amor 
concupiscentiae again plays a crucial role in specifying how the love characteristic of 
                                         
loved sought for her own sake. The desire for real union is an effect of love, whereas the affective 
union is love itself. So love itself entails loving the other as an end in herself, but gives rise to the 
desire for real union, which is not love itself, but an effect of love (Cf. ST 27.1). Accordingly, it is 
reasonable to think that real union doesn’t belong to the nature of love although it is nonetheless one 
of the two ends of love. What the taxonomy suggests is that the love characteristic of friendship is 
moral by virtue of its very nature insofar as other-directedness is an essential feature of such love. So 
it is true that the love characteristic of friendship is interested with respect to the desire for real union 
with the one loved, in which the motion of love terminates. Nevertheless, love itself with respect to 
the love characteristic of friendship, is essentially other-directed given the very nature of what it is.  
61. Secundum appetitivam vero partem dicitur aliquis extasim pati, quando appetitus alicuius 
in alterum fertur, exiens quodammodo extra seipsum. 
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friendship causes a sort of other-directedness lacking in the love characteristic of 
desire.62  
Amor directly causes the second kind of ecstasy [that belonging to the 
appetitive power], absolutely (simpliciter) with respect to amor amicitiae, but 
with respect to amor concupiscentiae not absolutely but in a certain respect. 
For concerning amor concupiscentiae the one who loves is carried outside 
himself, namely, insofar as he seeks enjoyment from something external 
to him, since he is not content to enjoy the good which he possesses. 
But because that person seeks to possess the external good for himself, 
he does not go out from himself absolutely, but rather, such affection 
concludes in an end within himself. But concerning amor amicitiae, the 
person’s affection goes out from himself absolutely because he wishes 
good to his friend and devotes himself [to his friend’s good] as if 
managing his own concern and care, on account of the friend himself.63  
In the case of amor concupiscentiae, the agent is carried outside of himself in the sense 
that he seeks to attain something he does not already possess. Concerning, for 
example, the love for wine, the agent goes out from himself to the extent that he 
seeks to enjoy something external to him. Upon apprehending the bottle of wine, he 
is carried outside of himself in the sense that he seeks to attain for himself something 
he does not already possess, i.e. a glass of wine. But he is carried outside of himself 
only in a limited respect since his affection for the wine terminates in his possession 
                                         
62. Cf. On Love & Charity, tr. Peter A. Kwasniewski (Washington, D.C: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 2008): 144, note b. 
63. Sed secundam extasim facit amor directe, simpliciter quidem amor amicitiae; amor autem 
concupiscentiae non simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Nam in amore concupiscentiae, quodammodo 
fertur amans extra seipsum, inquantum scilicet, non contentus gaudere de bono quod habet, quaerit 
frui aliquo extra se. Sed quia extrinsecum bonum quaerit sibi habere, non exit simpliciter extra se, 
sed talis affectio ininfra ipsum concluditur. Sed in amore amicitiae, affectus alicuius simpliciter exit 
extra se, quia vult amico bonum, et operatur, quasi gerens curam et providentiam ipsius, propter 
ipsum amicum. 
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and enjoyment of it. Hence, his affection comes back to him upon his attainment of 
object loved.  
On the other hand, in the case of amor amicitiae, the agent is carried outside of 
himself absolutely (simpliciter) insofar as his affection is not directed back toward 
himself, but rather remains outside of him (keeping in view that in accordance with 
Aquinas’s eudaimonism, amor amicitiae itself is ultimately a constitutive part of the 
agent’s own final ultimate end or happiness). The end of the love characteristic of 
friendship is external to the agent insofar as the agent desires and devotes himself to 
the good of the other, not on his own account but on account of his friend. He takes 
up the cares and concerns of the beloved friend the sake of her good, rather than for 
his own—the concern remains outside of him. For instance, in loving my sister with 
the love characteristic of friendship, I am carried outside of myself insofar as I desire 
and devote myself to her and to her good. In practical terms, it is if I were taking up 
her concerns as I would my own. If she needs something, for instance to sell her 
house, I wish good to her insofar as I desire for her sake that the right buyer comes 
along. Furthermore, I am moved to seek her good thus acting on her behalf, perhaps 
by taking the time to help her set up the house for a showing, or watching her 
children so that she is freed up to do so. By taking up her concerns in this way I am 
placed outside of myself. In contrast to amor concupiscentiae, my desire for her good 
remains outside of me.  
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In sum, there is a sense in which, on Aquinas’s account, the love characteristic 
of friendship is interested to the extent that one of its desired effects is the real union 
between the lover and the beloved. Nevertheless, is it just as true to say that such love 
is disinterested or other-directed insofar as another of its effects the agent’s going out 
from himself to take up the cares and concerns of the his beloved friend in such a way 
that the end of the agent’s affection is not directed back toward himself, but remains 
outside of himself in the one loved.  
6. AMOR AMICITIAE AND HAPPINESS 
 Still, there is a deeper worry with the moral nature of Aquinas’s account of 
even the very best kind of love between persons. Although desiring the good of 
another for her own sake is compatible with enjoying union with the other and is 
disinterested in the sense that the agent goes out from oneself in extasis, moral 
theorists like Whiting find it objectionable that the basic grounding of the goodness of 
friendship, in accordance with Aquinas’s eudaimonist account of human motivation, 
is that it is partly constitutive of one’s own happiness.64 Hence although Aquinas 
holds that the love characteristic of friendship entails concern for the good of another 
for the other’s own sake, even this sort of love appears to be non-moral to the extent 
that it is not ultimately grounded in disinterested concern for the good of the other, 
and is in fact ultimately justified in terms of its contribution to the agent’s own 
                                         
64. I am indebted to David Gallagher’s insightful discussion of this problem in “Desire for 
Beatitude and Love of Friendship in Thomas Aquinas.” Mediaeval Studies 58 (1996): 1-47.  
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happiness or fulfillment.  If this is the ultimate motivation, is amor amicitiae genuinely 
morally praiseworthy?  
 Pulling together the features of Aquinas’s account of amor amicitiae delineated 
above, we can see just how, although self-interested in a certain respect, the best kind 
of love for another person is morally praiseworthy. According most eudaimonist 
accounts of human motivation, all actions are ultimately undertaken for the sake of 
one’s own perfect good or happiness (Cf. ST I-II 1.4-6). The rational agent acts for 
the sake of this final ultimate end, i.e. the best life for a human being in which all of 
her rational desires are completely fulfilled. Nevertheless, this life includes and is partly 
constituted by possessing certain virtues, one of which is benevolence, an essential 
feature of amor amicitiae, the best kind of friendship between persons. So one of the 
reasons amor amicitiae is morally praiseworthy is that it entails desiring the highest and 
best good for the other—an objective good constitutive of the friend’s own happiness. 
Still, the love characteristic of friendship entails desiring real union with the other, 
which may be viewed as self-interested, but need not be since, as we have seen, union 
with the other in the best kinds of friendship partly constitutes the happiness or objective good both of 
the one loving and the one loved.  
With respect to ecstasy (extasis), amor amicitiae is essentially other-directed and in 
this sense is what contemporary philosophers may consider altruistic. The agent 
desires the objective good of the other, and promotes this end in such a way the 
agent’s affection or desire for the good of the other remains outside of herself and in 
 178 
the one love. The essentially other-directedness of amor amicitiae is another feature 
which makes it morally praiseworthy.  
The question remains, however, whether the agent can at once desire the good 
of another for the other’s sake when doing so is ultimately part of her own final 
ultimate end, or perfective of the agent herself. I believe the answer is yes. The view I 
have been advocating depends upon Aquinas’s view of the final ultimate end as an 
objectively good state according to which the agent directs all of her actions and ends 
toward the highest good. Amor amicitiae, insofar as it is included in that end, is morally 
praiseworthy, even if it ultimately motivated by the agent’s desire for her own 
objective good or perfection.  
The fact that Aquinas’s account of amor amicitiae entails both interested and 
disinterested aspects not only depicts a compelling descriptive account of what 
motivates such love, but moreover, provides a compelling normative account of the 
sort of unselfish concern such love ought to motivate. Amor amicitiae is a virtue partly 
constitutive of the agent’s highest good or perfection as a human being; one’s 
perfection as a human being entails wishing and doing good for another for the 
other’s sake—an essentially other-directed virtue.  
I see no reason to think Aquinas’s view that amor amicitiae is ultimately 
grounded in the agent’s own final ultimate end in any way takes away from the 
essentially other-directed character of such love. Hence, it is quite plausible to think 
that amor amicitiae is morally praiseworthy both insofar as it is other-directed and insofar 
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as it is a virtue which partly constitutes the objective good or the perfection of the 
agent. Hence, according to Aquinas, what makes love morally praiseworthy is not the 
impersonal or impartial nature of its object, as Whiting and Velleman contend, i.e. 
that love is justified in terms of apprehending the other qua virtuous or qua instance of 
rational nature. Rather, amor amicitiae is morally praiseworthy insofar as it is directed 
toward the good of another for the other’s own sake, even if and in fact because such love 
ultimately contributes to one’s own perfection or completion as both a rational and 
relational being.  
7. AMOR AMICITIAE AND PARTIALITY 
Thus far I have drawn upon Aquinas’s theory of love between persons in order 
to show that the morality of love does not depend upon the impersonal and impartial 
nature of the justification for love (initial or ongoing), but rather upon the very nature 
of the love characteristic of friendship as essentially other-directed and ultimately 
perfective of the agent. But further, Aquinas holds that the love characteristic of 
friendship should be partial inasmuch as we have normative reasons for prioritizing 
certain relationships over others based upon the particular relationships and shared 
histories we have with certain persons.65  
                                         
65. With regard to being partial in the sense of prioritizing certain relations over others, 
Whiting and Velleman could consistently agree. Both philosophers are concerned with how we 
come to value or continue to value certain persons on the basis of impersonal criteria—virtue or the 
capacity for valuation. But there is no particular relation between the thesis that we love people on 
account of their impersonal qualities and that we should or shouldn’t prioritize some relations over 
others. One could agree with Whiting or Velleman about what makes her friends worthy of concern, 
and yet still think that certain friends, in particular those with whom she is more intimately 
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The remainder of this chapter is devoted to understanding Aquinas’s account 
of the partiality of love. Significantly, unlike Aristotle, Aquinas holds that we have 
normative reasons for loving more those most closely connected to us than those 
who are more virtuous. He explicitly states as much in the midst of giving a detailed 
account of how one’s loves ought to be ordered. Still, virtue is important insofar as 
the love characteristic of friendship is directed toward the objective good of the other. 
One’s love of those closest to her entails the desire that her friend come to value 
those objects and ends constitutive of genuine happiness. Accordingly, such love 
entails wishing that the friend be more virtuous in order that he can partake more in 
happiness, the highest good for a human being. 
In delineating his account of caritas, Aquinas considers questions concerning 
how, out of caritas, one’s loves ought to be ordered. First, he argues caritas must have 
an order, appealing to Aristotelian natural teleology according to which things are 
naturally ordered toward their principle or source. Since caritas tends toward God as 
the principle of happiness, the things loved out of caritas must be ordered with 
reference to God as that the principle (ST II-II 26.1). Accordingly, God—the first 
principle of happiness—ought to be loved most of all, more than one’s neighbor and 
even more than oneself.66 Aquinas defends the Augustinian account of the order of 
                                         
connected, deserve more of her attention than those more distant, even if the more distant friends 
perhaps share the same qualities of character or rationality.  
66. With respect to the love of self, Aquinas appeals to relation of a part to the whole, 
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caritas, explaining how God is loved first as the principle of good upon which caritas is 
founded. One loves oneself next as a partaker in this good and then one’s neighbor as 
one who shares together (either actually or potentially) in the good. Aquinas’s reason 
for holding that one ought to love oneself more than one’s neighbor is that “unity 
surpasses union.” One is substantially united with himself, and his partaking in the 
divine good is a more powerful reason for loving than his sharing together in the 
divine good with another (ST II-II 26.4). Nevertheless, Aquinas maintains that loving 
oneself more than one’s neighbor pertains only to one’s spiritual well being. One 
ought to be prepared to sacrifice his physical well being, and even his life, for the well 
being of his neighbor (ST II-II 26.5).  
For our purposes, the most important claim Aquinas defends in his account of 
the order of caritas has to do with the ordering of one’s love for her neighbors. After 
arguing for the sense in which we should love certain neighbors more than others, 
Aquinas makes that striking claim that we should have greater love for those to whom 
we are most closely connected than those who are more virtuous.  
Before examining his defense of this claim, it will prove useful to rehearse the 
general reasons Aquinas gives for loving certain neighbors more than others. He again 
appeals to natural teleology in support of the claim that love increases in proportion 
                                         
arguing that God ought to be loved first as the universal principle of all who are able to take part in 
happiness (ST II-II 26.3). Of course much more needs to be said about self-love and the love of 
God, but unfortunately I cannot go into it here. For an excellent discussion see Thomas Osborne, 
Love of Self and Love of God in Thirteenth Century Ethics. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2005.  
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to the nearness of the one loved. We have reasons to love particular persons more 
than others due to the very nature of affection. “For the affection of caritas, which is 
the inclination of grace, is not less ordered than the natural appetite, which is the 
inclination of nature, for each inclination proceeds from divine wisdom” (ST II-II 
26.6).67 This is in keeping with Aquinas’s general view that grace fulfills nature rather 
than opposing it. He goes on to explain how the inclination of grace follows that of 
nature: 
Now we see in natural things that the inclination of nature is 
proportionate to the action or motion which is appropriate to the nature 
of each thing, just as in the earth the inclination of gravity is greater than 
in water, because it is proper for the earth to be below water. Thus it is 
also fitting that the inclination of grace, which is the affection of caritas, 
should be proportionate to those actions which should be done 
outwardly, since we have an intense affection of caritas toward those who 
are more beneficent toward us. And so it is said that even with respect to 
affection, it is fitting that we should love more someone closer to us 
than another, (Ibid).68 
Just as natural inclinations are proportionate to the action or motion appropriate to 
the nature of the thing, the affection of caritas ought to be proportionate to those 
actions which ought to be done outwardly. Hence we ought to love more those whose 
                                         
67. Non enim minus est ordinatus affectus caritatis, qui est inclinatio gratiae, quam appetitus 
naturalis, qui est inclinatio naturae, utraque enim inclinatio ex divina sapientia procedit. 
68. Videmus autem in naturalibus quod inclinatio naturalis proportionatur actui vel motui 
qui convenit naturae uniuscuiusque, sicut terra habet maiorem inclinationem gravitatis quam aqua, 
quia competit ei esse sub aqua. Oportet igitur quod etiam inclinatio gratiae, quae est affectus caritatis, 
proportionetur his quae sunt exterius agenda, ita scilicet ut ad eos intensiorem caritatis affectum 
habeamus quibus convenit nos magis beneficos esse. Et ideo dicendum est quod etiam secundum 
affectum oportet magis unum proximorum quam alium diligere.  
 183 
actions are better. But this would appear to be precisely the sort of view Whiting 
advocates: we ought to love more those who do more good, that is, the more 
beneficent (and hence more virtuous) person.  So why does Aquinas then conclude 
that we should love more those who are more closely related to us? The answer to 
this question is partially found in his reply to Augustine’s claim that we ought, out of 
caritas, to love all persons equally (ST II-II 26.6 ad 1; Cf. Augustine, De Doct. Crist. 
i.28).  Aquinas responds by distinguishing between beneficence and benevolence. 
With respect to beneficence, we cannot love all equally because we cannot do good to 
all. But with respect to benevolence, we ought to love all equally in the sense that we 
wish all persons the same good of everlasting happiness. Hence, he concludes that 
Augustine is right with respect to benevolence: we should love all equally in wishing 
them the same good. But with respect to beneficence, we should love those more 
with whom we are more closely connected by virtue of some sort of contingent 
circumstances, as Augustine himself points out (ST II-II 26.6 ad 2). Thus far, all that 
Aquinas has shown is that we ought to love more out of caritas those whose actions 
are more beneficent toward us. And those with whom we are more closely connected 
due to some circumstance or another are those who are in a better position to act 
beneficently toward us.  
This empirical observation serves as the basis for Aquinas’s normative claims 
about the reasons we have for loving and acting for the sake of those closest to us, 
and accounting for the fact that the various kinds of relationships we have with 
 184 
particular persons are important for determining in what way we are to act on their 
behalf.69 Accordingly, he continues his account of the order of caritas by arguing in 
accordance with what I will call the “principle of proximity:” that one has reason to 
love and to act for the sake of those more closely connected to us more than those who 
are more virtuous.   
Aquinas claims that we have normative reasons for prioritizing our loves in 
terms of proximity to us of our relations and friends, rather than those persons who 
are more virtuous. He gives the following reason:   
But the intensity of love (dilectio) must take into account the relation of 
the one who loves with respect to the person himself. And according to 
this, a person loves those who are closer to him with a more intense 
affection—an affection directed toward that good he loves on account 
of them, rather than [loving] those who are better with respect to the 
greater good (ST II-II 26.7).70 
Although Aquinas acknowledges that we have reasons to love virtuous persons 
insofar as such persons promote the greater good, he contends that we have reasons 
to love those persons closer to us with greater intensity of affection, based upon the kind 
of relationship and the shared history we have with them. The personal relationships 
we have with those close to use give us reason to desire their good more than that of 
                                         
69. Aquinas’s account of the order of caritas and the principles he appeals to ostensibly mark 
a significant departure from Aristotelian accounts of the best kinds of friendship based upon the 
character or virtue of the friends. Indeed, Aquinas explicitly argues that (in this life at least), love of 
others ought to be prioritized in terms of proximity as opposed to virtue (ST II-II 26.7). 
70. Sed intensio dilectionis est attendenda per comparationem ad ipsum hominem qui diligit. 
Et secundum hoc illos qui sunt sibi propinquiores intensiori affectu diligit homo ad illud bonum ad 
quod eos diligit, quam meliores ad maius bonum.  
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more virtuous persons who are deserving of a greater good. However, this doesn’t 
render us indifferent to the virtue of those closest to us. Quite the contrary, Aquinas 
explicitly states that part of the good we desire for those close to us is that they should 
become better persons, i.e. more virtuous, and thereby attain greater happiness (ST II-
II 26.7). 
We may recognize that persons like Nelson Mandela or Mother Teresa have 
great virtue and have brought about great goods for the poor and oppressed persons 
of this world. This gives us reasons to love them and to desire their good. But it 
would seem somehow inappropriate for us to love such persons with more intensity 
than those who are closer to us, given the fact that we don’t have close personal 
relations with them. We respect and admire those who are more virtuous because of 
the good they have done in the world, but we don’t know them as we know, for 
instance, our close friends. Hence, we don’t have reason to love them and promote 
their good over and above those with whom we have close relationships. When 
Nelson Mandela dies each of us will have reason to mourn on account of the fact he 
was a great man who helped bring about the end of Apartheid through his suffering 
and leadership. But it is right to think that we have greater reason to be affected by 
the death or a close personal friend, or parent, or especially the death of our own 
child. In fact it would be inappropriate, or even wrong, to be more upset by the loss 
of a person of great character, than we are about someone close to us in one of these 
ways. For these reasons, Aquinas is justified in claiming that it is normatively 
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appropriate to love our close friends and family members with greater intensity on the 
basis our personal relationships and shared histories with them.  
Aquinas specifies a further reason why we should love more those with whom 
we are more closely connected insofar as we are connected in more ways to such 
persons than we are to persons we love exclusively out of caritas. Caritas, the love of 
human beings for God, entails also the love of neighbor, an extension of our love for 
God (ST II-II 25.1). Out of caritas we have reason to love those persons with whom 
we are merely acquainted, or even those we don’t know at all. But with respect to 
those with whom we are more intimately connected, we have other kinds of 
friendship and thus reason to love them more:  
There is another manner in which, out of caritas, we love more those 
who are more closely connected to us because we love them in more 
ways. For with respect to those who are not closely connected to us, we 
have only the friendship based upon caritas. But with respect to those 
who are closely connected to us, we have certain other kinds of 
friendship according to manner of their connection to us (ST II-II 
26.7).71   
So while we have reason to love the virtuous and indeed all persons on the basis of 
caritas, we have greater reasons to love more those with whom we are connected in 
different ways.  
                                         
71. Est autem et alius modus quo plus diligimus ex caritate magis nobis coniunctos, quia 
pluribus modis eos diligimus. Ad eos enim qui non sunt nobis coniuncti non habemus nisi amicitiam 
caritatis. Ad eos vero qui sunt nobis coniuncti habemus aliquas alias amicitias, secundum modum 
coniunctionis eorum ad nos.  
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For example, my love for my best friend is an extension of my love for God, 
but there are many other reasons I love her given our long-term history as friends: the 
memories we share from growing up in the same neighborhood, being locker partners 
in high school, roommates in college, and the mutual support we have provided one 
another throughout the nearly thirty years we have known each other. Aquinas 
recognizes that we have greater reason to love certain persons more than others on 
the basis of being connected to them in more ways, and considers such reasons to be 
normative. To be sure, it is morally praiseworthy, and in fact morally required, for me 
to love Joe off the street out of caritas, but it would be inappropriate for me to love 
him more than I love Corri, my lifelong friend who I also love out of caritas, but for 
many other reasons as well. 
Hence, Aquinas’s provides a normative account of the order of caritas 
specifying how and why we are to prioritize our loves in such a way that corresponds 
with our natural affections. Nevertheless, his account extends beyond such natural 
affections to the love of those with whom we are not closely related, and beyond that 
to the love of our enemies. I will explore this aspect of the order of caritas and its 
demands in the final chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
AQUINAS ON IMPARTIAL LOVE 
The bulk of this dissertation has been devoted to understanding how on 
Aquinas’s account, there is an important sense in which certain forms of love can be 
essentially self-interested and partial and yet at once deeply moral. In particular, my 
intent has been to show how Aquinas’s account of love developed in the right way, 
provides compelling reasons to think that certain forms of love, in particular amor 
amicitiae, can at once be interested and yet other-directed in such a way that may even 
involve great personal sacrifice. As a eudaimonist, Aquinas’s moral psychology entails 
that all desires of a rational agent are ultimately rooted in the agent’s desire for her 
own perfection or completion as a human being—that is, her objective good. Further, 
this good entails desiring the good of other persons independently, without direct 
reference to the agent’s own good.  
Moreover, I have shown how Aquinas’s moral theory entails partiality insofar 
as amor amicitiae plays a central role providing the rational agent with reasons for 
prioritizing her own good and that of the persons to whom she has certain 
commitments and with whom she has a shared history. But although Aquinas’s moral 
theory, as specified in his account of the order of caritas, entails partiality, it is 
nevertheless impartial in the sense that it provides the agent with reasons for, and in 
fact positively requires, loving all persons, including one’s enemies. But this seems 
problematic insofar as it allows for a potential conflict of interest between prioritizing 
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the persons one loves and loving all persons as is proscribed by the greatest 
commandment of Christianity. My aim in this chapter is to show how the partiality 
and impartiality required by Aquinas’s moral theory can be reconciled into a coherent 
account of human motivation. 
A striking feature of caritas as understood in the Christian tradition is that all 
persons, even one’s enemies, are properly included within its scope. The greatest 
commandment of Christianity is twofold requiring that one love God with all her 
heart, soul and mind, and that she love her neighbor as herself.1 Since the term 
“neighbor” is inclusive, extending to all persons as actual or potential sharers of the 
everlasting happiness found in relationship with God, Christian love requires loving 
all persons with amor amicitiae.  
The antecedent of this view is the Stoic doctrine that ideally, all human beings 
form a community in which all other persons are included in the scope of those to 
whom we have obligations. This is evidence in Heirocles’s account of friendship 
according to which our concern for others is explained using the metaphor of 
concentric circles which begins with the self and ultimately extends to include the 
entire human race (Stobeus 4.671,7-673,11 tr. Long & Sedley):  
Each of us is as it were entirely encompassed by many circles, some 
small, others, larger, the latter enclosing the former on the basis of their 
different and unequal dispositions relative to each other. 
                                         
1. Mt. 22:36-40, Cf. Lev. 19:18, Deut. 6:5. 
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The first circle encompasses one’s self: mind then body, the second one’s immediate 
family, the third one’s extended family, the fourth extends from one’s other relations 
to local residents to one’s fellow citizens and countrymen. Finally, the outermost 
circle extends to include the entire human race. Stoic virtue, according to Heirocles 
entails bringing those in the outer circles into the more inner circles: “The right point 
will be reached if, through our own initiative, we reduce the distance of the 
relationship with each person.” There are at least two possible ways of interpreting 
the metaphor: 1) the virtuous person eventually fits the whole human race into his 
innermost circle—a view which seems quite incoherent given the constitutional 
limitations of human beings. As Julia Annas points out, attempting to all more 
persons into one’s innermost circle such that one cares for all persons with equal 
concern. 
Is problematic since increasing partiality for others can only result in the 
dilution of concern for those closest to us; it can never end in impartiality.2 The 
second and more plausible interpretation is that the virtuous person brings other 
persons closer within his circles of concern, but nevertheless keeps the circles distinct 
from one another. In this case, the doctrine need not entail the less plausible view that 
                                         
2. See Annas, The Morality of Happiness, 267-269. 
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we treat all persons with equal concern. Rather, the virtuous person is one who cares 
for more people, if not equally.3 
In specifying the order of caritas, Aquinas draws from the Stoic tradition 
providing a normative account of love ranging from the particular and the partial to 
the more general and impartial.4 In keeping with Augustine, Aquinas’s account of the 
order of caritas begins with the love of God, then the love of self, the love of 
neighbors, and finally, one’s own body (ST II-II, 26.1-5).5 After specifying this general 
order, Aquinas deals with the question of whether one should love some neighbors 
more than others. In response to this question, he gives a detailed account of the 
order of love towards one’s neighbors in accordance with the proximity principle (see 
chapter 3). Nevertheless, although one’s love is properly ordered in such a way that 
prioritizes particular persons closest to the one who loves, love founded on caritas is in 
some sense inclusive of all persons. 
                                         
3. Irwin, Terence, The Development of Ethics, Vol. I (Oxford: OUP, 2007) 347-351. 
4. While I cannot do justice to the topic here, it would be very interesting to explore the 
connection between the Stoic notion of a community of ‘friends’ and Aquinas’s account of the 
proper order of caritas. I am grateful to Charles Brittain for pointing out the Stoic antecedent to 
Aquinas’s account. Interestingly, Irwin sees the Stoic view as having its antecedent in the Aristotelian 
idea that there should be natural friendship between all human beings. For example, cf. 1155a16-21.  
5. By placing the love of one’s own body after the love of neighbor, Aquinas has in view that 
we should care about the spiritual state of others, more than our own material wellbeing, and in the 
most extreme case, should be willing under specific circumstances to sacrifice our bodies for the 
sake of our neighbor. Aquinas is quite clear that we should love our own soul more than our 
neighbor and thus should never sin even in order to somehow benefit one’s neighbor. Cf. ST 26.6. 
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In this last chapter I will consider the other side of Aquinas’s account of amor 
amicitiae, and in particular caritas, indicating the sense in which he thinks caritas (amor 
amicitiae ad Deum) actually drives morality insofar as it provides the very foundation for 
loving all other persons in a certain respect. In keeping with the Christian tradition, 
Aquinas holds that the two greatest commandments provide us with both reason and 
motivation for loving God, ourselves, and indeed all other persons as ends in 
themselves and provides an account specifying what the commandments entail as far 
as the order and extent of our friendship for others. Moreover, Aquinas provides an 
account of how these two commandments are inextricably related to each other such 
that one cannot genuinely love God without loving oneself and other persons, nor 
can one fully love oneself without loving God and hence other persons. 
In what follows, I will consider Aquinas’s account of what the greatest 
commandments amount to in terms of loving God, self, and other persons, i.e. one’s 
neighbors. Then I will sketch an account attempting to specify his claim that love of 
other persons is essentially partial in the sense that one has normative reasons to 
prioritize certain relations over others. Yet, insofar as the term “neighbor” extends to 
all persons, one also has normative reasons to love all persons and must do so in 
some respect to fulfill the requirement of the second commandment. On Aquinas’s 
theory then, love, in particular amor amicitiae, provides the very foundation of morality 
not only because it entails actively seeking to promote the good of particular persons 
as ends in themselves, but further because caritas, the most perfect form of amor 
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amicitiae, entails the extension of love to all persons as fellow participants in the 
everlasting fellowship of happiness found in God.  
Aquinas’s account of the love characteristic of friendship (and of the virtues in 
general) is deeply informed by his theological commitments. He considers caritas to be 
an infused virtue; unlike the natural love of God, which he describes as the inclination 
of all things toward God as the principle and the end of all natural beings, caritas is a 
non-natural virtue superadded to the will of rational beings by God, directing them 
toward their final ultimate end, the supernatural good of friendship with God (ST II-
II 23.2; cf. De Car. A.1; In I Sent. d.17, a.1). Accordingly, God is the direct and 
immediate object of caritas (ST I-II 62.1; 65.3). Aquinas further indicates that caritas is 
a form of amor amicitiae, i.e. a form of the love characteristic of friendship which a 
human being has for God, and which is rooted in the fellowship we have with God 
based upon the happiness God shares with us:  
Since there is a certain fellowship of a human being with God, in virtue 
of the fact that God shares his happiness with us, it is necessary that 
some kind of friendship be founded upon this fellowship, (ST II-II 
23.1).6 
The highest good, the final ultimate end toward which all human actions are directed 
is happiness which, as has been indicated, Aquinas identifies with a person’s 
completion or perfection. Such perfection can be found only in God since God is our 
                                         
6. Cum igitur sit aliqua communicatio hominis ad Deum secundum quod nobis suam 
beatitudinem communicat, super hac communicatione oportet aliquam amicitiam fundari. 
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first principle and ultimate end. God shares his happiness with us in everlasting 
fellowship. This fellowship is best described as a loving personal relationship between 
a person and God. As such it entails a sort of mutuality. God loves human beings, 
sharing with us the highest good in which human perfection consists by uniting us to 
himself. But a loving personal relationship is reciprocal, and thus entails that we love 
God in return, desiring God’s good as well as the union with God in which our final 
ultimate end culminates. To attain this end, requires the virtue of caritas, the most 
perfect form of love directed toward the highest good. 
[S]ince the principle of love (dilectio) is God or the one loving, it is 
necessary that the affection of love (affectus dilectionis) is greater in 
accordance with the closer proximity of one of those principles, for…in 
everything in which some principle is found, order is seen in accordance 
with the relation to that principle (ST II-II 26.6).7  
Aquinas’s account of the order of love stems from his view that caritas tends to God 
as the principle or source of happiness upon which the fellowship of amicitia caritatis is 
based (ST II-II.26.1; Cf. 23.1, 25.12). God is the first principle or cause of such love 
and as such God is to be loved first. But God is not the only principle or cause of 
friendship. The one who loves is herself the efficient cause and thus also a principle of 
amicitia caritatis. 
                                         
7. Et ratio est quia, cum principium dilectionis sit Deus et ipse diligens, necesse est quod 
secundum propinquitatem maiorem ad alterum istorum principiorum maior sit dilectionis affectus, 
sicut enim supra dictum est, in omnibus in quibus invenitur aliquod principium, ordo attenditur 
secundum comparationem ad illud principium. 
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A. THE TWO ENDS OF CARITAS  
As a species of amor amicitiae, Aquinas holds that caritas has two ends with 
respect to the love of God and other persons: (A) the real union with the other, and 
(B) the other’s own good or wellbeing. I will begin with Aquinas’s account of the love 
of God before going on to see how this account extends to the love of other human 
beings.  First, all human beings desire real union with God insofar as this is the 
highest good in which our happiness consists in. Though some fail to recognize God 
as such, all human beings desire their perfection and completion and on Aquinas’s 
account this is found in God alone. But desire for union with God is not enough; 
genuine caritas as a form of friendship also entails one’s desiring and actively 
promoting God’s good for God’s own sake—not merely as a means to one’s own 
happiness.  
1. UNION WITH GOD 
In his treatise on happiness (beatitudo), Aquinas begins by developing a formal 
account of happiness as the final ultimate end of all rational beings: that which fulfills 
all human desires in accordance with human nature as essentially rational (ST I-II 1-2). 
After developing his formal account of human happiness, Aquinas goes on to specify 
a concrete account of what such happiness consists in given his view of human 
nature. The formal object of the will, the rational appetite of human beings, is 
goodness. And love (in this case dilectio), insofar as it belongs to the will, has the same 
formal object. As indicated above, Aquinas distinguishes between the imperfect and 
 196 
the perfect good of a human being, the former which can be attained in this life, and 
the latter which can be fully attained only in the next. He contends that the knowledge 
and consequently the love of God, i.e. the universal good, is what human happiness 
ultimately consists in: 
The object of the will…is universal good, just as the object of intellect is 
[universal] truth. From this it is clear that nothing can bring the will of a 
human being to rest except the universal good. This is not found in any 
created thing, but in God alone (ST I-II 2.8).8 
Knowing and loving God, who is perfect goodness personified, is what brings all 
rational human desires to rest and is accordingly that in which perfect human 
happiness consists. However, perfect knowledge and love of God is not attainable by 
mere human effort or by any of the acquired virtues. It requires the supernatural 
virtue of caritas infused in us by God, the virtue by which we attain God himself and 
accordingly ultimately fulfill the natural desire for happiness in which the final 
ultimate end of all rational beings consists.9  
Aquinas maintains that it is the infused virtue of caritas by which God enables 
human beings to attain this sort of relationship and union with God. Accordingly, the 
                                         
8. Obiectum autem voluntatis, quae est appetitus humanus, est universale bonum; sicut 
obiectum intellectus est verum. Ex quo patet quod nihil potest quietare voluntatem hominis, nisi 
bonum universale. Quod non invenitur in aliquo creato, sed solum in Deo. 
9. Aquinas gives several reasons why human beings can attain the final ultimate end only 
through an infused virtue as opposed to an acquired virtue. For instance, he holds that although 
God is supremely loveable in himself as the object of genuine happiness, nevertheless, human beings 
fail on their own account to love him above all things, given their natural inclination to love visible 
goods (ST I-II 24.2 ad 2). Although I cannot specify the all the details here, it is important to note 
that Aquinas distinguishes between the natural love of God which is, at least in principle, attainable 
without divine aid and the perfect love of God requiring caritas. Cf. ST I-II 24.2; ST II-II 26.3.  
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Secunda Secundae is devoted to an in depth account of caritas, specifying what it consists 
in and how it is crucial to attaining the sort of union with God which constitutes the 
final ultimate end of rational beings. Here he appeals to the authority of Augustine 
(De Moribus Eccl. xi) who contends that caritas is the virtue directing rational beings to 
their final ultimate end insofar as it is what unites them to God: “Caritas is a virtue, 
which, when our affections are perfectly ordered, unites us to God, for by it we love 
him,” (ST II-II 23.3 sc). Aquinas agrees with Augustine that caritas is the virtue by 
which the human being can attain God hence making it possible for us to be united 
with him in everlasting happiness.  
It is worth pointing out Aquinas’s view that human beings desire happiness as 
the formal object in which their final ultimate end consists. However, he recognizes 
that many people seek to attain such happiness in the wrong sort of things (e.g. 
wealth, honor, pleasure, etc.). These things will never truly make human beings happy, 
since they fail to realize our true nature as essentially rational and social beings. Still, 
Aquinas thinks that some persons get it right, and hence can attain some degree of 
objective happiness in this life by valuing and attaining an aggregate of genuine, non-
instrumental goods including, for instance, virtue, friendship, knowledge, and other 
such objective goods insofar as such goods fulfill our desires as essentially rational and 
social beings. Nevertheless, he maintains that even this sort of happiness, although 
genuine, is imperfect and incomplete. Perfect happiness, he believes, consists in a 
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supernatural union with God, which can be attained to some degree in this life, but 
which can be fully attained only in the next (Cf. ST II-II 44.6) 
A significant feature of the supernatural union with God is that involves not 
only an intellective, but also an appetitive component. The deeper and clearer our 
knowledge of God, ultimately attained in the vision God, the more we love him. And 
the more we love God, the deeper the union. Hence the vision of God is not only 
intellectual, but also affective in that it entails the love for God culminating in real 
union with the perfect goodness personified. Moreover, the rational agent must have 
some sort of intellective cognition or understanding of God as the universal or 
complete good in order to love God above all things.10 The intellective recognition of 
God as the universal or complete good is required for a human being to love and 
hence to desire real union with God as her final ultimate end. Aquinas appeals to 
Augustine in explaining how some sort of prior knowledge is required for love: 
Love (dilectio) is prior to cognition in moving, but cognition is prior to 
love in attaining, for something cannot be loved unless it is known as 
Augustine says in de Trinitate X. Hence we attain an intelligible end first 
through the activity of the intellect, just as we attain a sensory end 
through the activity of the sense (ST I-II 3.4 ad 4).11, 12 
                                         
10. Cf. Knowledge of God is not sufficient for the love of God (even the demons believe in 
God and shudder); one must also recognize God as the highest good who is worthy of our love and 
devotion. See ST 3.8 where Aquinas specifies that complete or perfect happiness is found in the 
vision of God. This may appear to suggest that happiness is a purely intellective state. However, 
even in the Prima Secundae, Aquinas indicates that the love of God is necessary for complete 
happiness: “Perfection of caritas is essential to happiness as it pertains to the love of God, (ST 4.8 ad 
3). 
11. Dilectio praeeminet cognitioni in movendo, sed cognitio praevia est dilectioni in 
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The intellect’s cognition of God as the universal good is followed by the will’s 
response of loving God above all things. Love, then, is the principle of motion which 
gives rise to desire for God which, when fulfilled, comes to rest in real union with 
God.  
Of course, real union with another requires a sort of mutuality given that, 
necessarily, it involves the reciprocal love of two persons. Human love is a special 
case insofar as the very possibility for our love of God originates in God’s love for us. 
It is out of love that God made rational beings such that they are capable of love. 
God endowed rational creatures with freedom of choice hence making it possible for 
humans to choose to love God by accepting the gift of caritas which makes the real 
union with God, and hence perfect happiness, possible.13 But caritas, as a form of amor 
amicitiae entails not only the desire for union with God, where union with God is seen 
as the ultimate satisfaction of one's own desires and, hence, one's own ultimate good. 
It further entails a desire for God’s own good—the desire to seek and promote the 
ends of God for God’s own sake. This aspect of caritas raises a puzzle. What can it mean 
                                         
attingendo, non enim diligitur nisi cognitum, ut dicit Augustinus in X de Trin. Et ideo intelligibilem 
finem primo attingimus per 
actionem intellectus; sicut et finem sensibilem primo attingimus per actionem sensus. 
12. Aquinas does well here to quote Augustine here rather than Aristotle or Boethius, given 
that the Franciscans claim Augustine as supporting their side of the debate concerning whether 
happiness consists in knowledge or love. I’m grateful to Scott MacDonald for pointing out what a 
clever move this is on the part of Aquinas.  
13. Freedom of choice and its relation to caritas is an interesting issue in its own right; 
unfortunately, I cannot pursue it here.  
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for a human being to promote God’s good, given that God is perfect goodness 
personified? What can human beings, mere parts of God’s creation, possibly have to 
offer God that God does not already possess? I turn now to consider this aspect of 
caritas. 
2. PROMOTING GOD’S GOOD 
As Aquinas indicates in the following passage, God is goodness and the source 
of all goodness: 
We do not love God on account of something else, but on account of 
himself. For he is not ordered to another as toward an end, but he 
himself is the ultimate end of all things. Neither is he formed into that 
which is good by something else, but his substance is the same as his 
goodness, in accordance with which, as by an exemplar, all other things 
are good. And neither does his goodness come from some other thing, 
but from him to all other things (ST I-II 27.3).14 
God is loved on account of himself as the ultimate end given that God is perfect 
goodness, or goodness personified. All of creation is good insofar as God has created 
it.15 Given God’s aseity, it is worth thinking about why God created this world in the 
first place, what God’s purposes are in creating this world, and how we as rational 
                                         
14. Deum non diligimus propter aliud, sed propter seipsum. Non enim ordinatur ad aliud 
sicut ad finem, sed ipse est finis ultimus omnium. Neque etiam informatur aliquo alio ad hoc quod 
sit bonus, sed eius substantia est eius bonitas, secundum quam exemplariter omnia bona sunt. Neque 
ei ab altero bonitas inest, sed ab ipso omnibus aliis. 
15. This passage may seem to indicate that we love people on account of the qualities they 
have, i.e. the goodness they have as a result of being made by God who is pure goodness. Indeed, as 
I indicate in chapter three, the apprehension of person’s goodness provides an essential background 
condition for loving them, even with the love of caritas. Still, there is an order of caritas which, at least 
in this life, is based not upon the impersonal quality of goodness, but rather upon their proximity to 
the one loving.  
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beings can seek to actively promote those purposes. If we have caritas for God and 
caritas is a form of amor amicitiae, which on Aquinas’s analysis entails desiring the good 
of another, then it necessarily follows that we desire God's good. Thus desiring God’s 
good for God’s own sake, i.e. loving God as an end in himself, involves taking up 
God’s ends as our own ends and ordering our own desires in such a way that they 
reflect God’s desires. Doing so would then require the loving agent to determine what 
God’s purposes in this world are and to act according to those purposes.  
The very structure of the Summa Theologica provides us with a clue as to 
Aquinas’s understanding of what God’s purposes are and the part we play in 
promoting them. The work begins with an account of God’s nature as essentially 
good, and the expression of God’s goodness in creation as an outpouring of His love 
in the very act of creating the natural order and in particular rational creatures, i.e. 
beings made in the very image of God by virtue of their powers of intellect and 
choice.16 After considering God’s nature and creation, Aquinas then proceeds with an 
account of the return of all things to God, emphasizing the return of human beings 
and the role of grace in this process.17 All things according to Aquinas’s natural 
                                         
16. Cf. Norman Kretzmann’s companion articles, “A General Problem of Creation: Why 
Would God Create Anything at All?” and “A Particular Problem of Creation: Why Would God 
Create This World?” in Being and Goodness, ed. Scott MacDonald (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1991): 208-249. 
17. Although my emphasis in this dissertation is not the role of grace and its interaction with 
human choice, it is key to Aquinas’s view that caritas is an infused as opposed to an acquired virtue 
along with the theological virtues of faith and hope. Caritas is not something a human being can 
develop on her own, but rather, God through grace gives one the virtue of caritas (Cf. ST I-II 62.3). 
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teleology are inclined to God as their first principle and final end. But in the case of 
human beings qua rational creatures, the return to God entails the kind of love 
involving choice (dilectio). God’s intention is that all persons should choose to return 
to God by loving God as an end in himself, indeed as one’s final end. Part of God’s 
purposes in creating rational beings with the capacity for choice is that they might 
enter into a loving personal relationship with God. This is made possible by the virtue 
of caritas which entails desiring God’s good for God’s sake.  
We have seen that Aquinas holds God is goodness personified, which means 
there is an important sense in which human beings, or any created beings for that 
matter, could not add to God’s goodness. But there is another sense in which human 
beings play a significant role in bringing about God’s purposes in this world. 
Although God does not need our love too attain perfect goodness, he nevertheless 
desires to be united with us in friendship. A necessary condition for such friendship is 
that we respond to God’s grace and love by taking up God’s ends as our own. This 
entails, among other things, following God’s will for us to love other persons, 
exercising stewardship over God’s creation, obeying God’s commands, and 
worshiping God. 
                                         
Nevertheless, it is consistent with Aquinas’s view that human choice plays a significant role in 
deciding whether or not one embraces the virtue and seeks to develop it by seeking to be united 
with God and promoting God’s purposes in the world. I will develop further Aquinas’s account of 
the role of choice and the infused virtues below. 
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B. THE TWO GREAT COMMANDMENTS 
Given the above account of loving God and how it is inextricably connected 
with the happiness or final ultimate end of every human being, it seems odd, even 
contrary to reason, to think that God has to command human beings to love him. But 
as Aquinas holds, by virtue of the very fact that rational beings are beings with the 
capacity for choice, they also have the choice not to love God, but rather to promote 
what they take to be their own self-interest in a way contrary both to their very nature 
as creatures made in God’s image, and to God’s purposes of drawing all creation to 
himself.18 Such choices have the effect of separating rational beings from God and his 
love. Aquinas points out that human beings fail to love God when they mistakenly 
seek happiness in other things: “Those persons who sin are turned away from that in 
which their final end is actually found, but they do not turn away from the intention 
of the final end, which intention they mistakenly seek in other things,” (ST I-II 1.7 ad 
1). So while all persons act for the purpose of attaining their final end, those who sin 
mistakenly think their final end consists in things other than God. Still, whether or not 
human beings are mistaken in seeking their final end in something other than God, no 
one can attain their perfect or complete final end apart from caritas, the virtue infused 
by God which makes it possible for human beings to genuinely know and love God as 
                                         
18. Although the question of why rational beings would choose to not to love God, or to 
love other things more than God is a question of great interest, I cannot pursue it here. On 
Aquinas’s account, it amounts to a sort of rational failure to understand what one’s happiness 
actually consists in. Cf. ST I-II 2 for Aquinas’s consideration of some of the common views of what 
human beings think happiness consists in and why each is mistaken.  
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their final ultimate end. Aquinas contends that it is not possible for human beings to 
attain their final or perfect end by their own natural powers, since the knowledge of 
God surpasses natural human capacities (Cf. ST I-II 5.5). Since knowledge of the 
essence of God is required for the genuine love of God, Aquinas’s view seems to be 
that human beings cannot be united with God in love by their own natural capacities. 
Accordingly, given that caritas is an infused virtue, given to us by God, we 
might well wonder why God commands us to love him. The virtue of caritas actually 
entails loving God completely such that the commandment would appear to be 
irrelevant. Aquinas takes up this very question asking whether any precept should be 
given concerning caritas. In response, he explains that the commandments or precepts 
are about something due, in this case what is due to God. While some things are due 
for the sake of something else, others are due for their own sake. Loving God is 
something due for its own sake, because it directs human beings toward union with 
God, their final ultimate end. Aquinas thus cites Paul concerning the purpose of the 
commandment: “The end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a 
good conscience, and an unfeigned faith,” (I Tim. 1:5). In accordance with this 
passage, Aquinas gives the following account of the relation between the virtues and 
the precepts: 
For all the virtues, about which acts the precepts are given, are either 
directed toward purifying the heart from the whirlwinds of the passions 
in the case of the virtues which concern the passions, or at any rate 
toward having a good conscience in the case of virtues which concern 
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actions, or toward having a right faith in the case of those things which 
pertain to divine worship (ST II-II 44.1).19   
Aquinas thus responds to the question by telling us how the virtues are required for us 
to fulfill the commandment to love God by purifying our hearts from the passions (in 
particular the fear of punishment), performing actions from good conscience, and 
worshiping God from genuine faith.  
 But his response here falls short of telling us why the commandment to love 
God is required in the first place, in light of Aquinas’s understanding of caritas as a 
virtue given to us by God. We can better ascertain why Aquinas thinks the 
commandment is necessary in his reply to the objection that the commandment 
actually curtails human freedom by imposing upon us an obligation which undermines 
our freedom to choose to love God. Aquinas replies that such obligation need not be 
opposed to freedom. Rather, he suggests, “The precept of love (dilectio) cannot be 
fulfilled except from one’s own will,” (ST II-II 44.1 ad 2).20 Although he does not 
expand upon this here, it fits with what I have said above about the importance of 
choice as a necessary condition for a genuine loving personal relationship with God. 
God’s purpose of developing such relationships with individual rational beings entails 
intention and choice on the part of both persons in the relationship. Hence, God does 
                                         
19. Omnes enim virtutes, de quarum actibus dantur praecepta, ordinantur vel ad 
purificandum cor a turbinibus passionum, sicut virtutes quae sunt circa passiones; vel saltem ad 
habendam bonam conscientiam, sicut virtutes quae sunt circa operationes; vel ad habendam rectam 
fidem, sicut illa quae pertinent ad divinum cultum. 
20. Sed praeceptum dilectionis non potest impleri nisi ex propria voluntate. 
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not infuse human beings with the virtue of caritas contrary to their choice to love God 
as an end in himself. Accordingly, the commandment to love God does not oppose 
choice, but rather presents human persons with a choice. By commanding that we love 
him, God gives one a choice—to obey God or not to obey God. In other words, 
one’s choice to obey is a matter of choosing to embrace the virtue of caritas that God 
has superimposed on the will of the would-be participant in God’s love.21  
So, human beings can choose to follow the commandment or not depending 
upon what they apprehend to be constitutive of their own happiness. Yet even when 
one chooses to follow the commandment, God recognizes human limitations. 
Accordingly, he supplies what we need to make our love pure, our actions undertaken 
for the right reasons, and our worship genuine. God commands what we fail to see is 
our highest good in order that we might choose it, and then supplies us with the 
disposition or state of character which enables us to follow through with our intention 
not merely out of sense of obligation or fear, but rather with the right sorts of 
motivations and desires—those entailed by genuine love.  
1. THE COMMANDMENT TO LOVE GOD 
In accordance with the Christian scriptures, Aquinas maintains that the two 
greatest commandments are first, to love God with all of our heart, mind, and 
                                         
21. Certainly, there are other things to be said about the role of God’s grace and whether or 
not my account of Aquinas’s view is consistent with what Aquinas says about the role of grace 
elsewhere. This is no doubt an important issue, deserving of a more comprehensive treatment, but 
unfortunately I must set it aside for now. 
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strength, and second, which is an extension of the first, to love our neighbors as 
ourselves. These commandments hold us accountable to choosing that very thing for 
which we were intended and in which our final ultimate end consists. Moreover, I 
would suggest, the commandments provide an essential starting point from which 
human beings learn to love God habitually, such that our love becomes more than a 
matter of following a precept, but rather a matter of virtue which entails loving God 
as an expression of our deepest and most authentic desires. The commandments serve 
as the starting point for the desire to attain such virtue.22 Aquinas thus develops an 
account of the two greatest commandments concerning the virtue caritas. 
The first and greatest of the two commandments concerns the love of God 
above all else. Aquinas gives us some direction as to what this means in the following 
gloss on the text:23  
We are commanded to direct our entire intention, to God, which is 
signified by the phrase “with your whole heart;” and to submit our 
intellect to God, which is signified by “with your whole mind;” and to 
regulate our appetite according to God, insofar as we obey God with 
respect to our external actions which is “to love God with our whole 
strength or power or might” (ST II-II 44.5).24 
                                         
22. Of course, as indicated above, God infuses in us the theological virtues necessary for 
fulfilling the two greatest commandments. God intervenes on behalf of human beings to accomplish 
his purpose of ultimately united them to himself thereby aiding them in the attainment of their 
highest good.  
23. In this article, Aquinas considers the different ways in which the commandment is 
formulated in the Hebrew Bible and in the synoptic gospels, concluding that they amount to the 
same set of precepts. 
24. Praecipitur ergo nobis ut tota nostra intentio feratur in Deum, quod est ex toto corde; et 
quod intellectus noster subdatur Deo, quod est ex tota mente; et quod appetitus noster secundum 
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Earlier in the passage, Aquinas points out that each of these three aspects of loving 
God is essentially related to the will: the heart is the seat of the will and hence the 
principle of all of our intentional actions. The intellect is that which directs the will 
inasmuch as every act of the will is preceded by the intellect’s presentation of an 
object or end as the good to be pursued, which in this case is God, goodness itself. 
Power or strength is the capacity of the will enabling us to perform those external 
actions in accordance with our intentions. All three, Aquinas maintains, are 
constitutive of the genuine love of God manifested internally in the inclination of our 
heart toward God, intentionally in the pursuit of knowing God more fully and hence 
submitting our intellect to him, and externally through the actions we perform 
presumably in keeping with the intensity of our love. 
Aquinas goes into the most detail with respect to the first aspect of loving God, 
i.e. loving God with our whole heart by directing our entire intention to God. He 
distinguishes between the actual perfection of love attained in heaven according to 
which a person’s whole heart is always actually directed to God, and the sort of 
perfection of love one can attain in this life. In this life we attain the perfection of love 
when our whole heart is habitually directed toward God insofar as it does not consent 
to anything contrary to the love of God (ST II-II 44.4 ad 2). As indicated above, 
Aquinas’s understanding of what it means to love God with our whole heart entails 
                                         
Deum, quod est ex tota anima; et quod exterior actus noster obediat Deo, quod est ex tota 
fortitudine vel virtute vel Deum diligere. 
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that our intentions are entirely directed toward God. One aspect of this requires 
removing ourselves from that which stands in the way of our love for God. Aquinas 
indicates here a negative requirement for perfection of caritas, distancing ourselves 
from temporal things:“a human being, as far as it is possible, removes himself from 
temporal things, even those which are permitted, because they occupy the soul, they 
impede the actual motion of the heart toward God” (ST II-II 44.4 ad 3, cf. ST II-II 
44.3 ad 3 for other negative precepts pertaining to caritas).25 The point is not that 
temporal things are bad in and of themselves, but that they are much less valuable 
than God. God knows that the love of temporal things hinders our ability to direct 
our intention toward him, the final ultimate end in whom we attain perfect happiness.  
But the command to love God is much less about the negative precepts, than 
about the positive precepts. The act of caritas is to love God as an end in himself (ST 
II-II 27.3). I have already sketched in Part I how caritas includes the two ends of amor 
amicitiae: real union with God, and the active pursuit of God’s good which entails 
pursuing God’s purposes as if they were our own. I have further suggested that this 
involves playing a role in God’s grand plan of drawing all creatures back to himself 
out of love, and in particular human beings created for the very purpose of being in a 
loving personal relationship with him. It is with respect to this end that God issues 
                                         
25. Homo, quantum possibile est, se a rebus temporalibus etiam licitis, quae, occupando 
animum, impediunt actualem motum cordis in Deum. 
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the second commandment as a fulfillment of the first: to love your neighbor as 
yourself.  
2. THE COMMANDMENT TO LOVE YOUR NEIGHBOR 
Aquinas clearly specifies that caritas has two proper objects: God and one’s 
neighbor. Indeed, loving one’s neighbor is actually an extension of loving God insofar 
as it is the same species of act by which we love God and neighbor: 
The reason our neighbor is to be loved is God, for this is what we ought 
to love in our neighbor, that he is in God. Thus it is clear that the act by 
which God is loved is of the same species as that by which our neighbor 
is to be loved. On account of this, the habit of caritas extends not only to 
the love of God, but also to the love of neighbor (ST II-II 25.1).26 
By same species of act, Aquinas has in view that each of the commandments is aimed 
toward the good common to both, i.e. the good in general.27 The love of God and the 
love of neighbor are directed toward the good common to them all, i.e. God. They are 
inextricably connected to one another: the genuine love of God entails loving one’s 
neighbor. In this passage Aquinas emphasizes that caritas extends to all persons insofar 
as all are in God.28  
                                         
26. Ratio autem diligendi proximum Deus est, hoc enim debemus in proximo diligere, ut in 
Deo sit. Unde manifestum est quod idem specie actus est quo diligitur Deus, et quo diligitur 
proximus. Et propter hoc habitus caritatis non solum se extendit ad dilectionem Dei, sed etiam ad 
dilectionem proximi. 
27. “We love all our neighbors with the same love characteristic of caritas, insofar as they are 
directed to one good common to them all, which is God,” (ST 25.1 ad 2). It is worth noting here 
that Aquinas considers all persons as being directed toward God, not just those who have been 
infused with caritas. Accordingly, we are to love all persons as somehow being in God, even if only 
potentially as opposed to actually partaking in the fellowship of happiness in community with God.  
28. This may appear to suggest that we love persons according to some quality they possess 
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On the flip side loving one’s neighbor out of caritas entails loving God insofar 
as we love our neighbor as one who is in God. Aquinas does not here specify what it 
means to be in God, but one obvious sense is that the neighbor belongs to God 
insofar as he is a creation of God and, as such, an object of God’s love. We can 
further ascertain what it means to love one’s neighbor in God by looking at Aquinas’s 
account of the order of caritas. 
We have seen that Aquinas explains the second commandment in terms of its 
relation to the first, indicating that the commandment to love God is inextricably 
connected to the love of neighbor as one who is in God or belongs to God. 
Nevertheless, Aquinas argues that the love of God ought be primary: 
Friendship founded upon the fellowship of happiness, which is 
established by God as the first principle, consists essentially in God just 
as in the first principle, by whom it [friendship] is conferred upon all 
who are capable of happiness. Hence we should love God principally 
and chiefly out of caritas, for he is loved as the cause of happiness, while 
our neighbor [should be loved] as likewise sharing with us in the 
happiness from him, (ST II-II 26.2).29 
It is worth exploring two distinct aspects of this passage: first, the sense in which 
Aquinas thinks God should be the primary object of love as the first principle or 
                                         
and it is true that being in God provides a generic background condition in which caritas is grounded. 
Nevertheless, this does not conflict with Aquinas’s account of the order of caritas, which is grounded 
not only in the others being in God, but more specifically on the particular relationship the one 
loved has to us. 
29. Amicitia autem caritatis fundatur super communicatione beatitudinis, quae consistit 
essentialiter in Deo sicut in primo principio, a quo derivatur in omnes qui sunt beatitudinis capaces. 
Et ideo principaliter et maxime Deus est ex caritate diligendus, ipse enim diligitur sicut beatitudinis 
causa; proximus autem sicut beatitudinem simul nobiscum ab eo participans. 
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cause of the friendship founded upon happiness, and second, why he thinks sharing in 
happiness is connected to and counts as a reason for loving our neighbor out of 
caritas. With respect to the first, Aquinas holds that union with God in everlasting 
friendship is what the happiness of all rational beings consists in, as discussed above. 
Given that happiness is the final ultimate end of all rational beings, and that the love 
of God, in particular caritas, is the virtue required to attain happiness, fully rational 
human beings love God as the source of perfect happiness. Moreover, a further and 
related reason why the love of God is primary is because God is perfect goodness 
personified, or as Aquinas puts it, God alone is good by virtue of his essence (ST I 6.1). In 
his account of the rational appetite or will of all human beings, Aquinas indicates that 
its formal object is goodness: “the object of the will is an end and a good considered 
universally” (ST I-II 1.1; Cf. 1.3). Although human beings differ as to their opinions 
of what the good consists in, Aquinas argues that it is to be identified with God (Cf. 
ST I-II 2.8). Hence, God is the ultimate object of the rational will insofar as God is 
perfect goodness and, as such, the ultimate object of desire for all rational creatures, 
objectively speaking. Accordingly, the love of God is primary by virtue of his being 
perfectly good and, as such, the first principle of happiness in whom all of our rational 
desires are completely fulfilled. So, the love of God is primary in the sense that a 
personal loving relationship with God is what the final ultimate end of human beings 
consists in, insofar as God, the personification of perfect goodness is the highest 
object of the will. 
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Accordingly, the happiness of all rational or intellective beings consists in being 
united to God in love. Further, the passage indicates how the love of God entails the 
love of neighbor as one who, as previously noted, is in God in some respect. 
According to Aquinas, we are to love our neighbors out of caritas as fellow recipients 
of the perfect happiness which originates in God as the first principle; this love 
extends to all rational persons insofar as each one has the capacity or potential for such 
happiness.30 Still, one might wonder why being a fellow recipient of happiness 
(actually or potentially) counts as a rationale for loving one’s neighbor. Aquinas 
provides a clue later in the text where he explicitly addresses the precept to love one’s 
neighbor. As expressed above in the previous chapter concerning Aquinas’s account 
of the proper order of caritas, one reason for loving others has to do with their 
proximity to us. Of course, not every person is close to us in the same respect, or to 
the degree that our family members and close friends are. But Aquinas specifies the 
sense in which every person is related to us and hence properly loved insofar as every 
person is our neighbor: 
The reason for loving is indicated by the term “neighbor,” (proximus) for 
on account of this we ought to love (diligere) others out of caritas, because 
they are near (proximi) to us on account of [their possessing] the natural 
image of God, and on account of their capacity for glory, (ST II-II 
44.7).31 
                                         
30. Cf. Jean Porter The Recovery of Virtue: The Relevance of Aquinas for Christian Ethics (London: 
SPCK, 1990), and Nature as Reason: A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 2005). 
31. Ratio quidem diligendi tangitur ex eo quod proximus nominatur, propter hoc enim ex 
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Aquinas here provides two reasons specifying why we would love all other persons as 
those who actually or potentially share with us in happiness. The first has to do with 
the intrinsic value of other rational beings as naturally bearing God’s image. All 
persons, insofar as they are rational beings, have been made in the image of God. 
Accordingly, we have reason to love all persons given that that they possess the 
likeness of God, the first and principle object of caritas. As beings made in the image 
of God, every person is not only the object of God’s love, but exemplifies (to some 
extent or another) divine nature. 
Second, Aquinas indicates that each person, as possessing the image of God, 
has the capacity for glory or to be glorified by God.32 Glory consists in the goodness 
of the person being made known. Aquinas distinguishes genuine from false glory, 
indicating that false glory is based upon human knowledge which can be mistaken, 
whereas genuine glory is based upon God’s knowledge of a person’s true goodness 
(ST I-II 2.3). By “the capacity for glory” then, Aquinas presumably means the capacity 
for sharing in the happiness which comes from God. Since every person has capacity 
for sharing in such happiness, they have the capacity for glory. Hence we have further 
                                         
caritate debemus alios diligere, quia sunt nobis proximi et secundum naturalem Dei imaginem et 
secundum capacitatem gloriae.  
32. The term “gloria” can be translated by the English “glory,” or “glorification,” Cf. A 
Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas, Roy J. Deferrerari (Fitwilliam, NH: Loreto, 2004): 465-467. 
According to Aquinas, “Glory is the effect of honor and praise, since the result of our bearing 
witness to a person’s goodness is that his goodness becomes clear to the knowledge of many,” (ST 
II-II 103.1 ad 3). 
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reason to love all persons as beings with whom we may share in the everlasting 
happiness found in God. 
This account of the love of neighbor as one with whom we share happiness has 
important implications for his understanding of what loving one’s neighbor entails. 
Given that every person is a rational being capable of sharing in happiness as bearer 
of God’s image, and hence a being of great intrinsic worth, we have reason to love all 
persons out of caritas. Accordingly, the command to love our neighbor extends to 
each and every person, and thus entails a sense of impartiality. In the remainder of the 
chapter, I turn to consider further the universalism of the second commandment and 
to suggest how this might fit with the particularist picture I have called attention to 
throughout the dissertation. 
C. CARITAS AND IMPARTIALITY 
I have suggested how, on Aquinas’s view, caritas transforms the rational agent’s 
love for other persons in that it specifies who ought to be included within the scope 
of love. As indicated in the previous chapter, Aquinas’s account of the order of caritas 
provides normative reasons why our love for those with whom we have special 
relationships is to be ordered in such a way that prioritizes particular persons. Yet the 
second commandment requires us to love all persons to the effect that caritas is 
universal in scope. In keeping with the Christian view that the term “neighbor” 
denotes each and every person, those with whom we are closely connected as well as 
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the stranger, those who are morally virtuous as well as the sinner.33 Most strikingly, 
caritas extends even to one’s enemies (ST II-II.25.1, 6, 8, 12). Thus, caritas widens the 
scope of friendship beyond our familial relations, or the particular persons with whom 
we share a natural affinity and have special relationships.34 
One might object to this account, however, arguing that since the extension of 
the term “neighbor” is so broad, it can at best entail a sort of goodwill or well-wishing 
to other persons. This is not the case. Aquinas is careful to distinguish love 
characteristic of caritas from goodwill or benevolence insofar caritas is a form of 
friendship and, as we have seen, the love characteristic of friendship is directed toward 
two ends: the desire for the good of another for the other’s own sake, and a sort of 
real union with the other. Accordingly, caritas entails not only goodwill, but also a sort 
of affection for all other persons. Aquinas explains the distinction as follows: 
But love in the intellective appetite differs from benevolence. For it 
brings about a certain union in accordance with the affection of the one 
loving for the one loved inasmuch as the one loving values the one loved 
as being one with him in a certain respect, or related to him, and so is 
moved toward her. But benevolence is a simple act of the will by which 
we wish good to someone, even when the union of affection for that 
person is not presupposed. Hence benevolence is certainly included in 
                                         
33. Recall that this theory is akin to the Stoic view of a community of friends as inclusive of 
all persons insofar as they share together in common humanity. 
34. The proper ordering of one’s loves is a moral endeavor: Virtus dicitur ordo vel ordinatio 
amoris, sicut id ad quod est virtus, per virtutem enim ordinatur amor in nobis (ST I-II 55.1 ad 4). Cf. 
Aquinas’s Ethics, Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung, Colleen McCluskey, and Christina Van Dyke (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009): 135. 
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love (dilectio) insofar as it is an act of caritas, but dilectio or love (amor) adds 
the union of affection (ST II-II 27.2).35 
As the passage makes clear, Aquinas holds that insofar as love essentially involves an 
affective component, the love of neighbor transcends mere benevolence. We have 
seen that Aquinas identifies love with this sort of affective union36 (ST I-II 28.1). This 
involves the conforming of the appetitive power to the one loved. Accordingly, caritas 
entails that the one who loves has a sort of affection toward the other. The union of 
affection, i.e. love itself, as we have seen, is ultimately directed toward real union with 
the other. With respect to caritas, this union is based upon the actual or potential 
sharing in everlasting happiness which every intellective being may ultimately attain in 
a personal loving relationship with God.  
Admittedly, this raises a puzzle. How is one to have affective union for all 
persons giving that love is something which by nature requires much of us in terms of 
devoting oneself to the good of others and a genuine union with the other? It seems 
that the affective component of caritas which extends to all persons insofar as they are 
                                         
35. Sed amor qui est in appetitu intellectivo etiam differt a benevolentia. Importat enim 
quandam unionem secundum affectus amantis ad amatum, inquantum scilicet amans aestimat 
amatum quodammodo ut unum sibi, vel ad se pertinens, et sic movetur in ipsum. Sed benevolentia 
est simplex actus voluntatis quo volumus alicui bonum, etiam non praesupposita praedicta unione 
affectus ad ipsum. Sic igitur in dilectione, secundum quod est actus caritatis, includitur quidem 
benevolentia, sed dilectio sive amor addit unionem affectus. 
36. For one reading of Aquinas’s notion of “affective union,” cf. the introduction to On Love 
& Charity, tr. Peter Kwasniewski (Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America Press, 2008). 
According to Kwasniewski, it involves “a kind of conforming of the [appetitive] power to it’s object 
such that it moves the whole animal to pursuit of the object itself in its own proper being and 
goodness,” (xxviii). 
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in God can only be an ideal which we strive to attain since it is difficult, perhaps 
impossible, for one to have union of affection with all persons. Perhaps one solution 
is to hold that caritas is an ideal. One becomes more virtuous as she becomes united in 
affection with more and more persons. In this case the virtue of caritas is something to 
strive for, but due to the constitutional limitations of human beings it cannot be 
actually attained, at least in this life.37 
Accordingly, Aquinas’s account of loving one’s neighbor sets the bar extremely 
high both with respect to the scope of love’s proper objects and with respect to what 
this love requires of us. Out of caritas, one is to love all other persons as rational 
beings with the capacity to share with us in the ultimate end of happiness, which 
consists in real union with God and consequently with one another. Aquinas’s 
account of caritas, then, entails a sense in which all other persons are to be considered 
from a universalistic point of view. Moreover, as a form of friendship, caritas extends 
beyond contemporary notions of altruism insofar as it involves pursuing the good of 
another for the other’s own sake, not merely out of a sense of duty or obligation, but 
as we have seen, out of the union of affection which Aquinas identifies with love. 
In order to illuminate just what caritas requires of us with respect to loving all 
persons, it will prove useful to look at the most extreme case: the love of one’s 
                                         
37. The implications of Aquinas’s account of how the union of affection for all persons is 
a component of caritas deserves much more attention than I have been able to give it here. 
Unfortunately, my treatment of it here must be brief.  
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enemies. Aquinas specifies three ways in which we might love our enemies. He rules 
out the first way indicating that we should not love our enemies qua enemy, assuming 
that what is inimical to us is some evil pertaining to the person. The reason for this is 
that it is contrary to caritas to love someone insofar as they are evil.38 Nevertheless, 
there are two ways in which Aquinas maintains that we ought to love our enemies out 
of caritas. The first of these is in the general respect that we are to love all persons in 
accordance with their nature as rational beings who bear the image of God: 
One might understand the love of one’s enemies as to their nature, but 
in a universal sense. In this respect, the love of one’s enemies is required 
by caritas, since one loving God and neighbor should not exclude his 
enemies with respect to the general sense of dilectio, (ST II-II 25.8).39  
This passage exemplifies the universalism of caritas: it extends to all persons insofar as 
all persons in accordance with their very nature are rational beings. Accordingly, not even 
one’s enemy, who is a rational being, is to be excluded from the love characteristic of 
caritas. So, according to Aquinas, one is to love all persons, including one’s enemies, by 
virtue of the fact that all persons naturally, insofar as they are rational beings, bear 
God’s image. 
                                         
38. By the same rationale, we are to love sinners out caritas, not according to their guilt, but 
according to their nature as human beings, (ST II-II 25.8). 
39. Alio modo potest accipi dilectio inimicorum quantum ad naturam, sed in universali. Et 
sic dilectio inimicorum est de necessitate caritatis, ut aliquis diligens Deum et proximum ab illa 
generalitate dilectionis proximi inimicos suos non excludat. 
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But Aquinas goes even further to say that caritas involves loving one’s enemy in 
a special way which goes beyond loving them according their nature. This belongs to 
the perfection of caritas, insofar as it is motivated exclusively by one’s love for God. 
But that a person might actually fulfill this act  to love his enemies on 
account of God is not necessary, but belongs to the perfection of caritas. 
For when one’s neighbor is loved [exclusively] on account of God, the 
more one loves God, and the more he shows love to his neighbor, not 
being hindered by enmity.  In the same way, if someone loves some 
person greatly, by this love he would love that person’s children even if 
they were unfriendly to him, (ST II-II 25.8).40  
So, the most perfect form of caritas is attained when we love even our enemies where 
this is motivated by our love of God and the recognition of their intrinsic goodness 
insofar as they bear God's image. We have reason to love those who are inimical to us 
by virtue of the fact that God loves such persons. Appealing to the example of the 
natural love we have for our friends, we love those persons our friend loves on 
account of our friends. This ties into Aquinas’s view that one of the two ends of 
friendship is to desire and promote the good of our friend for the friend’s own sake. 
This may entail loving persons our friend loves, not necessarily because we are 
naturally inclined to love them, but because loving them is part of promoting the 
good of our friend. If we love our friend greatly, then we love those persons our 
friend loves, even if we wouldn’t be naturally inclined to do so. When it comes to the 
                                         
40. Sed quod absque articulo necessitatis homo etiam hoc actu impleat ut diligat inimicum 
propter Deum, hoc pertinet ad perfectionem caritatis. Cum enim ex caritate diligatur proximus 
propter Deum, quanto aliquis magis diligit Deum, tanto etiam magis ad proximum dilectionem 
ostendit, nulla inimicitia impediente. Sicut si aliquis multum diligeret aliquem hominem, amore ipsius 
filios eius amaret etiam sibi inimicos. 
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love of God out of caritas, the more we love all persons God loves, even those who 
are inimical to us, not necessarily on their own account, but on account of love for 
God. 
Accordingly, caritas provides us with at least two reasons for loving our 
enemies. The first is the general reason that we love all persons as rational beings and, 
as such, intrinsically valuable bearers of the image of God. This is precisely the reason 
we have for loving all persons, the love of our enemy simply being the most extreme 
case of such love. The second is the more special sense in which we love our enemy 
on account of God, which expresses the perfection of such love. The more perfectly 
we love God out of caritas, the more we love those God loves, even if they are 
inimical to us, insofar as God loves them and desires their good. This is part of what 
is involved in promoting God’s good insofar as it entails taking up God’s desires as 
our own, i.e. taking part in God’s purpose of drawing all beings back to himself.  
By looking at this most extreme case of what is required of us by the second 
commandment to love our neighbor as ourselves, we can see how such love is 
universal in the sense that it extends to all persons. But this brings up a worry 
concerning the partiality of love. Does loving all persons out of caritas permit loving 
certain persons more than others? Aquinas himself raises this worry. He raises the 
objection by appealing to Augustine’s claim that we ought to love all persons equally 
(De Doct. Christ. i.28). Augustine suggests that we do good to certain persons more 
than others simply by virtue of the circumstance that we happen to be closer to those 
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who, by chance, happen to be closer to us (ST II-II 26.6, obj. 1). In response to this 
objection, Aquinas distinguishes two ways in which we might have unequal love for 
others: 
In the first way, loving certain persons and not loving others [is fitting]. 
One is not required to love all equally with respect to beneficence, 
because we cannot benefit all persons, but with respect to benevolence, 
we should not have such inequality of love. But in the other way, 
inequality of love is the result of loving certain persons more than others 
(ST II-II 26.6 ad 1).41 
Concerning the inequality of love, Aquinas rejects the claim that we are justified in 
loving some persons and not others. However, he does hold that there is a sense in 
which we are not required to love all persons equally with respect to beneficence, since 
we are not in a position to actually benefit each and every person. With respect to 
benevolence, on the other hand, we are required to love all persons equally insofar as 
we are to desire the good of all persons for their own sake. So, when he says that 
there is an inequality in love, he means that we love some persons more than others 
given their relation to us and by virtue of being in a position to actually benefit some 
more than others, although we are required to be benevolent to all persons. Thus, out 
of caritas, we are required to love all persons with respect to desiring their good.    
                                         
41. Uno modo, ex eo quod quidam diliguntur et alii non diliguntur. Et hanc inaequalitatem 
oportet servare in beneficentia, quia non possumus omnibus prodesse, sed in benevolentia 
dilectionis talis inaequalitas haberi non debet. Alia vero est inaequalitas dilectionis ex hoc quod 
quidam plus aliis diliguntur. 
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Hence, Aquinas defends the view that with respect to benevolence we are to 
love all persons equally out of caritas, reflecting the universalism of the second 
commandment with respect to desiring the good of all persons as intrinsically valuable 
bearers of God’s image. Nevertheless, we also have reasons to love particular persons 
more by virtue of their special relationship to us, and because we are in a better 
position to actually benefit those closest to us. Moreover, in addition to Augustine’s 
claim that we can only actually do good to those with whom we happen to be more 
closely connected, Aquinas’s account of the proper order of caritas provides further 
reasons we have for loving such persons more than others.  
As indicated in the previous chapter, Aquinas indicates that we naturally love 
those closer to us with greater intensity, due to our relationship with the person. The 
order of caritas reflects our natural tendencies insofar as the affection of caritas, the 
inclination of grace, reflects these inclinations, in accordance with divine wisdom. But 
as indicated in the passage above (ST II-II 27.2), caritas requires that we have genuine 
affection for others. It is not merely a matter of goodwill, according to which we wish 
good to others their own sake, but it enables us (at least ideally) to have genuine 
affection for all persons thus transcending our natural inclinations.  
Still, Aquinas suggests that we have reasons to love with greater intensity those 
who are most closely related to us insofar as we have other forms of friendship 
toward such persons than the friendship based upon caritas. Such friendships are 
based upon the natural affection family members have toward one another, and the 
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shared interests and histories we have with particular persons. Aquinas holds that 
these natural ties and affections provide normative reasons for prioritizing our 
relationships and these are reflected in his account of the order of caritas. But the 
infused virtue of caritas enables us to truly love all persons based upon their intrinsic 
value as bearers of God’s image and by virtue of the actual or potential sharing 
together in everlasting happiness in God.  
Hence, the universalism of caritas does not exclude, but in fact entails loving 
certain persons more than others insofar as the grace by which we receive the virtue 
of caritas accords with our natural affections toward those who are most closely 
related to us. Aquinas’s account provides good reason to think that the universalism 
of the second commandment is consistent with his account of the order of caritas, 
such that the highest form of love is at once characterized by universalism and 
particularism. 
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